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BINARY BRIGHT-LINE DECISION MODELS FOR GOING CONCERN ASSESSMENT: 
ANALYSIS OF ANALYTICAL TOOLS FOR BANKRUPTCY PREDICTION  
CONSIDERING SENSITIVITY TO MATERIALITY THRESHOLDS 
 
In August, 2014, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued an update 
concerning the disclosure of uncertainties about an entity’s ability to continue as a going 
concern. The standard requires an entities management to evaluate whether there is 
substantial doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern and to provide 
related footnote disclosures in certain circumstances. One consequence of this 
regulation is the need for guidance for audit testing of management’s assessments in 
each phase of the audit.  
This research evaluates the usefulness of bankruptcy prediction models as 
analytical tools in the planning stage of an audit for going concern assertions and 
questions the use of precision as the only measure of a model’s effectiveness. I use 
simulation to manipulate the fundamental accounting data within five bankruptcy 
prediction models, explore failure rates in an environment with materiality concerns, and 
consider the total change in market value due to simulated errors. Given the inherent 
limitations of the information environment and/or current prediction models, my results 
indicate auditors’ current failure rates are not an indication of audit failure. The results 
suggest that bright-line testing using bankruptcy prediction models are sensitive to 
materiality and that the cost trade-off between Type I and Type II errors is an important 
indicator of model choice. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction and Motivation 
A company is a going concern if it has the resources needed to remain in 
existence long enough for a business to utilize all of its assets. Unless warned 
otherwise, financial statement users should be able to assume that an entity will not be 
compelled to liquidate its assets, end operations, or file for bankruptcy protection in the 
foreseeable future. If a company is likely to be unable to meet its obligations as they 
become due without extraordinary disposition of assets, debt restructuring, externally-
mandated operating revisions, or if management plans to liquidate or cease operations; 
then certain disclosures are required in current financial statements. Investment 
decisions about a company facing restructuring or bankruptcy differ greatly from 
decisions about companies that are going concerns. Providing useful information for 
economic decision-making is the primary objective of financial reporting; therefore, 
determining whether a company is a going concern is a fundamental judgment made by 
financial statement preparers.  
Different reporting standards exist for companies with substantial going concern 
uncertainty. The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles of the United States (GAAP) 
requires failing firms to include certain disclosures and potentially prepare their financial 
statements on a liquidation basis. For example, the balance sheet classif ication of 
assets and liabilities into current and non‐current categories is irrelevant in the 
liquidation basis. In addition, the periodicity and accrual concepts lose their 
relevance for distressed firms since the future economic benefit of assets is 
undefined and the realization of assets for their book value is uncertain for these 
firms and should be presented differently in financial statements prepared according 
to the liquidation basis.  
Financial Statement information is only valuable to accounting users if it is 
accurate, relevant, and reliable. When an independent auditor expresses an opinion 
on whether the financial statements are fairly presented in accordance with GAAP; 
financial statement users should be able to make decisions with a higher degree of 
confidence (Geiger, Raghunandan, & Rama, Recent changes in the association 
between bankruptcies and prior audit opinions, 2005). However, external audit 
reports only add credibility to financial statements if they consistently express proper 
opinions (Herbohn, 2007); therefore, a proper assessment of going concern is 
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critical to expressing an opinion on whether the financial statements are presented 
fairly (Carcello & Neal, 2003). A 2019 study used artificial intelligence techniques and 
found that the content of the auditors’ report contained as much bankruptcy prediction 
information as the entire financial report (Muñoz-Izquierdo, Camacho-Miñano, Segovia-
Vargas, & Pascual-Ezama, 2019). They found that the most significant variables to 
distinguish between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms were the audit opinion, the Matter 
sections disclosed in the audit reports, and the number of comments included in the 
Matter sections and qualification paragraphs. 
An audit opinion containing a going-concern qualification can have economic and 
legal consequences for both the audited company and the auditor. For example, audit 
firms face lawsuits if a client files bankruptcy without a warning from audit reports issued 
within a year of bankruptcy. On the other hand, if an audit firm issues a going-concern 
opinion and the client remains healthy, the auditor may lose future audit engagements 
with the client. Although audit fees may motivate auditors to side with clients; when there 
is a conflict of interests between financial statement users and those of the audit client, 
the auditor’s primary responsibility is to users.  
Prior research shows that auditors do not always arrive at an appropriate 
audit opinion (Herbohn, 2007). Historically, the majority of companies that file 
bankruptcy neither warned investors through going concern uncertainty disclosures nor 
prepared the prior financial statements under the liquidation basis of accounting. Given 
the high rate of errors in this judgment, research questions the information content of 
and investor’s reliance on audit opinions. For decades, improving the accuracy and 
timeliness of going concern uncertainty disclosures have been at the forefront of 
discussion within the auditing and accounting profession. 
Management and auditors can make two types of errors when issuing an 
assertion about going concern. Firstly, they could fail to issue a warning for a client that 
goes on to file bankruptcy in the subsequent two years. Secondly, they could modify the 
language of their report to issue a warning about substantial doubt for an entity to 
continue as a going concern and if that entity survived for two years, that would also be 
an error. Research generally classifies these errors as Type I and Type II. I define error 
types throughout the text, figures, and tables following the convention for this stream of 
literature. Figure 1 defines the relationship between audit opinions, bankruptcy, and error 
types used in this research. 
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No Bankruptcy in 
t+1 
Bankruptcy in t+1 
Unmodified 
Audit 
Opinion in t 
No Error:  
Viable Company 
Type I Error:  
Failed to Issue Warning 
for Subsequent 
Bankruptcy 
Modified 
Audit 
Opinion in t 
Type II Error:  
Warning Issued for 
Viable Company 
No Error:  
Warning Correctly 
Issued 
Figure 1: Type I and Type II Errors based on Historic Audit Opinions 
Due to the predictive nature of going concern assertions, the evaluation of both 
error types occurs in the subsequent period (t+1). A Type I error is made when a 
failing company is classified as non‐failing (e.g. the financial statements that precede 
a company’s bankruptcy, liquidation, or acquisition fail to include a warning). The 
economic and social costs for this type of error can be substantial to current 
investors, creditors, management, and the current audit firm. 
A Type II error exists if a modified audit opinion with going concern qualifications 
was issued for a company that remained viable and existed without bankruptcy a year 
after the report is issued. A Type II error is incorrectly classifying a healthy company 
as failed. These “false positives” exist when firms that do not subsequently fail after a 
going concern warning. 
I follow a large body of bankruptcy research in the classification of errors used in 
this research. This classification may seem to work counter to the convention of 
standard hypothesis testing where Type I errors are “false positives”. The confusion is 
derived from labeling companies that are failing as GCO companies. Accountants test 
the assumption that the company will continue to meet its financial obligations. The null 
hypothesis is that a company is not a going concern and is predicted to fail. Issuing a 
GCO warning is consistent with accepting the null and giving an opinion that a company 
is not a going concern. Therefor in a Type II Error, an auditor has incorrectly accepted 
the null that a company will not continue. In Type I Errors, an auditor has incorrectly 
rejected the null that a company will not continue. 
Taffler and Citron (1992) show that only 20 percent of UK failed companies 
received going concern qualifications before a bankruptcy filing. Vanstraelen (2003) 
found that fewer than 26 percent of bankrupt companies received audit qualifications 
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in Belgium. Van Peusem and Chan (2012) found that only 28 percent of failed 
companies received appropriate audit qualifications in New Zealand. Approximately 
half of the companies going bankrupt in the U.S. do not receive a prior GCO. Geiger and 
Rama (2006) find a Type I misclassification of 88 percent in the period between 1990 
and 2000. Myers, Schmidt and Wilkens (2014) find a Type I misclassification of 20 
percent in the period between 2000 and 2006 and suggest that increased scrutiny 
improved performance in large firms, but increased Type II errors in small firms.  
Research indicates that auditors are biased against issuing going concern 
qualifications. From the auditors' perspective, an incorrect audit opinion may result 
in expensive litigation (Hensher & Jones, 2007), loss of the audit fee, and damage 
to professional reputation  Kaplan and Williams (2013) find that (1) going concern 
reports deter lawsuits even when auditors are named in lawsuits, (2) an ex ante going 
concern report reduces the likelihood of large financial settlements. Some research 
suggests that issuing such a qualification creates a self-fulfilling prophecy (Louwers & 
Richard, 1999). Research indicates that Type I errors are costliest to auditors, where 
it would lead to the possible loss of audit fee, professional reputation and litigation 
from shareholders (Koh, 1991). Grant (1998) reports that approximately 9 percent of 
auditor revenues in the U.S.A. are spent on defending lawsuits. While this 
information may encourage auditors to issue more GCOs, auditors appear biased 
against reporting qualifications because investors react negatively (Menon & Williams, 
2010) and auditors may lose the client due to auditor switching. 
While individual studies vary, approximately two thirds of companies with a GCO 
do not subsequently go bankrupt. Lennox (1999) found that U.K. companies that do not 
go bankrupt in the year subsequent to a GCO is approximately 80 percent. Geiger, et al. 
(2005) found a Type II misclassification of 46 percent in the period between 2000 and 
2003. Geiger and Rama (2006) found a Type II misclassification of 51 percent in the 
period between 1990 and 2000. Feldmann and Read (2010) found a Type II 
misclassification of 41 percent in the period between 2000 and 2007. Myers et al. (2014) 
found a Type II misclassification of 32 percent in the period between 2000 and 2006. In 
Australia, the proportion of firms with GCOs that do not subsequently go bankrupt was 
88 percent, based on first-time GCOs (Carey, Geiger, & O'Connell, 2008). Evidence 
from Bellovary, Giacomino, & Akers (2006) suggests the issuance of an unqualified audit 
report for companies that have subsequently filed bankruptcy in the following year 
reduces the public’s reliance on audit opinions. Further evidence suggests the 
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prevalence of Type II errors during the 2008 financial crisis reduced investor confidence 
in accounting information and the function of audits.  
The costs associated with Type I and Type II errors are likely to be quite 
different. Prior research on bankruptcy prediction typically focus on (1) searches for 
statistical models to improve prediction accuracy—defined by precision in count and 
percentage or (2) probes for new bankruptcy predictors (financial ratios or other 
explanatory variables) (Mai, 2010). Research has not provided empirical evidence of 
the trade-off between models that minimize Type I error rates but increase Type II 
error rates. Currently, bankruptcy prediction studies assess a model’s ability to predict 
by counting total errors and generally correctly classify 95% or more of a sample into 
bankrupt and non-bankrupt categories. Most models identify fewer Type I errors and the 
number of Type II errors are consistently higher than the number of Type I errors. 
The popular press and investors react more strongly to Type I errors; however, Type 
II errors are not costless. Companies with going concern uncertainty disclosures 
face higher cost of debt and negative market reactions. Models proposed to reduce 
Type I errors may increase the number of Type II errors. The overall cost trade-off 
between Type I and Type II errors should be considered. 
The usefulness of a prediction model should consider the total cost trade-off 
of errors. However, prior research does not evaluate the models based on an 
estimation of these costs. Altman et al. (1977) use a lender’s decision model to 
argue that a lender could trade-off 35 Type II errors for each Type I error. However, 
this conclusion naïvely ignores loan size. The size of the loan and the relative cost 
of errors need to be included in the evaluation of bankruptcy prediction models 
(hereafter, BPMs). The purpose of this study is to capture the total market cost of 
bankruptcy errors and evaluate models based on the total cost, not the number of 
errors.  
Since the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued SAS 
No. 2 in 1974, auditors have struggled to assess a firm’s going concern status and to 
develop appropriate predictive models (Akers, Giacomino, & Bellovary, 2007). In a 1987 
study, auditors ranked 60 steps that comprised the audit by its level of difficulty. 
“Determining the validity of the going-concern assumption” ranked fourth in that study 
(Chow, McNamee, & Plumlee, 1987). A large body of research evaluates the accuracy 
of auditor’s going concern predictions and finds them lacking. Often, this research 
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evaluated the effectiveness of finance models by counting the number of errors as a tool 
for evaluation.  
Australian auditing standards recognize statistical models for assessing 
going concern uncertainty. The Australian standard on Analytical Procedures (AUS 
512) with reference to AUS 708 specifically highlights probit and discriminant 
analysis models. The1993 Proceedings of the Expectations Gap Roundtable in the 
United States called for continued research into the effectiveness of analytical 
procedures and identified the use of BPMs for assessing going concern uncertainty 
(Blocher & Loebbecke, 1993) American standards have historically not provided 
specific examples or guidance on the selection or timing of procedures using BPMs.  
Accounting Standards (SAS) No. 34 and SAS No. 59 did little to improve the 
accuracy of going concern opinion issuance (Raghunandan & Rama, 1995). Research 
identifies two problem areas for auditors when making a going concern judgment: 
auditors have difficulty (1) acquiring or selecting information and (2) processing or 
combining that information (Ho, 1994), (Rosman, Seol, & Biggs, 1999). Little guidance 
has been provided to assist auditors in making going concern judgments.  
The auditing standards list potential indicators of going concern uncertainty but 
remain silent about the use of statistical models in assessing going concern uncertainty. 
AU 341.06 includes four categories indicating going concern uncertainty: (1) negative 
trends, (2) other indications of possible financial difficulties, (3) internal matters, and (4) 
external matters. However, the auditing standard does not provide guidance as to how 
the auditor is to interpret and assess these events. Therefore, auditors must rely on their 
own judgment when assessing whether a firm’s going concern uncertainty meets the 
“substantial doubt” threshold for disclosure. Research suggests using a decision aid in 
the process of evaluating going concern uncertainty may be beneficial (Chung, et al., 
2012). Research has recognized the potential usefulness of objective statistical 
models for assessing going concern since the Cohen commission’s report (1978) on 
auditor responsibilities first suggested their use as a means toward reducing the 
expectations gap. In 1993, the AICPA the USA recognized the public’s demand for 
an early warning system of corporate failure (Loftus & Miller, 2000). 
Research shows objective statistical models outperform auditors in assessing 
company failure (Bellovary, Giacominio, & Akers, 2007). Although recent studies 
question the notion (Blay, Moon Jr., & Paterson, 2016), research often proxies the 
propensity to issue GCOs as an indicator of audit quality. A large body of research 
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explores substituting auditor judgment with established BPMs (BPM) as a means to 
improve audit quality. Such models can help auditors form more objective 
assessments of a clients’ going concern uncertainty and reduce the costs 
associated with Type I and Type II errors. 
Statistical BPMs provide an objective assessment of the probability of the 
client failing. If a model produces a score indicating a high probability of failu re, the 
auditor can classify the company as high-risk and plan to apply more rigorous audit 
procedures. Koh (2012) argue that accurate statistical models can help auditors 
identify high‐risk companies in the planning stages of the audit. Identifying high-risk 
companies at this stage helps the auditor plan specific audit procedures aimed at 
assessing the appropriateness of the going concern assumption. 
However, the audit environment presents a unique challenge due to the 
materiality assumption. The materiality assumption states that misstatements, 
including omissions, are material if they, individually or in aggregate, could 
reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of financial statement 
users. SAS No. 122 addresses the auditor’s responsibility to apply the concept of 
materiality in the planning stage of an audit. The auditor is charged to make 
judgments about the size of misstatements that will be considered material, thus 
providing a basis for determining the nature and extent of risk assessment 
procedures. The standard encourages the use of a percentage applied to a 
benchmark from the financial statements as a starting point for determining 
materiality (i.e. performance materiality threshold defined as a percentage of profit 
before tax from continuing operations). During the planning stage of an audit, 
unidentified misstatements may impact the accuracy of statistical models that rely 
on financial statement information. The question of how models perform in this 
environment has not been explored. This dissertation provides insight to the 
sensitivity of models to material misstatements present during the planning stage of 
the audit.    
The ability of corporate failure models to provide objective evidence for 
making a going concern judgment is important (Cormier, Magnan, & Morard, 2016). 
This objectivity in statistical evidence supports BPMs as a substitute for auditor 
judgment in court (Kuruppu, Laswad, & Oyelere, 2003). Therefore, practitioners can 
defend the reliance on an established BPM as an objective tool in court cases 
claiming audit failure. If an objective model minimizes the risk of both Type I and 
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Type II errors, this defense may help practitioners avoid litigation and minimize 
costs.  
When a company’s going concern status becomes uncertain in the period prior to 
filing bankruptcy, current regulation requires a going concern disclosure. Therefore, 
many going concern studies assess prediction accuracy using samples of bankrupt and 
non-bankrupt firms. Research related to BPMs often overlap going concern research. In 
this literature, bankruptcy is used as a proxy for corporate failure. Despite numerous 
studies in the area and regulatory updates, bankruptcy prediction rates have not 
substantially improved (Gissel, Giacomino, & Akers, 2007). Figure 2 lists the ten largest 
bankruptcies in United States history and highlights that only three firms issued timely 
going concern warnings. 
 
Rank 
by 
Size 
Company Name 
Date Bankruptcy 
Filed 
Assets 
Going 
Concern 
Opinion in 
Prior Year's 
Audit 
1 Lehman Brothers Holdings September 15, 2008 $691 billion No 
2 Washington Mutual August 26, 2008 $327.9 billion No 
3 WorldCom July 21, 2002 $103.9 billion No 
4 General Motors June 1, 2009 $91 billion Yes 
5 CIT November 1, 2009 $71 billion No 
6 Enron December 2, 2001 $65.5 billion No 
7 Conseco December 17, 2002 $61 billion No 
8 Energy Future Holdings April 29, 2014 $40.9 billion Yes 
9 MF Global Holdings  October 31, 2011 $40.5 billion No 
10 Chrysler April 30, 2009 $39 billion Yes 
Figure 2: 10 Largest Bankruptcies in US History 
During the 2008 financial crisis, regulators and investors questioned auditors for 
failing to issue GCOs in the period preceding many bankruptcies. Several hypotheses 
exist for why Type I errors persist: (1) the current bankruptcy models are not sensitive 
enough, (2) exogenous subsequent events prediction is beyond the scope of auditors’ 
duties, and (3) auditors purposely fail to issue a GCO due to client retention and 
because of the “self-fulfilling prophecy” stigma that follows a GCO. However, by not 
identifying an audit deficiency when Type I errors occurred during the financial crisis, the 
PCAOB seemed to indicate that Type I errors are beyond the scope of an auditor's 
responsibility (Gramling, Krishnon & Zhang, 2011).  
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In the years after the financial crisis, the failure of auditors to issue warnings prior 
to large bankruptcies continued and both the popular press and investors continued to 
look toward audit firms for justifications. For example, PwC did not include going concern 
uncertainty qualifications in the audit report for the financial statements prior to MF 
Global Holdings declaring bankruptcy in 2011. Forbes, American Banker, and Thomson 
Reuters all published articles discussing PwC’s culpability for investor losses due to MF 
Global’s bankruptcy. PwC ultimately settled lawsuits including a 2015 settlement of $65 
million to MF Global investors and an undisclosed amount to the bankruptcy 
administrator for MF Global.  
On August 27, 2014, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB or “the 
Board”) issued Accounting Standards Update No. 2014-2015 concerning the disclosure 
of uncertainties about an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. The standard 
requires an entity’s management to evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about 
the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern and to provide related footnote 
disclosures in certain circumstances. The standard clarifies the roles of management 
and auditors for going concern assertions: management will make an assertion 
concerning substantial doubt about an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern 
leaving auditors to evaluate the assertion.  
One consequence of this regulation is the need for guidance for audit testing of 
management’s assertions in each phase of the audit. My research evaluates the 
usefulness of BPMs as analytical tools in the planning stage of an audit for going 
concern assertions. I use simulation to manipulate the fundamental accounting data 
required by current BPMs, explore failure rates, and the associated net market costs of 
inaccurate going concern assessments. Given the inherent limitations of the information 
environment and/or current prediction models, my results indicate auditors’ current 
failure rates are not an indication of audit failure. The results suggest that bright-line 
testing using BPMs are sensitive to materiality and that the cost trade-off between Type I 
and Type II errors should be considered. 
Few studies address whether auditors were capable ex ante of predicting the 
Type I bankruptcies during the financial crisis. Given the information presented in the 
financial statements at the time of the audit and the inherent limitations of current BPMs 
(BPM), auditors may not have been capable of more accurate predictions. Before 
auditors can implement these models during the planning stage of the audit, several 
questions concerning their appropriateness and usefulness need to be addressed. 
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Specifically: (1) Are the models valid and sensitive enough to predict bankruptcies? (2) 
What thresholds for quantitative planning materiality are appropriate for distressed 
firms? (3) Are we asking auditors [and managers under IAS No. 1] to assume 
responsibility for an impossible mission? (4) What is the relative cost of Type I and Type 
II errors?   
 My research will address these questions using simulation methods. I will 
calculate error rates considering common materiality thresholds and estimate the market 
cost of each type of error. Ultimately, I will inform the discussion about the 
appropriateness of a BPM as an analytical tool within a risk-based audit setting.  
My research will contribute to the research in two important ways. First, my 
research investigates the role of quantitative planning materiality in going concern risk 
assessments and examines the sensitivity of BPMs to common thresholds for 
materiality. My analysis will be useful for regulators as they prepare audit guidance in 
response to proposed changes to GAAP. Second, my research investigates the relative 
costs of Type I and Type II errors in going concern opinions as predicted by these 
models. This information will also inform regulators about the potential costs and 
benefits of using BPMs as analytical tools in an audit.  
1.2 Current Regulation 
 The FASB issued Accounting Standards Update (ASU) “Disclosure of 
Uncertainties About an Entity's Ability to Continue as a Going Concern” No. 2014-15 in 
August 2014. The update includes amendments requiring management to disclose 
uncertainties about an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern and was effective 
for annual periods ending after December 15, 2016. Before the amendment, GAAP 
provided no guidance about management’s responsibility to evaluate substantial doubt 
for going concern or to provide footnote disclosures. The new standard applies to all 
entities and requires management (1) to evaluate whether it is probable that within one 
year after the date of the financial statements are issued for each reporting period 
(including interim periods) the entity will be unable to meet its obligation as they become 
due and (2) to disclose substantial doubt with an explicit statement or to explain how 
substantial doubt is alleviated as a result of management’s plans. 
 Statement of Auditing Standards No. 122 amended SAS No. 59. This standard’s 
update aligns GAAP with the current auditing standards: AU-C section 570 and AU-C 
section 930. AU-C section 570 requires auditors to assess the adequacy of footnote 
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disclosures when auditors conclude that substantial doubt for going concern exists. AU-
C 930 requires auditors to consider substantial doubt for going concern in interim 
financial reports. 
 The primary objective of Statement of Auditing Standards No. 132 (2017) is to 
address the provisions of ASU No. 2014-15. Statistical models are often used during the 
planning stage of an audit. Horizontal and vertical analysis using certain ratios is 
common and encouraged in audit standards. Research supports the use of analytical 
procedures to provide quantitative audit evidence and support audit judgment through 
decision aids.  
1.3  Overview of Simulations and Findings 
In this research, I use 10 BPM specifications as bright-line tests to predict 
bankruptcy: (1) Altman’s Z-Score with 1.8 score cut-off (1968), (2) Altman’s Z-Score 
(1968) with a calculated 50% probability cut-off, (3) Altman’s Z-Score (1993), (4) 
Hillegeist et al.’s re-estimation of Altman’s Z-Score (2004), (5) Ohlson’s O-Score(1980), 
(6) Hillegeist et al.’s re-estimation of Ohlson’s O-Score (2004), (7) Shumway’s Hazard 
model at 50% probability (2001), (8) Shumway’s Hazard model at 70% probability, (9) 
Merton’s KMV at 50% probability (Bharath & Shumway, 2008) and (9) Merton’s KMV at 
70% probability. I compare the count and percentages of estimated errors to the errors 
generated from auditor’s historic going concern opinions. I found that bright-line tests 
derived from Altman’s Z-Score and Merton’s KMV outperformed auditor’s judgment in 
limiting the count and percentage of Type I errors and a bright-line test derived from 
Shumway’s Hazard model outperformed auditors’ judgment in limiting the count and 
percentage of Type II errors. Only the Shumway Hazard model resulted in fewer total 
errors than auditors’ GCO decisions in any sample. 
I propose the use of these models in the planning stage of an audit where risk 
assessments and testing are subject to materiality thresholds. Applying the models in 
this unique setting warrants exploration into the sensitivity of the models to materiality 
thresholds. I investigated the performance of each model under simulated conditions for 
different definitions of planning materiality thresholds and misstatement classifications. I 
found that all BMP models were sensitive to misstatements at the level of planning 
materiality to varying degrees. Consistent with research, my findings suggest that 
planning materiality thresholds should be lower than “rules-of-thumb” for firms with low 
or negative income.  
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Finally, I examine the effectiveness of auditor judgment and bright-line testing 
using BMPs based on a naïve estimate of total market cost. By estimating the percent 
change in share price by error type for firms in the historic condition and applying it to 
the classifications generated by bright-line testing, I quantify an estimate of total market 
cost for errors predicted by each bright-line test. I find that auditor judgment, the 2004 
Altman Z-Score, and the Shumway model outperform other models when evaluated 
based on this cost trade-off assumption. The evaluation based on market cost is 
different than a counting of errors approach most often used to support the use of a 
particular model. 
In this dissertation, I provide empirical evidence that while BMPs may be useful 
in the planning stage of an audit, measuring the effectiveness of a particular model 
based on precision (count and percentage) does not capture the whole story. I provide 
evidence of the appropriateness of common materiality thresholds when BPMs are used 
as bright-line tests for analytical procedures during the planning stage of an audit. Using 
a naïve model for estimating enterprise value, I measure the market cost trade-off 
between Type I and Type II errors using changes in cumulative abnormal returns. My 
study provides evidence that using precision to evaluate Type I and Type II accuracy 
rather than auditor judgment would result in greater overall negative market reactions. 
Overall, this research supports the value of auditor judgment and decision making in 
evaluation going concern uncertainty over reliance on several financial models.  
1.4 Organization 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a 
review of the research related to the regulation history, reporting trends, bankruptcy 
prediction in audit testing, and the evolution of BPMs. Chapter 3 develops the 
hypotheses and motivation of this study. Chapter 4 addresses the research design and 
methodology. Chapter 5 provides the results and statistical analyses. Chapter 6 
discusses the results, limitations, and concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1  Regulation Stakeholders 
The FASB is not the only regulatory body that is taking interest in going concern 
standards. The International Accounting Standards Board and Auditing Standards Board 
have a direct interest in the FASB project.  
The FASB and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have been 
working closely on a project to converge the accounting standards in the US with those 
practiced globally. The IASB has a fulltime liaison who monitors the FASB’s work and 
the FASB also serves within the IASB and monitors their discussions and decisions. IAS 
1 was originally issued in 1997 and has seen several updates since that time. Currently, 
IAS 1 (25) specifies for management to make a going concern assessment while 
preparing the financial statements. The IFRS Interpretations Committee was called to 
provide more guidance about the timing of and purpose of going concern uncertainty 
disclosures and monitor FASB’s work as they address these concerns (IFRS 
Interpretations Committee, 2013). 
The US Auditing Standards Board’s interest in changes to GAAP is obvious. AU 
Section 341 did not assume that management is responsible for going concern 
assertions and requires auditors to make predictive assessments for the following twelve 
months. Despite this regulation, the PCAOB did not seem to hold auditors responsible 
when going concern assertions turn out to be incorrect. In ex post reviews of audits that 
fail to accurately predict and warn investors of bankruptcies, the PCAOB has not issued 
deficiencies (Gramling, Krishnan, & Zhang, 2011). AU-C Section 570 reaffirmed that it 
was “the auditor’s responsibility to evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about the 
entity’s ability to continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time” (AICPA, 
2017). 
At a round table at the Center for Audit Quality’s Symposium (2012), breakout 
groups questioned the complexity of disclosures and the overlapping information 
between the MD&A section and the footnotes. The group concluded that earlier 
qualitative disclosure by management with specific action plans would mitigate the need 
and usefulness of going concern opinions issued by the auditor. The International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) issued International Standard on 
Auditing (ISA) 570, “Going Concern,” which established the requirement and guidance 
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for auditors to consider the appropriateness of management’s use of the going concern 
assumption and auditor reporting.  
While ASU 2014-15 requires managers to determine whether “substantial doubt” 
exists concerning a company’s ability to continue as a going concern, research 
questions whether managers are capable of accurately predicting uncertainty 12-months 
and 24-months beyond the financial statement date given the information available. 
What tools, if any, can be identified to assisted management in making these assertions 
and auditors in assessing management’s assertions? 
2.2  Regulation History 
Before the most recent update, the regulation for GCOs was provided in SAS No. 
59 with some clarity offered by subsequent amendments. U.S. GAAP required 
companies to prepare financial statements on a going-concern basis unless (a) a 
liquidation plan had been approved by the owners or (b) the plan was being imposed by 
other forces and it was very unlikely that the entity would continue as a going concern. 
There was considerable debate surrounding liquidation versus going concern 
presentation of the financial statements, including a call for both presentations for certain 
distressed firms. However, there was no specific guidance in U.S. GAAP about (1) who 
was responsible for making going concern assertions, (2) management’s role in 
assessing, or (3) disclosing going concern uncertainties or the timing, nature, and extent 
of these disclosures. Until the August 2014 Accounting Standards Update, all of the 
regulation and guidance for making these assertions came from the generally accepted 
audition standards (GAAS).  
Since the AICPA first issued SAS No. 2 in 1974, auditors have struggled to 
assess a firm’s going concern status and to develop appropriate predictive models 
(Akers, Giacomino, & Bellovary, 2007). SAS No. 2 was the first standard to specifically 
address the circumstance necessary for a modified “subject to” opinion. When SAS No. 
34 replaced SAS No. 2, it provided guidelines for auditors to follow when assessing 
going concern uncertainty, but fell short of requiring the assessments. To address the 
“expectation gap” between the role of auditors and the perception of that role, SAS No. 
59 made going concern assessments a requirement for auditors but left many thresholds 
and definitions up to professional judgment. Even though the regulation was tightening 
and clarifying the role and expectations of auditors, SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59 did little 
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to improve the usefulness or accuracy of going concern opinion issuance  (Carcello, 
Hermanson, & Huss, 1995).  
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 59 (SAS 59), The Auditor's Consideration 
of an Entity's Ability to Continue as a Going Concern, required auditors to evaluate 
whether “substantial doubt” exists about an audit client's ability to continue as a going 
concern. The first stage in making this going concern evaluation required consideration 
of whether the results of audit procedures performed related to the various audit 
objectives identify existing conditions and events that indicate “substantial doubt” about 
the client's ability to continue as a going concern.  
Under this standard, when auditors believed that “substantial doubt” existed, they 
considered management's plans for dealing with the effects of those conditions and 
events, and then concluded if “substantial doubt” remains. However, regulation fails to 
provide an exact definition of what constitutes “substantial doubt”. Due to past ambiguity 
of the definition of “substantial doubt,” much research investigated this threshold in 
practice. Boritz (1991) concluded that a 50 to 70 percent likelihood would represent 
substantial doubt. Under SAS 59, if the threshold for “substantial doubt” was met, the 
auditors were required to include an explanatory paragraph in their report to reflect this 
uncertainty. For example, if a client company failed to meet a debt covenant but 
presented evidence that the financial institution waved the requirement and did not 
consider the client to be in default, then the auditors may choose to issue a modified 
opinion with certain going concern language instead of a GCO. 
In June 2009, General Motors filed the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history 
preceded by a going concern warning. Deloitte & Touch LLP provide an example of the 
language used in warnings issued under SAS 59 regulations. On February 17, 2009, 
General Motors filed a “Viability Plan” detailing management’s intention to continue 
operating as a going concern after requesting U.S. Government funding totaling $22.5 
billion to cover baseline liquidity requests. Subsequent to that filing, Deloitte & Touche 
LLP’s audit report dated March 4, 2009 included the following explanatory paragraph 
expressing substantial doubt about General Motor’s ability to continue as a going 
concern: 
The accompanying consolidated financial statements for the year ended 
December 31, 2008, have been prepared assuming that the Corporation will 
continue as a going concern. As discussed in Note 2 to the consolidated financial 
statements, the Corporation’s recurring losses from operations, stockholders’ 
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deficit, and inability to generate sufficient cash flow to meet its obligations and 
sustain its operations raise substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a 
going concern. Management’s plans concerning these matters are also 
discussed in Note 2 to the consolidated financial statements. The consolidated 
financial statements do not include any adjustments that might result from the 
outcome of this uncertainty. (138) 
 
The ambiguous language in standards such as AU section 341 created problems 
for litigation. In an attempt to clarify the standards, the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) 
issued Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 126, The Auditor's Consideration of 
an Entity's Ability to Continue as a Going Concern (Redrafted), to supersede SAS No. 
59, The Auditor's Consideration of an Entity's Ability to Continue as a Going Concern, as 
amended. However, SAS No. 126 did not significantly change or expand SAS No. 59 
and it did not converge with the IAASB’s international auditing standard on going 
concern.  
In 2004, Section-104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 required audit firms 
registered with the PCAOB to be assessed on their compliance with professional 
standards. The publicly available reports from these assessments include identified audit 
deficiencies. Gramling, Krishnan, and Zhang (2011) studied the audit deficiencies 
identified during PCAOB Section 104 inspections between 2004 and 2006. The stud 
indicated no audit deficiencies due to the failure to issue a going concern opinion for 
firms that subsequently filed bankruptcy. Their analysis did not demonstrate a significant 
change in the likelihood of issuing a going concern or in Type I and Type II errors. By not 
issuing deficiencies or requiring additional procedures for evaluating the likelihood of 
bankruptcy, the PCAOB appear to support the adequacy of audit methods for evaluating 
going concern assertions.  
Since 1973, the FASB has been responsible for issuing standards of financial 
accounting and reporting for the private sector. Regulators could not agree who was 
primarily responsible for assessing going concern and issuing opinions: management or 
external auditors. Throughout this regulatory history, the FASB has remained silent 
about Going Concern reporting and management has never been required to make a 
going concern prediction or assertion. As the US GAAP convergence process 
proceeded, demand for breaking that silence to conform to the IAS 1 (25) grew.  
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Respondents to FASB’s 2008 exposure draft for regulation concerning GCOs 
expressed concerns over ambiguous language and time horizons as well as the failure 
of the standard to incorporate current audit research concerning mitigating factors or 
adequately explain how to prepare the financial statements under the liquidation basis. 
In 2010 the Board evaluated the issues brought forth in the 2008 exposure draft and 
modified the project’s objectives. In May 2012, the Board began the process of providing 
guidance to management for assessing going concern uncertainty and making required 
disclosing. Through the project it is expected that GAAP will provide guidance that is 
more in line with international standards. IAS 1 (25) currently requires managers to 
assess going concern during the preparation of the financial statements. IAS 570 
requires auditors to consider the appropriateness of management’s going concern 
assumption in both the planning and performing stages of the audit. 
On June 26, 2013, the FASB issued an exposure draft for “Presentation of 
Financial Statements (Topic 205): Disclosure of Uncertainties about an Entity’s Going 
Concern Presumption” (2013) requiring management to perform going concern 
assessments and provide related footnote disclosures in certain circumstances. In an 
attempt to address some of the concerns from the 2008 Exposure Draft, the new draft 
carefully defined “substantial doubt” and “probable” and identifies specific time horizons. 
Two guidelines for disclosing uncertainties were identified according to their time 
horizon-time: (1) that it is more likely than not that the entity will be unable to meet its 
obligations within 12-months after the financial statement date and (2) it is known or 
probable that the entity will be unable to meets its obligations within 24-months after the 
financial statement date. In addition, the draft provided seven areas that should be 
accessed: (1) sources of liquidity, (2) operating funds, (3) conditional and unconditional 
obligations, (4) adverse conditions and events, (5) mitigating conditions, and (6) the 
predicted effects of management’s plans. 
 On August 27, 2014, the FASB issued Accounting Standards Update No. 2014-
15, Presentation of Financial Statements – Going Concern (Subtopic 205-40): 
Disclosures of Uncertainties about an Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern 
(the Update). The Update defined managements’ responsibility to evaluate whether 
there is “substantial doubt” about an organization’s ability to continue as a going concern 
and to provide related footnote disclosures. The new standard represents both a move 
toward convergence with IAS No. 1 (25) and a change in the role of auditors concerning 
going concern opinions. It also defines the timing and content of disclosures. It applies to 
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all companies and not-for profit organizations with an annual period ending after 
December 15, 2016.  
In periods after 2016, issuing going concern warnings remains a problem even 
for the largest bankruptcy cases. For example, in its notes to financial statements filed 
April 12, 2017, Toy’s “R” Us included the following going concern disclosure in which it 
failed to issue a warning for the liquidation that occurred eleven months later: 
 
In August 2014, the FASB issued ASU No. 2014-15, “Presentation of 
Financial Statements-Going Concern (Subtopic 205-40): Disclosure of 
Uncertainties about an Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern” (“ASU 
2014-15”). ASU 2014-15 is intended to define management’s responsibility to 
evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about an organization’s ability to 
continue as a going concern and to provide related footnote disclosures, if 
substantial doubt exists. The amendments in this ASU are effective for reporting 
periods ending after December 15, 2016, with early adoption permitted. The 
Company adopted the amendments of ASU 2014-15 as of January 28, 2017. 
The adoption did not have an impact on our Consolidated Financial Statements. 
(2017) 
 
In January 2015, the IAASB revised ISA 570 to expand the descriptions of 
auditors’ and managements’ roles and responsibilities regarding going concern for 
annual periods ending after December 15, 2016. 
 In response, in February 2017, the ASB issued SAS No. 132, The Auditor’s 
Consideration of an Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern to supersede SAS 
No. 126. SAS No 132 clarifies the auditor’s objectives and provides guidance related to 
audit scope, timing, and explanatory language within the audit report. This standard 
takes effect beginning after fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2017. The 
standard requires auditors to make determinations and conclusions based on audit 
evidence on whether substantial doubt exists about an entity’s ability to continue as a 
going concern for a reasonable amount of time. It also includes a list of examples of 
adverse conditions and events that may raise substantial doubt about an entity’s ability 
to continue as a going concern. That list includes “negative financial trends,” “other 
indicators of possible financial difficulties,” and other adverse key financial and liquidity 
ratios. Financial and accounting researchers have long studied BPMs and other 
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“negative financial trends” that are more predictive than simple trends in ratios. Because 
these models are widely accepted and supported publicly in research, the results from 
these models may better fulfill the evidence requirements of SAS No. 132 than simple 
ratios.  
2.3 Reporting Trends 
Because auditors are charged to evaluate management’s assertion for a 
business’ likelihood of being able to meet future obligation; investors, creditors, 
shareholders, and other financial statement users expect to be warned by a going 
concern disclosure of an impending bankruptcy. Audit Analytics reported that between 
14.1% and 21.1% of audit opinions included going concern uncertainty language each 
year between 2000 and 2016 (Whalen, Esq. & McKeon, 2018), yet investors are only 
warned about 43% of bankruptcies through GCO. Compared to the accuracy of auditors’ 
predictions, a case for removing auditor judgment and defaulting to BPM in making 
GCOs may exist.  
In response to the collapses of Carillion and BHS, the British Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) issued a statement that existing going concern requirements need to be 
strengthen. On March 4, 2019 the FRC unveiled proposals to make auditors apply more 
robust checks and through tests when reviewing whether a company was likely to 
continue as a going concern and to include an explanation for how they came to their 
conclusion (Financial Reporting Council, 2019). The proposed changes to the 
International Auditing Standard on Auditing (UK) 570 was available for comments as an 
exposure draft until June 14, 2019. The draft did not include specific guidelines for 
identifying appropriate testing. At the time of this defense, deliberations on the proposal 
were ongoing.   
In their review of going concern prediction studies, Gissel, Giacomino and Akers 
(2007) report the model accuracy of 27 BPMs. Overall, they found that predictive abilities 
from multiple discriminate analysis models achieved 78-94% accuracy, logit models 
achieved 60-100% accuracy, probit models achieved 83-86% accuracy, and neural 
network models achieved 77-92% accuracy. According to their research “over time, the 
range of model accuracies remained consistent.” However, accuracy rates fail to 
consider the trade-off of costs between both types of errors. While auditor judgment 
seems less likely to predict a subsequent bankruptcy, they are also less likely to issue a 
qualified opinion for a non-bankrupt firm.  
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The Gissel et. al (2007) study also notes that adding explanatory variables did 
not necessarily improve accuracy. This seems to support the debate that academic 
conclusions based solely on statistical tests may include models that suffer from 
overfitting. In the 2019 edition of The American Statistician, 43 articles are presented 
that encourage researchers to consider the reliance on p-values for drawing conclusions 
about associations. 
Although other forms of liquidation risk exist, bankruptcy is a common proxy 
throughout the research for “business failure” or identification as a “non-going-concern”. 
It is important to note that going-concern assessments are a prediction about an 
uncertain future and not all conditions or circumstances are knowable by the auditors at 
the financial statement date. Therefore, a Type I or Type II error does not necessarily 
indicate an audit failure. The PCAOB does not routinely issue audit deficiencies based 
on the failure of an audit firm to issue a GCO for a company that subsequently filed for 
bankruptcy1. Current auditing standards prevent auditors from considering 
circumstances, events, and risks that have not yet occurred, thus constraining an 
auditor’s ability to issue a GCO due to worsening market conditions.  
The Cohen Commission (1978) and other research (Altman, 1993; Asare, 1990; 
Louwers & Richard, 1999; Loftus and Miller, 2000) suggest that auditors' opinions were 
inferior indicators of bankruptcy relative to the predictions of statistical models. However, 
Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler (1994) reexamined the question and found that 
auditors are not substantially worse. They found two research design choices to be 
particularly important: partitioning the sample into stressed and non-stressed 
observations and adjusting the forecast errors to reflect the proportion of bankrupt firms’ 
auditors face. One implication of my research is to provide information about the efficacy 
of using BPMs as an analytical review tool. 
My research may have further implications for documenting objective 
measure criteria used during ligation. In the final stages of the audit, BPMs may 
verify that a client’s overall going concern assessment is appropriate (Chen & 
Church, 1996). In the event that an adverse or qualified opinion is rendered, an 
objective statistical model can more readily help the auditor in justifying the decision 
                                                          
1 Although PCAOB inspection reports do not find material weaknesses for Type I failures, 
research suggests that PCAOB inspections are associated with GCO rates. Audit firms 
with recent audit deficiencies are more likely to issue a GCO for their clients (Gramling, 
Krishnan, & Zhang, 2011).  
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to interested parties (Chen and Church, 1992) and avoid litigation (Kaplan & 
Williams, 2013). 
2.4 Decision Aids 
Statistical BPMs consistently outperform auditors’ going concern judgment in 
discriminating between bankrupt and non‐bankrupt companies. Due to the perceived 
expectations gap between auditors and financial statement users, statistical models 
may assist auditors in making more accurate going concern judgments if used as a 
decision aid during audit planning.  
The Audit Standards Board issued SAS No. 56 in 1988. The standard formally 
required auditors to use analytical procedures in all financial audits. The purpose of 
analytical procedures varies across different phases of the audit (i.e. planning phase, 
testing phase, and completion phase). In the planning phase, analytical procedures are 
employed as attention–directing devices to inform the nature, timing, and extent of 
substantive procedures performed in the testing phase. Simple quantitative techniques 
involving ratio and trend analysis were the most commonly used analytical procedures 
(Putra, 2010). Researchers have suggested analytical procedures be used in the 
planning phase of going concern assessments (Koskivaara, 2004). Auditing standards 
are silent about the use of specific statistical models in assessing going concern 
uncertainty. AU 341.06 includes four categories of events that may indicate substantial 
doubt about the continuation as a going concern: (1) negative trends, (2) other 
indications of possible financial difficulties, (3) internal matters, and (4) external matters. 
Nevertheless, the auditing standard is unclear as to how the auditor is to interpret and 
assess these events. 
Accounting practitioners and researchers recognize the need for reliable audit 
tools to assist auditors in evaluating the going concern assertion. Kuruppu et. al. (2012) 
surveyed 152 New Zealand auditors and found that auditors perceive corporate failure 
models as beneficial in the planning stage of an audit. They concluded that these 
models could help identify high-risk clients and alert them to expand the scope of testing. 
In order to evaluate the existence of substantial doubt a company will continue as a 
going-concern, the auditor must know what information to acquire as well as how to 
combine that information. The auditor’s going concern assessment is a complex process 
that can benefit from the use of a decision aid (Putra, 2010).  
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The use of decision aids has many uses improving judgments and decision 
making. Bonner, Libby and Nelson (1996) suggest that decision aids could help auditors 
weight causal explanations relevant to determining a client’s ability to continue as a 
going concern. Discriminate analysis common in BPMs includes a mechanical weighting 
of identified variables. However, Davis (1998) finds that decision makers prefer 
descriptive phrases over mechanical aggregation aids. Davis notes that decision makers 
follow aid recommendations to a greater extent when aid type matches their personal 
style. Analytical individuals rely more heavily on quantitative information and concrete 
data (Davis & Elnicki, 1984). It follows that the use of a quantitative models (such as 
BPMs) as part of the analytical procedures performed during an audit may match the 
analytical decision aid with the task and personal style of auditors. 
2.5 Materiality in Audit Testing 
Furthermore, SAS No. 122 (AU-C Section 320) provides guidance for auditor’s 
responsibility to apply the concept of materiality in planning and performing and audit of 
financial statements. Auditing materiality provides a framework for the scope of the audit 
and risk assessment--how much the auditor needs to look for misstatements. AU-C 
Section 320 discusses materiality determinations and “tolerable misstatement.” Per the 
standards, “performance materiality” should be applied to various classes of 
transactions, account balances, or disclosures based on the auditor’s 
judgment. “Performance materiality” is defined in AU-C Section 320 as an amount set by 
the auditor “to reduce to an appropriately low level the probability that the aggregate of 
uncorrected and undetected misstatements exceeds materiality for the financial 
statements as a whole.” Performance materiality is used in planning to (1) determine the 
scope of the audit (e.g. which financial statement areas and accounts the auditor will 
focus their attention on); (2) calculate statistical sample sizes; (3) determine whether 
analytical review variances should be investigated; and (4) assess the risk of material 
misstatement. The auditing standards preclude the sole use of analytical procedures as 
a source of audit evidence to support a significant assertion unless supported by tests of 
details or controls.  
AU-C Section 320 describe a basis for setting a “benchmark” to determine 
planning materiality from among key financial statement items or other metrics. Auditor 
judgment is required in the selection of an appropriate benchmark. Certain benchmarks 
based on accounting measures may be too volatile, thus creating impractical audit scope 
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and sample sizes. Benchmarks can also create comparability issues when evaluating 
year-to-year waived adjustments. Levy & Jacoby recommend that auditors use relatively 
stable benchmarks for determining planning materiality, such as the larger of assets or 
revenues, or a measure of entity value (2016).  
Research consistently finds that large accounting firms have higher materiality 
thresholds than smaller firms and are less likely to issue going-concern qualifications 
(Eilifsen & Messier Jr, 2015). Research examining auditors’ materiality judgments on 
financial ratios such as the ratio of misstatement to current net income, inventory write-
downs, and changes in accounting principles find that an item’s percentage effect on 
income is the single most important factor in materiality judgments (Chewning, Pany, & 
Wheeler, 1989). Results also indicate large national CPA firms have larger materiality 
thresholds than smaller firms (Messier, Jr., 1983). Ryu and Roh (2007) find that firms 
defining higher materiality thresholds were less likely to issue going-concern opinions to 
their clients with financial problems. We would expect larger firms to have higher rates of 
bankruptcy prediction error; however, Geiger and Rama (2006) investigated both types 
of errors for Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms and found that both Type I and II error 
rates for Big Four audit firms are significantly lower than the error rates for non-Big Four 
firms.  
Eilfesen and Messier (2015) examine the proprietary materiality guidance of the 
eight largest U.S. accounting firms and find a high level of consistence across firms in 
terms of quantitative benchmarks. They identify ten accounting measures used for 
benchmarking by the largest eight firms. They report that percentages from these 
fundamental accounting measurements are applied to determine overall materiality for 
determining tolerable misstatement. Their results suggest that small firms set a lower 
quantitative materiality threshold; however, that doesn’t translate into lower error rates. 
Because the levels of materiality set by large national CPA firms in prior research did not 
seem to negatively impact error rates, I use Table 3: Percentages Used for Setting 
Quantitative Benchmarks from their research to select the materiality benchmarks used 
in the simulations in this dissertation.  
2.6 BPMs in Audit Testing 
Auditing standards do not require an auditor to design specific audit procedures 
to identify conditions and events that might raise questions about the validity of the 
going-concern assumption. SAS No 132 requires auditors consider key financial ratios 
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and adverse financial trends. In addition, auditors are required to consider whether 
certain conditions or events discovered during the course of the audit contradict the 
going-concern assumption. Such evidence would include information about the 
company’s ability to meet its maturing obligations without selling operating assets, 
restructuring debt, revising operations based on outside pressures, or similar strategies.  
SAS No. 56 did not mandate specific analytical procedures for auditors to use in 
their evaluation of the going concern issue; however, research often associates BPMs 
with this evaluation (Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler 1994; Blocher and Loebbecke 
1993; and Altman 1993).  
SAS No. 59 does not specify audit procedures that auditors should use to 
evaluate the going concern assumption. However, the standard highlights analytical 
procedures as an example of audit procedures that may identify conditions that would 
create doubt about a company’s ability to continue as a going concern. Adding a 
requirement for BPMs to be performed as part of the analytical procedures of all audits 
may prove useful. Research suggests, however, that auditors do not apply BPMs as part 
of the analytical procedures in the planning or final stages of an audit even when the use 
of analytical procedures is prescribed by the standards of that country2 (Vida & 
Roghayyeh, 2011).  
Similarly, SAS No. 132 provides examples of risk assessment procedures and 
related activities, but falls short of recommending any specific tests, ratios, or models to 
evaluate liquidity or financial distress. The standard directs auditors to base their risk 
assessments on negative financial trends including “other adverse key financial ratios.” I 
argue that existing BPMs would provide a stronger basis of risk assessment than 
general ratio analysis. 
The Proceedings of the Expectations Gap Roundtable called for continued 
research on the effectiveness of analytical procedures in various contexts, including the 
going concern evaluation (Blocher & Loebbecke, 1993). The Cohen Commission 
indicated that statistical failure models might be considered by auditors in their overall 
assessments of companies (Cohen, 1978). 
BPMs may alert auditors to certain problems that are difficult to detect with 
traditional auditing procedures. Altman and McGough (1974) suggested that BPMs may 
help auditors’ judge companies’ abilities to continue as a going concern by alerting 
                                                          
2 Data from a survey of 153 Iranian auditors. Regulatory differences may impact the implementation of 
similar standards within the United States.  
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auditors to certain problems that may be difficult to detect using traditional auditing 
procedures. Other early research presented evidence that BPMs may be useful to 
auditors in making going concern judgments (Lasalle, Anandrarajan, & Kleinmann, 1996) 
(Mutchler, Hopwood, & McKeown, 1997). If models are useful audit tools for evaluating a 
firm’s going concern potential, then they may be helpful for making GCO assessments, 
particularly as analytical procedures during the require risk assessment stage of the 
audit.  
2.7 Bankruptcy Prediction Models 
Academic researchers and financial institutions have long used BPMs to assess 
financial distress. As a suggestion for future research, Beaver (1966) introduced the 
possibility that considering multiple ratios simultaneously might have higher 
predictive value than a single ratio. From there, Altman’s (1968) study identified five 
financial ratios out of 22 studied to form a score from discriminate analysis using 
data from 33 industrial firms. Sinkey’s (1975) study examined 110 banks using a 
matched sample to identify five significant indicators out of over 100 studied. 
Trieschmann and Pinches’ (1974) model classifies insurance firms as distressed or 
solvent using a combination of six variables. This study advanced the models by 
including a systematic factor analysis to evaluate the usefulness of the proposed 
ratios. 
The seminal work by Altman (1968) and McGough (1974) first suggested the 
usefulness of BPMs for assessing company going concern status. They compared 
their model’s 82-percent accuracy in predicting bankruptcy filings to auditors’ going 
concern assessment of 46-percent accuracy. These results gave rise to a stream of 
research in which researchers developed BPMs to predict company failure and 
examined the usefulness of a model for assessing going concern by comparing the 
accuracy of developed models to auditors’ going concern qualifications issued prior 
to bankruptcy. Chen and Shimerda (1981) reviewed 27 early discriminate analysis 
studies from 1932 to 1975 and tabulated which of 66 distinct financial ratios were 
mentioned or found to be useful for predicting distress in each study. Since these 
seminal studies, numerous models and modifications to models have been proposed 
and tested. The research concerning BPMs is vast and replete with examples of models 
being evaluated by count and percentage accuracy. Bellovary et al. (2007) reviewed 165 
BPM journal articles published between 1930 and 2007 and determined that multivariate 
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discriminate analysis and neural networks offer the most promise. Altman et al. (2014) 
finds over thirty publications between 2000 and 2014 using and expanding upon the Z-
Score model alone. Alaka (2018) reviewed 49 BPM journal articles published between 
2010 and 2015 and classified BPMs into eight categories: multiple discriminate analysis, 
logistic regression, artificial neutral network, support vector machines, rough sets, case-
based reasoning, decision tree and genetic algorithm. Emerging models using artificial 
intelligence are criticized for operating in a “black box” and lacking explanations for 
predictions. They concluded that bankruptcy prediction should be informed by an 
integration of tools (Alaka, 2018).  
Mulcher (1985), Hopwood, McKeown, & Mutchler (1994), Cormier et al. 
(2016), and Lennox (1999) measured the number of errors identified by various 
financial models and found the models to be more accurate than auditors’ prior audit 
opinions. This evidence in aggregate suggests that financial models could assist 
auditors in forming more accurate going concern judgments. Applying these models 
could assist the accounting profession to reduce the public’s expectation gap of the 
profession, and to increase the public’s confidence in the audit function. 
Lennox (1999) went further to study whether stakeholders should rely on five 
BPMs for decision-making rather than auditor issued GCOs: (1) Altman’s Z-Score 
(1968), (2) Merton’s model (1974) (3) Ohlson’s O-Score (1980), (4) Shumway’s distance 
to default model (2001), and (5) Campbell et al.’s CHS Model (2008). Default prediction 
models and the auditors’ institutional environment have evolved since the 1990’s, 
however research continues to question the accuracy of GCOs as predictors of default. 
BPMs cannot incorporate auditors’ professional judgment and access to private 
information, so a large body of research focuses on the value and quality of this 
incremental information in issuing GCOs. Recently, a study (Gutierrez, Krupa, Minutti-
Meza, & Vulcheva, 2016) combining GCOs and default probability models resulted in 
small, although statistically significant, incremental predictive accuracy, suggesting that 
the incorporation of a statistical model in the GCO assessment may be beneficial. They 
also compare GCOs against changes in public credit ratings and find that GCOs have 
statistically greater predictive power, which suggest that auditors compound changes in 
credit ratings in their GCO assessment. A 2017 study found that private information, 
including business strategy, influenced the decision of auditors to issue GCOs. 
Specifically, they found that auditors commit more Type II errors when a troubled firm 
exhibits a prospector business strategy (Chen, Eshleman, & Soileau, 2017). 
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For the purpose of scope and clarity, this research examines four seminal 
models categorizing trends in research: discriminate analysis, logistical regression, 
hazard model, and distance to default. By evaluating these four seminal models, this 
research limits the scope while providing insight into four classifications of models from 
the extant literature.  
Zmijewski (1984), Ohlson (1980), and Altman (1968) developed early BPMs. 
Ohlson and Altman employed multiple discriminate analysis (MDA). Discriminate 
analysis models can be used as a decision aid to mechanically combine several 
variables into a single measure, which is then used to classify a company as either 
bankrupt or non-bankrupt. Many of the BPMs using MDA, however, rely heavily on 
assumptions that do not hold in going-concern reporting. Logit uses maximum likelihood 
estimation that does not impose the same statistical requirements on the distributional 
properties of the predictors. Ohlson’s (1980) and Shumay’s (1981) model incorporated a 
more complex estimation model: a logit regression. While the MDA used in Gissel et al. 
(2007) reports that including more variables does not necessarily increase a model’s 
accuracy. Still more bankruptcy prediction studies use logistic regression models (Chen 
and Church 1992; Hopwood et al. 1994; and Mutchler et al. 1997). However, logit and 
probit BPMs are criticized due to small samples sometimes used in GCO studies that 
may not be statistically appropriate.  
Researchers have used structural equation modeling to explore financial 
dimensions and financial ratios (Ziebart, 1987). Bankruptcy prediction using structural 
equation models was first introduced as distance to default which builds upon the Black 
Scholes (1973) option pricing model and Moody’s structural default probability model 
(hereafter, KMV) (Merton, 1974). Where other models are based on factor analysis, 
distance to default is mathematically based on the assumption that a company will 
default on financial obligations when its liabilities are greater than its assets. 
In 2001, Shumway introduced a new way to think about bankruptcy prediction by 
arguing that hazard models are more appropriate than single-models in forecasting the 
outcomes of ailing firms. His research finds that a simple hazard model using both 
accounting ratios and market-driven data produces consistent estimates using fewer 
explanatory variables.  
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2.7.1 Discriminate Model: Z-Score 
The use of discriminate models in credit analysis applies financial ratios to help 
lenders quantify a potential borrower’s default risk and serve as an early warning device 
for changes in a borrower’s credit risk. Discriminate models consider the effects of many 
key financial ratios simultaneously. One popular model used extensively in financial and 
accounting research is the Altman Z-Score. Altman’s Z‐score BPM is a frequently 
used benchmark for the performance of newly developed BPMs. Altman’s Z-Score 
has been used in a number of different countries across various industry settings, 
and has been found to outperform country-specific corporate failure models 
(Eidleman, 1995). 
In 1968, Edward Altman introduced the Zeta Model for predicting bankruptcy. 
Rather than search for a single best ratio, Altman built a discriminate analysis model that 
estimates the chance of a  public company going bankrupt by combining five key 
performance ratios into a single score—the Z-score. To develop the Z-Score formula, 
Altman (1968) compiled a list of twenty-two financial ratios and classified each into one 
of five categories (liquidity, profitability, leverage, solvency, and activity). Altman selected 
the ratios on the basis of their popularity in the research and his belief about their 
potential relevancy to bankruptcy. Altman derived his original coefficients from a sample 
of 66 bankrupt manufacturing firms from 1946 to 1965. Ultimately, the model combines 
information about the company’s current profitability, long-term profitability, liquidity, 
solvency, and asset efficiency into a single measure of bankruptcy risk. The Z-score’s 
famous calculation gives insight on corporate financial health. While the model has been 
updated and evaluated several times throughout the literature, the original model is 
generalizable to publicly traded companies.  
Accounting researchers, practitioners, and educators cite the Z-Score model than 
any other BPM (Altman 1993), therefore I select it as my discriminate analysis model for 
simulation. For sensitivity, I calculate Z-Scores for each firm-year using the 1968, 1983, 
and 2004 weightings for the defined variables. I limit the pool of Z-Score derivatives due 
to practical considerations3.  
The five determinants of the Z-Score model and associate weightings for each 
model follow. The original 1968 Z-Score formula follows: 
                                                          
3 For example, in 1977 Altman published a re-estimation of his model using 1969-1975 bankruptcies. In that study, he 
trademarked the ZETATM  score. I do not test the ZETATM due to issues related to the sensitivity of the cut-off. 
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Z-Score = 1.2 (X1) + 1.4 (X2) + 3.3 (X3) + 0.6 (X4) + 1.0 (X5)  (1) 
 
 Where: 
X1= Working Capital/Total Assets,  
X2=Retained Earnings / Total Assets,  
X3=Earnings Before Interest and Tax / Total Assets,  
X4=Market Value of Equity / Total Liabilities, and  
X5=Sales / Total Assets 
 
Z-scores are interpreted using a system of established rankings and ratings. In 
general, the lower the Z-score, the more likely a company will subsequently file 
bankruptcy. Certain cut-offs are commonly seen in the literature. A Z-Score lower than 
1.8 indicates severe financial distress; a Z-Score above 2.99 suggests that a company is 
a Going Concern (or a “prompt payer”); and a Z-Score between 1.81 and 2.7 predicts 
that a company has an increased probability of insolvency. Altman classified anything 
less than 1.81 as clearly fell into a “deadbeat” category and predicted to go bankrupt. Z-
scores have since been converted to credit ratings using conventional cutoffs: 4 – AAA, 
3.5 – AA, 2.9 – A, 2.5 – BBB, 2.25 - BB, 2 – B, 1.8 – C, and less than 1.8 D. I apply 
these definitions as a bright-line test, where a Z-Score less than 1.8 would predict a 
going concern modification.  
Studies suggest that bankruptcy model predictions are more accurate than 
auditor opinions in signaling impending failure (Koh 1991; Altman 1982; and Altman and 
McGough 1974). The accuracy of auditors signaling impending failure ranged from 40% 
to 54% in pre-SAS No. 59 studies, while the accuracy of the models ranged from 82% to 
93%. Altman and McGough (1974) provided a link between BPMs and auditors’ opinion 
decisions by comparing the accuracy of Altman’s (1968) BPM to auditors’ opinions prior 
to the bankruptcy event. They analyzed the model’s predictions and auditors’ opinions 
for 34 firms that filed bankruptcy during the 1970-1973 period. The results indicated that 
the Z-Score model correctly signaled impending failure prior to bankruptcy in 82% of the 
cases. They reported that auditors’ opinions signaled impending failure in only 46% of 
the cases. 
Altman (1982) extended the evaluation of Altman’s original Z-Score model in the 
auditors’ opinion context using two additional samples: (1) 37 bankrupt firms from 1974-
1978 and (2) 44 bankrupt firms from 1978-1982. The Z-Score model correctly signaled 
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impending failure for 81.1% (93%) of the 1974-1978 (1978-1982) companies; 
additionally, he reported that auditors issued GCOs to 59.5% (40%) of the 1974-1978 
(1978-1982) companies. These results suggest Z-Score model (auditors) provided early 
warning signals of subsequent failure in 86.2% (48.1%) of the cases. 
Over the last half century, many researches have studied and updated the 
coefficients to reflect larger samples, more recent samples, and samples of firms from 
both more diverse and more specialized industries. Hillegeist et al. (2004) conclude that 
several of the coefficients in accounting-based bankruptcy models have changed 
possibly due to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and asbestos-related bankruptcies in 
the manufacturing industry. For robustness, I examine the error rates using two 
subsequent versions of Altman’s Z-Score: the Altman et al.(1983) coefficients expand 
beyond manufacturing firms and the Hillegeist et al. (2004) coefficients that update using 
756 bankrupt firms from 1980-2000.  
 
Z-Score83 = 6.56 (X1) + 3.26 (X2) + 6.72 (X3) + 1.05 (X4)     (2) 
Z-Score04 = 4.34 + 0.08 (X1) - 0.04 (X2) + 0.1 (X3) + 0.22 (X4) – 0.06 
(X5) 
(3)
  
I also examine a subset of firms from the financial industry. These firms face 
a unique regulatory environment. The Gramm-Leach-Billey Act and the more recent 
financial crisis were particularly important among financial firms. The probability of 
bankruptcy of financial firms and performance of statistical models may be distorted 
in my sample because of the Emergency Stabilization Act of 2008 and the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. I remove these firms for sensitivity 
analysis.  
Following Hillegeist et al. (2004), I estimate the probability of bankruptcy as 
(eScore/1+eScore) for Z-Score, Z-Score93 and Z-Score04. I evaluate the score using a 
bright-line test that predicts a going concern modification when the predicted 
probability of bankruptcy is greater than fifty percent. 
Studies using multiple discriminant analysis often use a matched-sample or 
equal-group-size sample approach. Because discriminant analysis optimally 
classifies between the two given sample groups, a matched sample is not 
necessary. George and Mallery (2003) explain that because prior probabilities can 
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be computed from the individual samples by weighing, discriminant analysis does 
not require equal group sizes.  
2.7.2 Logit Model: Ohlson  
Created by James Ohlson in the 1980’s, the Ohlson Score model (O-Score) 
introduced a bankruptcy prediction indicator generated from a set of balance sheet 
ratios. Ohlson’s model was derived from a much larger sample (2,058 public companies 
including 105 bankruptcies) than the Z-Score model (66 companies including 33 
bankruptcies). The O-Score used a sample of bankrupt firms from 1970 to 1976 to 
identify a 9-factor linear combination of coefficient-weighted business ratios which are 
available in standard annual reports provided by publicly traded corporations. The O-
Score Model estimates the probability of failure using a logit regression. He found that 
using the probability cut-off point of 3.8% minimized Type I and Type II errors and 
correctly classified 87.6% of his bankrupt sample and 82.6% of his non-bankrupt 
sample. One of the advantages of this model as an analytical tool at the planning stage 
of an audit is that it is entirely an accounting-based model and that it is relatively simple 
and the results are intuitive. The most current BPMs that employ machine learning 
methods are criticized for the lack of explainability in the results. The O-Score produced 
by Ohlson’s model is readily interpreted as the probability of bankruptcy. 
Ohlson ultimately identified six variables from previous approaches and added 
three dummy control variables to create his predictive model of nine weighted variables:  
 
O-Score= 1.32 + 0.41(X1) – 6.03(X2) + 1.43(X3) – 0.08(X4) + 2.37(X5) + 
1.83(X6) – 0.285(X7) +1.72(X8) + 0.52(X9) 
(4) 
 
Where: 
X1 = Adjusted Size (AS): Ohlson measures a company’s size as its total assets adjusted 
for inflation. Smaller companies are deemed to be more at risk for failure. AS = 
log(Total assets/GNP price-level index). 
X2 = Leverage Measure (LM): Designed to capture the indebtedness of a company, the 
more leveraged the more risk the company is to shocks. LM = Total liabilities/Total 
assets. 
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X3 = Working Capital Measure(WCM): Even if a company is endowed with assets and 
profitability, it must have sufficient liquidity to service short-term debt and upcoming 
operational expenses to avoid going bust. WCM = Working capital/Total Assets. 
X4 = Inverse Current Ratio (ICR): This is another measure of a company’s liquidity. ICR 
= log(Current liabilities/Current assets). 
X5 = Discontinuity Correction for Leverage Measure (X): Dummy variable equaling one if 
total liabilities exceeds total assets, zero otherwise. Negative book value in a 
corporation is a very special case and hence Ohlson felt the extreme leverage 
position needed to be corrected through this additional variable. 
X6 = Return on Assets (ROA): An indicator of how profitable a company is, assumed to 
be negative for a close to default company. ROA = Net income/Total Assets. 
X7 = Funds to Debt Ratio: A measure of a company’s ability to finance its debt using its 
operational income alone, a conservative ratio because it does not include other 
sources of cash. If the ratio of funds from operations to short-term debt is less than 
one the company may have an immediate problem. FTDR = Funds from 
operations/Total liabilities; where Funds from operations = pretax income + 
depreciation. 
X8 = Discontinuity Correction for Return on Assets: Dummy variable equaling one if 
income was negative for the last two years, zero otherwise. 
X9 = Change in Net Income (Y): Designed to take into account any potential progressive 
losses over the two most recent periods in a company’s history. CINI = (Net income 
t - Net income t-1) / (Net income t + Net income t-1 )
Like Altman’s original model, the original O-Score has been extensively followed 
and updated through literature. Begley et al. (1996) replicated the methodology on a new 
sample and didn’t find Ohlson’s original precision rates to hold. For robustness, I also 
examine the model using the updated coefficients from Hillegeist et al. (2004): 
 
O-Score= 5.91 - 0.04(X1) – 0.08(X2) – 0.011.43(X3) + 0.01(X4) – 
1.20(X5) – 0.18(X6) – 0.01(X7) – 1.59(X8) + 1.10(X9) 
(5) 
 
Following Hillegeist et al. (2004) I convert each O-Score into a probability using the 
formula Probability = (eScore/1+eScore). This model allows for a bright-line test where a probability 
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of bankruptcy of greater than 0.5 indicates a company is “more likely than not” to fail the going 
concern assumption. 
Studies have generally found the O-Score to be a better forecaster of bankruptcy 
than the 1968 Altman’s Z-Score. The O-Score even outperforms updated variations of 
the Z-Score model. However, past research is mixed. Studies found no significant 
difference in accuracy between MDA models and logit analyses (Collins and Green, 
1982; Cormier et al., 1995; Allen and Chung, 1998). Neither model has been able to 
regularly beat the predictive accuracy Merton’s Distance to Default. Therefor I move 
away from discriminate analysis and BPMs that use only accounting-based numbers. 
2.7.3  Distance to Default Model: Merton’s KMV 
Introduced as the “Kealhofer-Merton-Vasicek” model (hereafter, Merton’s KMV) 
in 1974, the distance-to-default estimates the probability a firm will default by comparing 
the firm’s value to the face value of the firm’s debt. The model uses simultaneous 
equations to measure the distance between the expected value of the assets (drawing 
from assumptions in the Black-Scholes option pricing theory) and the default point to 
calculate the probability of default. To calculate the probability, the model subtracts the 
face value of the firm’s existing debt from an estimate of the future market value of the 
firm and then divides this difference by an estimate of the volatility of the firm (scaled to 
reflect the horizon of the forecast). The ratio is substituted into a cumulative density 
function to calculate the probability that the value of the firm will be less than the face 
value of debt. The resulting score is referred to as the expected default frequency 
(hereafter, EDF). 
Merton’s KMV uses a two-step process to set the default point as somewhere 
between short-term debt (LCT) and the total debt (LT). The first step to calculate the 
EDF is to derive parameters needed in estimation: 
1. Returns and volatility of equity over the previous year; 
2. Market rate of equity: total number of stocks times the closing stock price (S); 
3. Risk-free interest rate (r); 
4. Liabilities maturing in one year (LCT); and 
5. And short-term liabilities plus one half of long-term liabilities (TD). 
The second step simultaneously solves two linear equations to derive value (μ) 
and volatility (σ) of the firm’s assets. And, finally, distance-to-default and probability to 
default are calculated. I interpret EDF as the percentage likelihood of bankruptcy. 
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Research suggests that regulation requires an uncertainty disclosure for uncertainty 
assessed at somewhere between 50% and 70%. Therefore, I set bright-line testing 
thresholds for GCO judgments at EDF greater than 0.5 and EDF greater than 0.7.  
The major disadvantage of Merton’s model lies in its complexity and its need for 
market-based data. Not all audit firms have access to the market-based information 
needed to run the model and not all audit clients are publicly traded, which makes it 
impractical as a potential analytical tool for private companies and small audit firms. In 
order to use the Black-Shoal’s bond pricing model, distance to default makes two 
important assumptions. First, that the total firm value follows a Brownian motion. The 
second is that the firm has only one discount bond maturing in the time-period. 
2.7.4 Hazard Model: Shumway 
For decades, accountants and economists employed static, single-period models 
to predict bankruptcies. In his 2001 study, Shumway argues that the use of a discrete 
hazard model for forecasting bankruptcy is more appropriate than single–period models 
because it recognizes that companies change over time. Hazard functions (often used in 
survival analysis) determine the probability that an entity will experience an event (e.g. 
bankruptcy) within a defined time-period, given the risk that the event might occur. In the 
bankruptcy setting, hazard models measure a firm’s “health” as a function of its latest 
financial condition. Unlike static models, hazard models utilize panel data to control for 
how long a firm is at risk of failure and impound information. Shumway’s model is 
essentially a multi-period dynamic logit model. 
Shumway’s bankruptcy forecasting technique estimates a discrete-time hazard 
model with a logit program consisting of several accounting ratios and market-driven 
variables (Shumway, 2001). In his re-estimation of Altman (1968) and Zmijewski (1984), 
Shumway found that many of the determinants from these models were unrelated to 
bankruptcy after market driven variables were introduced and he explicitly controlled for 
each firm’s period at risk (Shumway, 2001). He also incorporated market variables such 
as market size, past stock returns, and idiosyncratic returns variability as bankruptcy 
predictors. He found that a multi-period logit outperformed traditional MDA for his sample 
including 300 bankrupt firms.  
 
Shumway_Score = -13.03 – 1.982(X1) + 3.593(X2) – 0.467(X3) - 1.809(X4) + 
5.791(X5) 
(6)
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Where:  
X1 = Return on Assets (ROA): The ratio of net income to total assets measures 
profitability of a firm.  
X2 = Leverage Measure (LM): Designed to capture the indebtedness of a company, the 
more leveraged the more risk the company is to shocks. LM = Total liabilities/Total 
assets. 
X3 = Average Relative Size: The logarithm of each firm’s size relative to the total size of 
the NYSE and AMEX market. 
X4 = Abnormal Returns: Each firm’s past excess return in year t as the return of the firm 
in year t-1 minus the value-weighted CRSP NYSE/AMEX index return in year t-1; 
where each firm’s annual returns are calculates by cumulating monthly returns. 
X5 = Sigma: The idiosyncratic standard deviation of each firm’s stock returns. Sigma is 
related to variable cash flows and may measure something like operating leverage. 
Again, this model is more complex than the discriminate analysis and scores 
produced by the Z-Score and O-Score models. The need for market-based data limits 
the practical application and usefulness of this model during audit planning for private 
clients and small audit firms. 
2.8 Proprietary Models 
Large audit firms have developed and used internally developed BPMs for years. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (PwC) designed an econometric model to quantify the 
relationship between observed business conditions and the incidence of bankruptcy 
filings (Pate, 2003).   Similar to discriminate analysis, PwC’s measure focuses on five 
factors that influence the level of bankruptcy filings: degree of corporate leverage, cost of 
borrowing, prevalence of excess production capacity, change in high-yield debt 
issuance, and aggregate economic activity. Deloitte utilizes a “data analytics” tool 
specifically to identify first-time defaulters (Deloitte Center for Financial Services, 2011). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that large audit firms use a combination of ratio analysis 
and proprietary models to analyze the likelihood of bankruptcy. These models, however, 
are not publicly available or vetted in the academic literature. 
Mai’s (2010) dissertation also examines these four models. Her empirical results 
show that combining Shumway’s model with accounting ratios and market-driven 
variables improves bankruptcy forecasting accuracy and precision. She also ranks the 
precision of these models with the best results from Shumway (2001), Altman (1993), 
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Ohlson (1980), and Zmijewski (1984). My dissertation adds to this discussion by 
evaluating the models based on market cost in addition to precision. 
2.9 Cost Estimation 
 Many market participants view the auditor’s report as a critical component for 
warning of imminent going-concern problems (Venuti, 2009). Auditors are charged with 
warning stakeholders through issuing going concern opinions to decrease investor 
surprise. While companies do not always enter liquidation through bankruptcy, investors 
tend to equate going concern opinions as a prelude to bankruptcy. The expectation is 
that auditors’ going concern qualifications will minimize losses at the time of bankruptcy 
by providing investors with an ex ante signal. Given the frequency of bankruptcies that 
occur with no warning, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the role of GCOs as a 
warning system. Some research defines “audit failure” as only those situations where 
clients become bankrupt within the next financial reporting period when auditors failed to 
issue a going-concern.  
Evidence suggests that there is a large gap between the warnings that investors 
expect auditors to provide, and the actual warnings issued (Carson, et al., 2013). 
Investors, legislatures, the popular press, and the public at large expect auditors to issue 
a warning before each bankruptcy. From January 2001 to December 2017, audit firms 
issued 48,053 going concern warnings. During the same period, 2,698 corporations filed 
bankruptcy. However, a warning preceded only 43% of the actual bankruptcies. Not only 
did they fail to issue a warning 1,994 times (Type I error); they issued 46,539 false 
warnings. The top 10 largest bankruptcy filings in U.S. history occurred between April, 
2001 and December, 2016 (see Figure 2). Only three of those companies included 
qualifying language to warn investors of substantial doubt for the company’s ability to 
continue as a going concern in their annual report prior to the filing. Each of these large, 
unwarned bankruptcies caught international media attention and investors questioned 
auditor reliance.  
The FASB issued an update in August 2014 to provide guidance in U.S. GAAP 
about management’s responsibilities in evaluating going concern uncertainty and 
disclosure requirement for an entity’s financial statement footnotes. While the role is 
technically different, the ability of auditors’ to evaluate these disclosures and to predict 
financial distress and impending bankruptcy is paramount in improving the reputation 
and value of the audit report to stakeholders. Therefore, there is continued interest in 
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improving the accuracy rate of GCO reporting and reducing the associated costs of both 
Type I and Type II errors. 
As noted, research assesses the value of a prediction model by comparing the 
percentage of firms, bankrupt and non-bankrupt, predicted correctly by the model. We 
argue this fails to capture the impact of the nature of the costs of errors. 
Altman et al. (1977) estimate the relative cost of errors using the bank loan 
function and argue that a representative approximate cost for Type I errors is “in the 
vicinity of” 70% of the amount of the loan, and the cost for Type II errors is equal to 
between 2-4% of the amount that could have been lent, The cost of Type II errors for this 
study was an estimate of the opportunity cost of not earning the spread on the loan. 
They conclude that the cost trade-off is approximately 35 Type II errors have the 
equivalent cost to lenders as one defaulted loan. They use this trade-off when 
determining the optimum cut-off for ZETATM. However, this proposed trade-off does not 
consider loan size. The size of the firm (or loan amount) and the relative cost of errors 
should be included in the evaluation of BPMs. Their model also studies the costs from a 
lender perspective and fails to consider other market participants.  
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the necessity of incorporating the 
costs of errors to properly assess the models’ trade-off between errors as well as in 
evaluating one model against another. I use changes in total market capitalization to 
show how incorporating both Type I and Type II error costs impact the evaluation of 
models. It may seem obvious to some that the usefulness of a prediction model cannot 
be fully assessed without considering these costs; however, the extensive body of 
research examining and using the ability of financial statement information to predict 
bankruptcy does not yet include this assessment. This study attempts to fill this void. 
The second piece of this research is to quantify the costs of both Type I and 
Type II errors. Although, quantifying the total cost of errors in going concern assertions is 
difficult, limited attempts at estimating the trade off in costs have been made. Carson et 
al. (2013) calls for more research in the cost of errors. My research attempts to answer 
this call. I define a Type I error cost as the total change in market capitalization to a 
bankrupt firm, and a Type II error cost as the opportunity loss from not lending to a non-
bankrupt firm (or a gain from lending to a non-bankrupt firm). The market capitalization 
of a company represents the value that the market places on the entire company. Market 
capitalization represents total enterprise value of all the company’s outstanding stock: 
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the share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. I evaluate bankruptcy 
models by calculating the overall market cost for errors produced by each model.  
Krishnan and Krishnan (1993) research the cost trade-off that arises when 
auditors issue qualified opinions. They conclude that auditor’s litigation risk and client 
retention are important factors influencing an auditor’s decision to issue a qualified 
opinion. Audit firms often lose audit fees as a result of auditor-switching when going 
concern opinions are issued (Carey, Geiger, & O'Connell, 2008). There is a large stream 
of research that follows the impact of client retention on independence and the issuance 
of qualified opinions, including going concern opinions. In addition, the implementation of 
new models within analytical procedures would not be costless, because the level of 
testing required for a given engagement affect audit fees. My work, however, ignores 
these costs. Instead, I focus on the cost of bankruptcy surprise for investors in the stock 
market.  
Kausar, Kumar and Taffler’s (2009) study provides insight on the type of 
investors trading based on GCOs information and describes these trades in terms of a 
lottery system. According to their work, GC investors are similar to retail investors who 
have a greater propensity to gamble and have specific socioeconomic and regional 
characteristics. They conclude that this gambling activity may add noise to the market 
and cloud investors’ ability to respond rationally to the unambiguous bad news signal 
conveyed by a GCO. Winchel, Vanervelde, and Tuttle’s experimental work, however, 
suggests that the reliability of the GCO signal would contribute to market pricing (2017). 
They conclude that GCOs will meet their objectives of informing investors of impending 
bankruptcies and stabilizing the stock prices of viable companies only when GCOs are 
highly reliable. This would suggest that research and models that improve the accuracy 
rates of bankruptcy prediction and GCO issuance are necessary to improve the 
usefulness of GCOs. However, it also demonstrates the difficulty of calculating the total 
impact of changes in Type I and Type II errors. 
Davydenko, Strebuaev and Zhao (2012) use a large sample of firms with 
observed prices of debt and equity that defaulted over fourteen years to estimate the 
cost of default for an average defaulting firm. They find the average cost of default to be 
21.7% of the market value of assets. The costs vary from 14.7% for bond renegotiations 
to 30.5% for bankruptcies, and are substantially higher for investment-grade firms 
(28.8%) than for highly levered bond issuers (20.2%).  
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In their ex post study of Belgium firms, Carcello, Vanstrael, and Willenborg 
(2009) provide evidence that after Belgian auditing standards were introduced that 
required compliance to two specific criteria, there was a decrease in Type II errors and 
an increase in Type I errors. The research goes on to estimate the net cost of this trade-
off in errors for creditors, auditors, companies, and employees. Earlier work by Carcello, 
Hermanon, and Huss provides guidance for estimating the net market cost of changes in 
Type I and Type II failures (1995).  
I use a simple model that captures cumulative abnormal returns (hereafter, CAR) 
within the three-day or five-day window surrounding a bankruptcy announcement to 
estimate the trade-off of costs between Type I and Type II errors. Prior research finds 
that GCOs provide some explanatory power and should therefor reduce market surprise 
surrounding the bankruptcy announcement period. CAR should be less negative for 
firms with GCO warnings than those without (Type I error). However, distressed firms 
that survive (Type II errors) would also experience unusually negative CAR when GCOs 
are announced. I acknowledge that this approach fails to capture litigation and other 
costs of bankruptcy directly. I loosely replicate Carcello et al. (1995), Chen and Church 
(1996), and Davydenko, Strebuaev and Zhao (2012) to investigate the trade-off in cost 
associated with lowering Type II errors using the various models. I use ex post data to 
simulate the effect of using BPMs as criteria for going concern assessments.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
A vast research explores BPMs (Bellovary, Giacominio, & Akers, 2007). Most of 
this research focuses on improving the efficacy of a particular model or comparing the 
efficacy of one or more models as tools for prediction. While some researchers conclude 
that the existing models are not useful for prediction, others find that using these models 
as decision tools for determining going concern risk results in higher accuracy rates than 
current auditor judgment. 
The literature, however, fails to consider the materiality qualification in auditors’ 
assertion. In the audit opinion, the scope of the audit is limited and auditors explain that 
“they have reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of 
material misstatement” (emphasis added). This means that accounting numbers and 
estimates may differ from actual firm performance within a predetermined threshold for 
materiality. When testing the sensitivity of bankruptcy models, prior research has not 
explored the possibility that “immaterial” changes in accounting fundamentals may 
create material differences in the outcome of bankruptcy models that are driven by these 
amounts. 
 Although there is no set standard for the quantity of materiality, SAS No. 2 (1985) 
states that an amount is material if “its omission or misstatement could influence 
the economic decision of users taken on the basis of the financial statements.” The level 
of materiality depends on the size of the item or error judged within particular 
circumstances. Thus, the concept of materiality provides a threshold or cut-off point 
rather than providing a primary qualitative characteristic for useful information. 
3.1 Research Question 1: Model Sensitivity 
A few “rule-of-thumb” levels for quantitative materiality (e.g. five percent of net 
income, 0.5 percent of total assets, one percent of total equity) exist in practice (U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 1999). AU Section 312.34 specifically warns that 
quantities deemed immaterial according to rules-of-thumb would be considered material 
if they trigger loan-covenant default. The sensitivity of BPMs (and thus economic 
decisions predicted by them) to these rule-of-thumb levels for quantitative materiality has 
not been tested empirically. Moreover, prior research does not provide evidence about 
whether assuming unreported “bad news” within these materiality levels would improve 
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the predictability and accuracy rate of existing bankruptcy models. My research 
examines this question. 
RQ1: Ex post, how sensitive are current bankruptcy models to small changes in 
the accounting fundamentals within the prior year's annual report?  
Using accounting fundamentals and existing bankruptcy models, I will calculate 
the likelihood of default for firms and compare the results to known bankruptcies. 
Through simulation, I will manipulate the accounting fundamentals of each firm 
assuming negative outcomes within rule-of-thumb materiality thresholds and document 
the changes in prediction and accuracy rates. I predict that the accuracy of current 
bankruptcy models will not significantly improve through simple mathematical 
manipulations of accounting fundamentals at magnitudes less than the materiality 
thresholds used by the auditing profession as rules-of-thumb. 
H1a: Bankruptcy models predict all bankruptcies.  
H1b: BPMs are robust within rule-of-thumb materiality changes in accounting 
fundamentals.  
3.2 Research Question 2: Decision Sensitivity 
I recognize that any amount which would cause a change in investor decisions 
should be considered material by definition. If a change in accounting fundamentals 
changes the outcome of a bankruptcy model, then the change in the underlying 
accounting, regardless of size, would be material. Misstatements typically impact one or 
two accounts, while BPMs weigh information about the overall company. It is not obvious 
if a particular BPM will be sensitive to relatively small misstatements. However, the 
appropriateness and magnitude of materiality as they apply to bankruptcy decisions 
using models has not been explored directly through research. Therefore, I question the 
sensitivity of bankruptcy models to materiality thresholds. 
RQ2: How often would an event within the level auditors consider “standard 
materiality” trigger a failure in the model?  
Through simulation I will manipulate the accounting fundamentals of each firm as 
with H1 and identify firms whose bankruptcy prediction score from a given model 
changes due to “immaterial” fluctuations. After identifying these firms, I will consider if 
the change in prediction from the model reflects the ex post outcomes of the firm (i.e. 
bankruptcies reported in the following two years). I predict that current bankruptcy 
models are not sensitive enough for “immaterial” changes to improve predictive accuracy 
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rates. In other words, I predict that BPM accuracy rates will not change if fundamental 
accounting inputs change by an immaterial amount. 
H2: Bright-line decisions based on BPMs are robust within rule-of-thumb 
materiality changes in accounting fundamentals.  
3.3 Research Question 3: Cost of Investor Surprise 
Historically, more than half of the bankruptcies filed for public companies in a 
given year were preceded by a going concern warning. Given the failure rates of going 
concern predictions and the availability of other—often more timely--information, 
stakeholders question the usefulness of going concern disclosures. The failure to warn 
investors of impending bankruptcies has caught the attention of investors, media, and 
regulators. Research related to the “self-fulfilling prophecy” nature of going concern 
opinions cautions any attempt to quantify the costs of either failing to issue a going 
concern qualification or issuing one for a company that continues to operate. However, 
investor surprise is not costless. Some attempt has been made to estimate the cost 
trade-off from a lender perspective, but the overall economic impact has been ignored. 
While the absence of comprehensive cost models make it difficult to address the 
economic impact of inaccurate predictions, estimating the cost of investor surprise does 
provide some insight into the trade-off between issuing too many going concern opinions 
and issuing too few. 
RQ3: What is the cost of investor surprise for bankruptcies when auditors failed 
to issue going concern opinions?  
Bankruptcy is costly to investors. While the total cost of bankruptcy is difficult to 
quantify, I measure the cost by examining the market reaction around the date a 
bankruptcy was announced (i.e. the bankruptcy filing date). I predict a negative market 
reaction on that date. Chen and Church (1996) find that investors do respond to going 
concern opinions and provide evidence of a significantly stronger negative reaction to 
bankruptcy news for firms who file bankruptcy in the absence of a going concern 
warning. I apply their methods to my sample and predict similar outcomes. 
H3: The estimated market cost due to “surprise” from Type II errors is zero. 
43 
 
3.4 Research Question 4: Cost Trade-off 
Further, I continue to question the expanded use of BPMs and their sensitivity to 
auditors’ materiality. I explore the trade-off in costs for using bankruptcy models for 
going concern assertions. 
RQ4: What is the cost trade-off for using BPMs as a decision-aid for going 
concern assertions? 
Managers and auditors have access to private information that may mitigate the 
risk identified by BPMs. However, some research suggests that using these models 
provides a more accurate basis for making this determination. I question the cost trade-
off when bankruptcy models are used as a bright-line test for issuing going concern 
opinions. Altman et al. (1977) defines a 1:35 ratio between Type I and Type II error costs 
based commercial bank loan analysis framework. I measure the overall market cost of 
errors by applying CAR to the total market capitalization for firms. I evaluate and rank 
BMPs based on their total market cost of errors.  
H4a: The cost of Type I Errors is more than 35 times the cost of the average 
Type II Error. 
I then apply the average CAR to the simulated errors to measure the cost of 
changes in predictions due to immaterial misstatements. 
H4b: The change in total cost of errors due to simulated misstatements is zero.  
H4c: A 1% decrease in Type I error costs results in a greater than 35% increase 
in Type II error costs. 
After considering the results from testing the hypotheses above, my research 
should address whether or not BPMs are an appropriate analytical tool for managers or 
auditors to use in making and testing going concern assertions. The results also provide 
information about the sensitivity of bankruptcy models to “standard materiality” 
assumptions within accounting fundamentals and provide insight about the 
appropriateness of these models within an audit. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 
This study is designed as an ex post analysis using archival data for a sample of 
688 firms that filed bankruptcy between 2002 and 2017. I conduct analyses using BPMs 
and going concern prediction models from the current literature. Going Concern 
Opinions are available on Audit Analytics beginning in 2002. Access to fundamental 
accounting data and market data required to calculate the probability score for 
bankruptcy generated by various models from prior research (Altman's Z, Zmijewski's 
score, distance to default, etc) or a probability score generated through current going 
concern prediction models are available through Compustat and CRSP. Materiality 
thresholds are manipulated through simulation (5% of net income, 1% of total sales, 
0.3% of total assets, 0.5% of total assets, and 1% of retained earnings). I will manipulate 
the size (materiality) of an event required by each model to reduce Type II error to the 
level predicted by FASB’s exposure draft. I will follow prior research to form a 
conservative estimate of the reduction in market cost (from increased Type I error) of 
accepting each model. I will also explore a long-window trend for these models to 
determine if long-term downward trends resulted in higher prediction accuracy than one-
time shocks.  
4.1 Data and Sample Selection 
Data available from Audit Analytics – Bankruptcy Notifications identifies 2,698 
bankrupt filings from January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2017. Of this original 
sample, two filings were unclassified, 572 filed Chapter 7, and 2,124 filed Chapter 11. 
Data available from Audit Analytics – Audit Opinions identifies 283,219 audit opinions 
from January 1, 1999 through December 31, 20016. I matched the bankruptcy data from 
audit analytics to the audit opinion from prior fiscal years’ filings using the date range 
beginning 730 days prior to the bankruptcy filing date. Using this definition, if an auditor 
predicted a bankruptcy up to two years prior to the filing date, my results would not 
reflect a Type II error. Some firms had more than one audit report filed within this range. 
620 firms with bankruptcies were not matched to an audit report within 730 days of the 
filing date. My final matched sample includes 279,761 observations with 3,458 
bankruptcies and 48,053 going concern opinions. 
Current accounting and auditing standards explicitly allow for some Type II 
errors. ASU No. 2014-2015 uses “probable” in the standard to define when an auditor 
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should include language about “substantial doubt” for going concern. The standard 
states:  
 
Substantial doubt about an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern exists 
when relevant conditions and events, considered in the aggregate, indicate that it 
is probable that the entity will be unable to meet its obligations as they become 
due within one year after the date that the financial statements are issued (or 
available to be issued). The term probable is used consistently with its use in 
Topic 450, Contingencies. [emphasis added]  
  
This language is important because it identifies a specific threshold for testing. In 
the early 1990s, the General Accounting Office urged FASB to clarify the continuum in 
SFAS 5 because it had found that, in practice, “probable” meant as high as 95%. A 
GASB survey of CPA firms defined “probably” as 75-80 percent. The Federal Accounting 
Standards Advisory Board discussed the definition of probably in their January 17-18, 
2007 meeting and came up with ambiguity and uncertainty around identifying a specific 
percentage. In general, “probable” has a higher threshold than “more-likely-than-not”. In 
practice, the "probable" threshold is generally understood to mean a 70 to 75 percent 
confidence level while the "more likely than not" threshold generally equates to 50 
percent or less. Since “more-likely-then-not” is 50 percent, and the low end of firm 
estimates “probable” at 70 percent, I test at each of these endpoints. Because ASU No. 
2014-2015 requires auditors to issue GCO when a company has 50-70% likelihood of 
filing bankruptcy, when the standard is perfectly applied 30-50% of GCO’s issued should 
be false positives and result in Type II errors. Figure 3 shows the error rates expected by 
the standards given a sample size of 279,761 with 3,458 bankruptcies.  
The 2x2 matrix follows the same structure as Figure 1. This matrix shows that 
Type II errors are prescribed by the standards. The error rates expected by the 
standards given the sample size and subsequent bankruptcies for this study. My sample 
includes 3,458 bankruptcies. According to the standard, auditors should issue a warning 
within one year of every firm that is more likely than not to file bankruptcy within one 
year. If I follow auditors’ definition of “more likely than not” as a 50% probability, the 
standards suggest that 6,916 GCOs would be issued and 50% would be correct (3,458) 
with 3,458 Type II errors expected. They would correctly predict a bankruptcy half for 
half of the GCOs issued. If auditors used a 70% threshold for firms that will file 
bankruptcy within two years, then 1,482 Type II Errors would be still be expected. The 
figure highlights that the standard prescribes Type II Errors, but not Type I Errors. 
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  No Bankruptcy in t+1 Bankruptcy in t+1 
Unmodified Audit 
Opinion in t 
No Error:  
 
272,845 – 274,821 
Type I Error:  
 
0 
Modified Audit 
Opinion in t 
Type II Error:  
 
1,482 - 3,458  
No Error:  
 
3,458 
Figure 3: Diagram of Expected GCOs, Type II Errors, and Type II Errors given Sample 
Size  
Figure 4 shows the number of historical errors observed in the sample based on 
GCOs issued and bankruptcies filed within 730 subsequent days. Note that both Type I 
and Type II errors are significantly higher than the standards prescribe for this sample 
(p>0.0001). Figure 4 highlights the actual errors and error rates contained in the sample 
from Audit Analytics. The sample includes the 283,219 firm-year observations available 
in Audit Analytics. For the majority of surviving firms, auditors did not issue GCO 
warnings. 82.35% of the firms in the overall sample were healthy firms with no error. In 
addition, auditors correctly identified 1,514 firms as having uncertainty with respect to 
going concern. 0.53% of the sample declared bankruptcy with warning. Although these 
firms failed, this is not defined as an error because auditors appropriately warned 
investors.  In this study, firms failing after warnings are classified as Type III.  
The sample includes 1,994 Type I errors where firms filed bankruptcy without 
warning. For these firm-year observations, the audit firm failed to warn investors in the 
audit of the annual report prior to a bankruptcy filing. Type I errors represent 0.69% of 
the sample of all firms. The standard expects 100% of bankruptcies to be preceded by a 
warning; however, out of 3,508 bankruptcies filed, 56.84% were not preceded by a GCO 
warning. 
The sample includes 46,539 Type II errors. For these firm-year observations, the 
audit firm issued a GCO warning, but the firm did not file bankruptcy within one year. 
Type II errors represent 16.43% of the sample.  
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  No Bankruptcy in t+1 Bankruptcy in t+1 
Unmodified Audit 
Opinion in t 
No Error:  
 
233,222 
Type I Error:  
 
1,994 
Modified Audit 
Opinion in t 
Type II Error:  
 
46,539 
No Error:  
 
1,514 
Figure 4: Diagram of Actual GCOs, Type II Errors, and Type II Errors for Sample 
Table 4.1 Panel A reports the sample of all firms by audit opinion indicators 
reported in Audit Analytics by year from 1999 through 2016 with column 1 reporting the 
number and percentage of firms with a clean GCO during the year, column 2 including 
the number and percentage of firms with a GCO warning during the year, and column 3 
reporting the total number of firms with audit opinions for each year. The sample for 
period t includes 283,219 firm-year observations with 48,053 going concern warnings 
issued. 
Table 4.1 Panel B reports the sample by all firms with bankruptcy indicators 
reported in Audit Analytics by year from 1999 through 2016 with column 1 reporting the 
number and percentage of firms without a bankruptcy during year t+1, column 2 
including the number and percentage of firms with a bankruptcies filing during year t+1, 
and column 3 reporting the total number of firms with audit reports for each year. The 
sample for period t includes 283,219 firm-year observations with 3,458 bankruptcies filed 
from 2000 to 2017. I tested the relation between historic auditor’s judgement and actual 
bankruptcies (untabulated). In each Pearson’s Chi-Square test, the relation between 
historical auditors’ judgment and actual bankruptcies is statistically significant (at 
P<0.001). 
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Table 4.1 Number of Firms in Sample by Year 
 Panel A: Number 
of Firms with 
GCO Opinions by 
Year 
Panel B: Number of 
Firms with Bankruptcies 
Filed by Year 
 
Year 
No 
GCO 
Issued 
GCO 
Issued 
No 
Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy 
Filed in t+1 
Total 
1999 7,536 1,574 8,875 325 9,110 
2000 17,382 2,844 19,709 517 20,226 
2001 15,925 3,018 18,571 372 18,943 
2002 14,355 2,863 16,986 232 17,218 
2003 15,137 2,590 17,573 154 17,727 
2004 14,199 2,579 16,650 128 16,778 
2005 14,252 2,738 16,843 147 16,990 
2006 13,760 2,896 16,421 235 16,656 
2007 13,378 3,328 16,391 315 16,706 
2008 13,487 3,392 15,682 197 15,879 
2009 12,542 3,137 15,546 133 15,679 
2010 12,811 3,007 15,703 115 15,818 
2011 12,518 2,581 15,096 101 15,199 
2012 12,245 2,592 14,761 76 14,837 
2013 12,136 2,436 14,470 102 14,572 
2014 11,952 2,285 14,103 134 14,237 
2015 11,452 2,141 13,472 121 13,593 
2016 11,099 1,952 12,997 54 13,051 
Total 
Percentage 
235,166 
83.03% 
48,053 
16.97% 
279,761 
98.78% 
3,458 
1.22% 
283,219 
100% 
                          
 Table 4.2 explores these errors by year. The significant Pearson’s Chi-Square 
(p<0.001) indicates that there is a strong dependence between GCO opinions in t and 
Bankruptcies in t+1. Bankruptcies are distributed throughout the sample period as 
expected with a higher rate of bankruptcy in 2008-2010 as expected due to the 2008 
recession. 
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Table 4.2 Error Count by Error Type and Sample Year 
Year 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
1999 7,314 79 1,471 246 9,110 
2000 17,083 139 2,626 378 20,226 
2001 15,725 64 2,845 308 18,943 
2002 14,251 48 2,735 154 17,218 
2003 15,057 23 2,516 131 17,727 
2004 14,140 25 2,510 103 16,778 
2005 14,174 21 2,669 126 16,990 
2006 13,619 31 2,602 204 16,656 
2007 13,179 66 3,212 248 16,706 
2008 12,145 32 3,267 145 15,879 
2009 12,484 11 3,062 122 15,679 
2010 12,753 23 2,950 92 15,818 
2011 12,465 23 2,633 78 15,199 
2012 12,202 11 2,559 65 14,837 
2013 12,071 12 2,399 89 14,572 
2014 11,849 29 2,254 105 14,237 
2015 11,360 47 2,104 74 13,593 
2016 11,072 16 1,925 38 13,051 
Total 
Percentage 
233,222 
82.35% 
699 
0.25% 
46,539 
16.43% 
2,759 
0.98% 
283,219 
100% 
Where Year is the fiscal year end. Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as 
a going concern (i.e. no warning was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in 
the subsequent year; Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was 
identified as a going concern, but subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm 
with a Type II error, where a warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy 
within 730 days; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days 
before a bankruptcy filing. 
 
There are several types of bankruptcy protection available to companies under 
the current US Bankruptcy law. Chapter 7 is a straight liquidation, while Chapter 11 
allows a firm to “reorganize” and continue operations. Some argue Chapter 11 
bankruptcies do not require a GCO, as a Chapter 11 bankruptcy may be strategic. 
Chapter 15 covers cases in which firms with US assets file bankruptcy internationally. 
Table 4.3 examines the error rates among the type of bankruptcy filed. The relationship 
between Type I errors and the type of bankruptcy filed is significant (p<0.001) using 
Fisher’s exact testing. Auditors issued GCO warnings within the two years prior to 
75.24% of the Chapter 7 bankruptcies and 65.73% of the Chapter II bankruptcies. By far, 
the most common form of bankruptcy in my sample was Chapter 11. Type I and errors 
were more likely for Chapter 11 firms than Chapter 7 firms. This may indicate that 
auditors are making the distinction between strategic bankruptcies and straight 
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liquidations. However, Chapter 7 firms may also be characterized by greater financial 
distress and thus more accurate predictions can be made in advance. The source of this 
discrepancy is beyond the scope of my study, but it could be addressed in future 
research. The sample includes only twelve Chapter 15 bankruptcies. This subsample is 
too small for further analysis. 
 
Table 4.3 Comparison of Error Rates Based on the Type of Bankruptcy Filed 
US 
Bankruptcy 
Filing Type 
Type I: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
Chapter 7 86 612 718 
Chapter 11 608 2,119 2,727 
Chapter 15 4 8 12 
Unclassified 1 0 1 
Total 
Percentage 
699 
20.21% 
2,759 
79.79% 
3,458 
100% 
Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, 
but subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued 
within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. 
Other descriptive statistics about the sample highlight systematic differences 
between firms with GCOs and/or subsequent bankruptcies. Table 4.4 reports the 
number of days between the audit opinion and a subsequent bankruptcy by error type. 
Firms with no bankruptcies report 365 by design. The mean number of days between the 
firms with each kind of error is significantly different. On average bankruptcies that were 
preceded by a warning were filed 171 after the date of the auditor’s report. Bankruptcies 
filed without warning were, on average, filed 60 days later (mean 231 days after the 
audit report). Bankruptcies that weren’t preceded by a warning occurred after a longer 
delay from the previous audit report. This may indicate that GCOs expedite a firms’ 
bankruptcy under the “self-fulfilling prophecy” hypothesis, or it could indicate that 
predictive accuracy decreases due to the information environment over time. Or, this 
relationship may indicate that factors influencing a later bankruptcy may not have been 
available at the time of an audit.  
 
51 
 
Table 4.4 Mean Number of Days Between Auditor Report and Bankruptcy Filing 
Panel A: Number of Days between Date of Audit Report and Bankruptcy Filing Date  
Error Type 
Number 
of Firms 
Number of Days until Bankruptcy Filing 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Type I 699 231.07 90.13 1 355 
Type III: No Error 
(bankruptcy in t+1) 
961 171.05 103.81 0 355 
Type III: No Error 
(bankruptcy in t+2) 
1,798 543.15 107.58 356.00 730 
Panel B: Number of Days between Year End and Bankruptcy Filing Date 
Error Type 
Number 
of Firms 
Number of Days until Bankruptcy Filing 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Type I 699 346.77 134.54 70 355 
Type III: No Error 
(bankruptcy in t+1) 
961 267.36 129.52 77 355 
Type III: No Error 
(bankruptcy in t+2) 
1,798 554.52 136.65 426 730 
Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, 
but subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued 
within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. 
 I divided the sample by CIK industry classification to analyze the potential impact 
from a concentration of firms in the financial industry. Tables 4.5 provides descriptive 
statistics comparing the sample of financial firms to non-financial firms. This table 
highlights that both Type I and Type II errors are less likely for financial firms. There are 
39,728 financial firms in the sample with 312 bankruptcies and 5,905 GCOs. I identify 65 
Type I errors and 5,788 Type II errors. The Pearson’s Chi Square test is significant 
(p<0.001) for firm type and both going concern opinions and bankruptcies, so sensitive 
testing is planned. This analysis is necessary to highlight any concentration during the 
2008 financial crisis particularly due to “Too Big to Fail” policies at that time. I conclude 
that removing financial firms from my sample is not necessary. 
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Table 4.5 Comparison of Error Types within a Subsample of Firms in the Financial 
Industry 
 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
Financial 
Firms 
39,726 65 5,788 247 45,826 
Non-Financial 
Firms 
194,114 634 40,751 2,512 238,011 
Total 
Percentage 
233,842 
82.39% 
699 
0.25% 
46,539 
16.40% 
2,759 
0.97% 
283,839 
100.00% 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning 
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I 
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a 
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III 
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. 
When setting the level for planning materiality, auditors use several rules-of-
thumb. Common thresholds for planning materiality include: five percent of earnings 
before taxes (EBIT), one percent of EBIT, 0.3 percent of total assets, 0.5 percent of total 
assets, or one percent of retained earnings. Table 4.6 describes the mean of each of 
these five thresholds for the historical sample. Panel A highlights the mean difference 
between the quantitative thresholds for surviving entities versus entities with subsequent 
bankruptcies. Note that the mean RE for bankrupt firms is negative and all planned 
quantitative materiality thresholds for firms with subsequent bankruptcies are less than 
that planned for firms without subsequent bankruptcies. In Panel B, note that firms with 
Chapter 7 bankruptcies have lower quantitative thresholds than those with Chapter 11 
bankruptcies when determined based on EBI or Total Assets. These differences in 
underlying fundamentals may drive the performance of certain bankruptcy models in the 
audit environment.   
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Table 4.6 Descriptive Statistics for Common Materiality Thresholds by Bankruptcy 
Indicator and Type 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Materiality Thresholds by Bankruptcy Indicator 
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
Number 
of 
Firms 
Materiality Threshold Mean 
Lowers 
95% CL 
for 
Mean 
Upper 
95% CL 
of Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
0 51,976 
5% of EBIT 11.96 11.72 12.20 25.82 
1% of EBIT 2.39 2.34 2.44 5.16 
0.3% of Total Assets 14.73 14.47 15.00 30.35 
0.5% of Total Assets 24.56 24.12 24.99 50.59 
1% of Retained 
Earnings 
5.05 4.91 5.18 15.32 
1 493 
5% of EBIT 1.41 0.58 2.24 9.16 
1% of EBIT 0.28 0.12 0.45 1.83 
0.3% of Total Assets 6.73 5.27 8.19 16.51 
0.5% of Total Assets 11.22 8.78 13.65 27.52 
1% of Retained 
Earnings 
-2.07 -2.63 -1.50 6.29 
 
  
54 
 
Table 4.6 (continued) 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Materiality Thresholds by Bankruptcy Type 
Bankruptcy 
Type 
Number 
of 
Firms 
Materiality 
Threshold 
Mean 
Lowers 
95% CL 
for 
Mean 
Upper 
95% CL 
of Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Chapter 7 74 
5% of EBIT -0.45 -0.74 -0.15 1.23 
1% of EBIT -0.09 -0.15 -0.03 0.25 
0.3% of Total 
Assets 
0.40 0.11 0.68 1.24 
0.5% of Total 
Assets 
0.66 0.18 1.14 2.06 
1% of Retained 
Earnings 
-1.16 -1.84 -0.47 2.98 
Chapter 11 472 
5% of EBIT 1.29 0.48 2.10 8.73 
1% of EBIT 0.26 0.10 0.42 1.75 
0.3% of Total 
Assets 
6.89 5.50 8.28 15.37 
0.5% of Total 
Assets 
11.48 9.17 13.80 25.62 
1% of Retained 
Earnings 
-2.06 -2.66 -1.46 6.47 
Chapter 15 6 
5% of EBIT 20.19 -6.07 46.45 25.03 
1% of EBIT 4.04 -1.21 9.29 5.01 
0.3% of Total 
Assets 
50.24 -2.42 102.9 50.19 
0.5% of Total 
Assets 
83.74 4.04 171.5 83.64 
1% of Retained 
Earnings 
-3.40 -6.48 -0.32 2.93 
Where the Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730 
days of the audit report filing date.  
4.2 Part 1. Model Simulations 
I collect all accounting variables required for Z-Score, O-Score, Shumway Score, 
and the Merton KMV’s Distance to Default calculation from the Compustat annual file. 
Audit Analytics identified the issuance of a going concern opinion as a “1” in the indicator 
variable “GCO”. After matching on the Central Index Key (CIK), my sample includes 
45,828 financial firm-year observations from Audit Analytics. I identify 5,905 companies 
with a modified audit report for going concern (GCO) in t and 312 companies with 
bankruptcies in t+1. The pattern of bankruptcies by year was similar to that of the overall 
sample, with higher filing rates near 2001 and 2008.  
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4.2.1 Z-Score Testing. 
I collect the variables needed to calculate each determinant of Altman’s Z-Score 
from Compustat North America Daily - Fundamentals Annual dataset from 1999 through 
2016. I match the variable to my sample from Audit Analytics. The matched sample 
includes 89,755 firm-year observations with adequate data availability that include 2,456 
bankruptcies and 15,950 modified going concern opinions. Table 4.7 includes 
descriptive statistics for the determinant variables of Altmans Z-Score, Winsorized at 1% 
to limit the effect of outliers in the Compustat data. The descriptive statistics highlight the 
absence of data for some observations. Observations with incomplete data for each 
model are dropped from the sample when testing that model only. 
 
Table 4.7 Descriptive Statistics for Determinant Variables of Z-Score Model 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
AT 142,386 7,306.55 30,282.76 0.02 440.30 248,437.00 
ACT 101,937 831.62 2,563.05 0.00 86.84 19,023.00 
LT 142,386 5,613.93 24,913.83 0.08 249.33 209,886.00 
LCT 102,394 621.54 2,067.37 0.04 38.52 15,347.82 
WCAP 101,073 197.17 719.33 -1,489.72 21.93 4,939.46 
CSHO 142,386 90.80 249.69 0.00 21.20 1,884.31 
SALE 123,456 2,144.72 6,845.84 0.00 145.07 49,964.80 
OIADP 123,454 283.97 1,034.22 -209.00 9.84 7,876.94 
EBIT 122,810 284.39 1,034.83 -209.78 9.83 7,877.00 
RE 138,988 635.06 2,980.63 -2,803.46 3.96 22,632.00 
PRCC_F 130,202 36.01 1,199.49 0.00 11.86 141,600.00 
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT 
indicating total assets, ACT indicating total current assets, LT is total liabilities, WCAP is 
working capital, CSHO is the number of common shares outstanding, SALE is total 
revenue, OIADP is operating income before amortization and depreciation, EBIT is 
earnings before interest and taxes, RE is retained earnings, and PRCC_F is the price 
per share of common stock at the end of the fiscal year. N is the number of firm-level 
observations. 
Following literature, I use three models of the Altman Z-Score to estimate the 
probability of bankruptcy. I calculate the Z-Score according to the specifications in 
Altman (1968), Altman et al. (1993), and Hillegeist et al. (2004). Table 4.8 reports the 
means of Altman’s Z-Score for each model. Panel A compares the sample of firms with 
bankruptcies in t+1 to all other firms. As expected, for each model, the mean Z-Scores 
for firms with bankruptcies is significantly smaller than the Z-Score for surviving firms. 
Panel B compares the sample of firms with going concern opinions in t to firms all other 
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firms. Note the mean Z-Score for the going concern sub-sample using equation 1 and 2 
are significantly lower than the “healthy” firms, as expected. However, the mean Z-Score 
for GCO firms using the Hillegeist (2004) model in equation 3 is higher than the non-
GCO firms. Testing the reason behind this surprising result is beyond the scope of my 
dissertation, but it could indicate that auditors’ predictions fail to incorporate changes in 
bankruptcy regulation in the 2004 model. 
 
Table 4.8 Descriptive Means of Z-Score Models - Equations 1-3 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Z-Scores for all Firms in Sample 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
Altz 88,955 -6.18 65.45 -533.25 2.53 107.56 
Altz93 88,955 -21.38 162.83 -1,346.52 3.33 185.38 
Altz04 88,955 7.06 8.27 4.16 4.89 70.31 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Z-Scores by Bankruptcy Indicator  
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
0 
Altz 86,980 -6.10 65.75 -533.25 2.59 107.56 
Altz93 86,980 -21.22 163.56 -
1,346.52 
3.45 185.38 
Altz04 86,980 7.10 8.33 4.16 4.91 70.31 
1 
Altz 1,975 -9.86 50.36 -533.25 -0.12 107.56 
Altz93 1,975 -28.20 126.68 -
1,346.52 
-3.07 185.38 
Altz04 1,975 5.35 4.25 4.16 4.41 70.31 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Z-Scores by GCO Indicator  
GCO 
Indicator 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
0 
Altz 75,465 4.48 21.04 -533.25 2.96 107.56 
Altz93 75,465 5.91 47.67 -1,346.52 4.17 185.38 
Altz04 75,465 6.41 6.23 4.16 4.86 70.31 
1 
Altz 13,490 -65.82 146.89 -533.25 -9.48 107.56 
Altz93 13,490 -
174.02 
366.97 -1,346.52 -27.16 185.38 
Altz04 13,490 10.73 14.74 4.16 5.33 70.31 
Where the Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730 
days of the audit report filing date. GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern 
qualifications in the audit report. 
 
I test the appropriateness of using a bright-line test based on BPMs as a 
substitute for auditors’ judgment to identify firms with going concern uncertainty during 
the planning stages of an audit. I again use three models of the Altman Z-Score to 
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estimate the probability of bankruptcy. The results of testing are summarized in Table 
4.9. A sample of 142,386 firms had sufficient data to calculate Z-Scores. A classifies 
sample firms based on historic GCO warnings and bankruptcies filed. Auditor judgment 
resulted in appropriate predictions for 88.47% of firm observations with 1,466 (1.03%) 
Type I errors and 14,946 (10.50%) Type II errors reported.  
Table 4.9 Panel B reports the error rates that would result if equations 1-3 had 
been used in place of auditor judgment. For the classic model (equation 1) the bright-line 
test is defined by any score less than 1.8 substitutes for auditor judgment as a predicted 
bankruptcy in period t+1. Using the classic cut-off definition of Z-Score<1.8 as a bright-
line test resulted in the greatest number of GCO warnings issued prior to a bankruptcy 
(2,456, 84.25%) which is significantly better than auditor’s predictions (987, 40.19%). 
Therefore, Type I error rates were 3.8 times higher for bankrupt firms based on auditor 
judgments. If the only goal of auditors was to predict bankruptcies, a bright-line test 
based on the classic Z-Score appears to outperform auditor judgment; however, there 
were significantly more Type II errors using the bright-line test in Panel A (87,726) 
compared to historical errors (14,963). 
For robustness I also tested the original model and two re-estimated models 
(equation 2 and 3) and use probability of bankruptcy > 50% and 70% as a bright-line 
tests to substitute for auditor judgment.  Each model resulted in a similar tradeoff 
between Type I and Type II errors when evaluated by count and rate. Because the cost 
of each type of error and each bankruptcy is not equal to stakeholders, evaluating the 
usefulness of each model requires cost trade-off analysis between Type I and Type II 
errors. The results based on count do not address whether the costliest bankruptcies 
were predicted by auditor judgment for a specified model. 
 
  
58 
 
Table 4.9 Results from Bright-Line Testing of Z-Score Models 
Panel A: Historical Error Count based on Auditor Judgment 
Panel B: Simulated Error Count Where Bright-Line Testing Replaces Auditor Judgment 
Bright-Line Test 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
1968 Z-Score with Classic Threshold 53,066 
37.27% 
386 
0.27% 
86,869 
61.01% 
2,065 
1.45% 
142,386 
100.00% 
1968 Z-Score with Probability (p>0.5) 71,309 
50.08% 
1,497 
1.05% 
68,626 
48.20% 
954 
0.67% 
142,386 
100.00% 
1993 Z-Score with Probability (p>0.5) 76,015 
53.39% 
1,847 
1.30% 
63,920 
44.89% 
604 
0.42% 
142,386 
100.00% 
1993 Z-Score with Probability (p>0.7) 75,547 
53.06% 
1,830 
1.29% 
64,388 
45.22% 
621 
0.44% 
142,386 
100.00% 
2004 Z-Score with Probability (p>0.5) 52,955 
37.19% 
476 
0.33% 
86,980 
61.09% 
1,975 
1.39% 
142,386 
100.00% 
2004 Z-Score with Probability (p>0.7) 71,309 
50.08% 
1,497 
1.05% 
66,626 
48.20% 
954 
0.67% 
142,386 
100.00% 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning 
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I 
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a 
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III 
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. 
 Because many of the Chapter 11 bankruptcies in the overall sample may be 
strategic, these types of bankruptcies might not be prewarned in financial fundamentals 
and some have argued that strategic bankruptcy filings do not represent going concern 
uncertainty. Chapter 7 bankruptcies, however, do meet the standard definition of going 
concern uncertainty. Table 4.10 examines the use of bright line testing to limit Type I 
errors by bankruptcy type. Auditors issued GCOs before 259 of the Chapter 7 
bankruptcies (untabulated). The bright-line test using the classic 1.8 threshold would 
have predicted 382. The difference between the Type I error count for auditor judgment 
versus (195) the classic Z-Score model (72) for Chapter 7 bankruptcies is significant 
(p<0.001), but doesn’t address the relative market cost given firm characteristics. 
 
Auditor Judgment 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
Going Concern Opinions 
Percentage 
124,989 
87.78% 
1,466 
1.03% 
14,946 
10.50% 
985 
0.69% 
142,386 
100.00% 
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Table 4.10 Simulated Error Count Using Z-Score Classic Model for Bright-Line Test by 
Bankruptcy Type 
Bankruptcy Type Type I: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
Chapter 7 72 
15.86% 
382 
84.14% 
454 
100.00% 
Chapter 11 314 
15.81% 
1,672 
84.19% 
1,986 
100.00% 
Chapter 15 0 
0% 
10 
100% 
10 
100.00% 
Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, 
but subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued 
within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.  
I include a Pearson’s Correlation matrix in Table 4.11 for each BPM specification 
against actual bankruptcies in t+1. As expected, each model is significantly predictive. 
The correlation coefficient between Bankruptcy Indicator and GCO Indicator (0.1218) is 
larger than between Bankruptcy Indicator and any of the tested Z-Score models. This 
suggests that auditor judgment outperforms the scores for bankruptcy prediction.   
 
Table 4.11 Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for BPM Predictions compared to Historical 
Going Concern Opinions and Bankruptcy Filings 
Variable 
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
GCO  
Indicator 
1968 Z-
Score 
Classic 
Indicator 
1968 Z-
Score 
(p>0.5) 
Indicator 
1993 Z-
Score 
(p>0.5) 
Indicator 
2004 Z-
Score 
(p>0.5) 
Indicator 
Bankruptcy  
Indicator 
1.0000      
GCO  
Indicator 
0.1218 
<0.0001 
1.0000     
1968 Z-Score 
Classic 
Indicator 
0.0596 
<0.0001 
0.1810 
<0.0001 
1.0000    
1968 Z-Score 
(p>0.5) 
Indicator 
-0.0263 
<0.0001 
-0.2061 
<0.0001 
-0.7930 
<0.0001 
1.0000   
1993 Z-Score 
(p>0.5) 
Indicator 
-0.0550 
<0.0001 
-0.2264 
<0.0001 
-0.8252 
<0.0001 
0.92724 
<0.0001 
1.0000  
2004 Z-Score 
(p>0.5) 
Indicator 
0.0495 
<0.0001 
0.1628 
<0.0001 
-0.6008 
<0.0001 
0.7577 
<0.0001 
0.7055 
<0.0001 
1.0000 
Where the Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730 
days of the audit report filing date. GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern 
qualifications in the audit report. Model specifications and variable definitions are 
provided in equations 1-3. 
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This dissertation questions whether it is appropriate to use bright-line tests in the 
planning stage of an audit. This is a unique environment because auditors must consider 
the impact of planning materiality when performing analytical procedures. I simulate the 
risk-based auditing environment by transforming the accounting fundamentals for 
individual companies to reflect negative news at common materiality thresholds4.  
 I test five alternatives for quantitative materiality thresholds that could be used 
during audit planning. I manipulate the accounting fundamentals of each company to 
reflect negative news within five common materiality thresholds. The five levels of 
planning materiality simulated or each type of misstatement include (1) five percent of 
earnings before taxes (hereafter, EBIT), (2) one percent of EBIT, (3) 0.3 percent of total 
assets, (4) 0.5 percent of total assets, and (5) one percent of retained earnings. In 
analyzing the results, I am aware that different thresholds for planning materiality are 
used to evaluate balance sheet and income statement items. A percentage of EBIT (1 
and 2) is used to evaluate misstated sales (A), where a percentage of total assets (3 and 
4) is used to evaluate misstated assets and liabilities (B through E). Furthermore, 
quantitative materiality thresholds are often set at 5% of net income as a rule-of-thumb in 
practice; however, research suggests that this threshold is set lower for companies that 
show weak earnings. 
I simulated the performance of bright-line testing using (1) the Altman’s (1968) Z-
Score model and the classic threshold of Z-Score < 1.8 as a proxy for default and (2) the 
Hillegeist et al. (2004) Z-Score with the threshold probability of default at 50%. For each 
model, I simulated twenty-five errors: the combination of errors at five levels of planning 
materiality and five types of misstatements tested include simulations where (A) net 
sales are overstated, (B) long-term assets are overstated, (C) current assets are 
overstated, (D) long-term liabilities are understated, and (E) current liabilities are 
understated. Table 4.12 presents the results of the simulations. Panel A includes the 
simulation results using the 1968 classic definition of Z-Score. Panel B reports the 
results from the 2004 re-estimation.  
 
                                                          
4 Preliminary analysis of $1 less than the materiality threshold or 99.99% of the materiality threshold 
indicated that BPM analysis is not sensitive to this cut off. 
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Table 4.12 Simulated Error Count from Bright-Line Tests using Z-Score Model in a 
Simulated Audit Planning Environment 
Panel A: Bright-Line Tests of 1968 Z-Score Classic Model Given Simulated 
Overstatements in Sales 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
5% of EBIT 87,028 
61.12% 
2,057 
1.44% 
52,907 
37.16% 
394 
0.28% 
142,386 
100.00% 
1% of EBIT 87,072 
61.15% 
2,064 
1.45% 
52,863 
37.13% 
387 
0.27% 
142,386 
100.00% 
0.3% of TA 87,312 
61.32% 
2,072 
379% 
52,623 
36.96% 
379 
0.27% 
142,386 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 87,457 
61.42% 
2,073 
1.46% 
52,478 
36.86% 
378 
0.27% 
142,386 
100.00% 
1% of RE 86,950 
61.07% 
2,062 
1.45% 
52,985 
37.21% 
389 
0.27% 
142,386 
100.00% 
Panel B: Bright-Line Tests of 1968 Z-Score Classic Model Given Simulated 
Overstatement in Long-term Assets 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
5% of EBIT 96,951 
68.09% 
1,528 
1.07% 
42,984 
30.19% 
923 
0.65% 
142,386 
100.00% 
1% of EBIT 9,943 
65.28% 
1,829 
1.28% 
46,992 
33.00% 
622 
0.44% 
142,386 
100.00% 
0.3% of TA 106,182 
74.57% 
2,186 
1.54% 
33,753 
23.71% 
265 
0.19% 
142,386 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 109,583 
76.96% 
2,214 
1.55% 
30,652 
21.32% 
237 
0.17% 
142,386 
100.00% 
1% of RE 139,935 
98.28% 
2,451 
1.72% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
142,386 
100.00% 
Panel C: Bright-Line Tests of 1968 Z-Score Classic Model Given Simulated 
Overstatement in Current Assets 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
5% of EBIT 96,939 
68.08% 
1,524 
1.07% 
42,996 
30.20% 
927 
0.65% 
142,386 
100.00% 
1% of EBIT 92,947 
65.28% 
1,829 
1.28% 
46,988 
33.00% 
622 
0.44% 
142,386 
100.00% 
0.3% of TA 106,212 
74.59% 
2,186 
1.54% 
33,723 
23.68% 
265 
0.19% 
142,386 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 109,623 
76.99% 
2,215 
1.56% 
30,312 
21.29% 
236 
0.17% 
142,386 
100.00% 
1% of RE 94,515 
66.38% 
1,702 
1.20% 
45,420 
31.90% 
749 
0.53% 
142,386 
100.00% 
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Table 4.12 (continued) 
Panel D: Bright-Line Tests of 1968 Z-Score Classic Model Given Simulated 
Understatement in Long-Term Liabilities 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
5% of EBIT 86,843 
60.99% 
2,050 
1.44% 
53,092 
37.29% 
401 
0.28% 
142,386 
100.00% 
1% of EBIT 87,003 
61.10% 
2,066 
1.45% 
52,932 
37.18% 
385 
0.27% 
142,386 
100.00% 
0.3% of TA 87,196 
61.24% 
2,066 
1.45% 
52,739 
37.04% 
385 
0.27% 
142,386 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 87,259 
61.28% 
2,066 
1.45% 
52,676 
37.00% 
385 
0.27% 
142,386 
100.00% 
1% of RE 86,805 
60.96% 
2,059 
1.45% 
53,130 
37.31% 
392 
0.28% 
142,386 
100.00% 
Panel E: Bright-Line Tests of 1968 Z-Score Classic Model Given Simulated 
Understatement in Current Liabilities 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
5% of EBIT 86,834 
60.98% 
2,048 
1.44% 
53,101 
37.29% 
403 
0.28% 
142,386 
100.00% 
1% of EBIT 87,004 
61.10% 
2,066 
1.45% 
52,931 
37.17% 
385 
0.27% 
142,386 
100.00% 
0.3% of TA 87,245 
61.27% 
2,068 
1.45% 
52,690 
37.01% 
383 
0.27% 
142,386 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 87,337 
61.34% 
2,068 
1.45% 
52,598 
36.94% 
383 
0.27% 
142,386 
100.00% 
1% of RE 86,793 
60.96% 
2,060 
1.45% 
53,142 
37.32% 
391 
0.27% 
142,386 
100.00% 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning 
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I 
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a 
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III 
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. 
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT is 
total assets, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, and RE is retained earnings. 
Informed by the performance of bright-line testing in Table 4.9. I selected the 
2004 Z-Score Model as a sensitivity test for discriminate analysis models. I repeated the 
test simulations from Table 4.12 with the 2004 specification (equation 3) of the Z-Score 
model. The results appear in Table 4.13. The pattern suggests that this model fails to 
correctly predict bankruptcies given relatively small changes in accounting 
fundamentals. Auditors using this model as an analytical procedure in the planning stage 
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of the audit would identify fewer Type II errors, but would also fail to identify almost all 
bankruptcies.  
Table 4.13 Simulated Error Count from Bright-Line Testing using the 2004 Z-Score 
Model in a Simulated Audit Planning Environment 
Panel A: Bright-Line Tests of 2004 Z-Score Model Given Simulated Overstatements in 
Sales 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
5% of EBIT 86,879 
97.67% 
1,975 
2.22% 
101 
0.11% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
1% of EBIT 86,879 
97.67% 
1,975 
2.22% 
101 
0.11% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
0.3% of TA 86,879 
97.67% 
1,975 
2.22% 
101 
0.11% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 86,879 
97.67% 
1,975 
2.22% 
101 
0.11% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
1% of RE 86,879 
97.67% 
1,975 
2.22% 
101 
0.11% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
Panel B: Bright-Line Tests of 2004 Z-Score Model Given Simulated Overstatement in 
Long-term Assets 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
5% of EBIT 86,929 
97.72% 
1,975 
2.22% 
51 
0.06% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
1% of EBIT 86,917 
97.71% 
1,975 
2.22% 
63 
0.07% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
0.3% of TA 86,879 
97.67% 
1,975 
2.22% 
101 
0.11% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 86,879 
97.67% 
1,975 
2.22% 
101 
0.11% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
1% of RE 86,924 
97.72% 
1,975 
2.22% 
56 
0.06% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
Panel C: Bright-Line Tests of 2004 Z-Score Model Given Simulated Overstatement in 
Current Assets 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
5% of EBIT 86,930 
97.72% 
1,975 
2.22% 
50 
0.06% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
1% of EBIT 86,917 
97.71% 
1,975 
2.22% 
63 
0.07% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
0.3% of TA 86,879 
97.67% 
1,975 
2.22% 
101 
0.11% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 86,879 
97.67% 
1,975 
2.22% 
101 
0.11% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
1% of RE 86,924 
97.72% 
1,975 
2.22% 
56 
0.06% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
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Table 4.13 (continued) 
Panel D: Bright-Line Tests of 2004 Z-Score Model Given Simulated Understatement in 
Long-Term Liabilities 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
5% of EBIT 86,558 
97.31% 
1,972 
2.22% 
422 
0.47% 
3 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
1% of EBIT 86,862 
97,65% 
1,975 
2.22% 
118 
0.13% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
0.3% of TA 86,883 
97.67% 
1,975 
2.22% 
97 
0.11% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 85,883 
97.67% 
1,975 
2.22% 
97 
0.11% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
1% of RE 86,217 
95.92% 
1,965 
2.21% 
763 
0.86% 
10 
0.01% 
88,955 
100.00% 
Panel E: Bright-Line Tests of 2004 Z-Score Model Given Simulated Understatement in 
Current Liabilities 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
5% of EBIT 86,562 
97.31% 
1,972 
2.22% 
418 
0.47% 
3 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
1% of EBIT 86,863 
97.65% 
1,975 
2.22% 
117 
0.13% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
0.3% of TA 86,883 
97.67% 
1,975 
2.22% 
97 
0.11% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 86,883 
97.67% 
1,975 
2.22% 
97 
0.11% 
0 
0.00% 
88,955 
100.00% 
1% of RE 86,221 
96.93% 
1,965 
2.21% 
759 
0.85% 
10 
0.01% 
88,955 
100.00% 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning 
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I 
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a 
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III 
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. 
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT is 
total assets, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, and RE is retained earnings. 
Note that the classic Z-Score model appears more sensitive to misstated assets. 
Overall, the 2004 model and the probability>0.5 test appear less sensitive to 
misstatements at the level of planning materiality and more stable in the audit 
environment. However, this bright-line test also results in substantially more Type II 
errors, as noted previously. The 2004 Z-Score model appears to be sensitive to errors 
that auditors may consider immaterial during the planning stage of the audit. Table 5.3-
Panel D reports 474 Type I errors with the 2004 O-Score model used as a bright-line test 
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in audit planning. The simulations demonstrate that a misstatement at the level of 
planning materiality could result in between 474 and 2,456 Type I errors using this model 
as a bright-line test. Type II errors would decrease from 87,743 to between 54,468 and 
87,244. This may indicate that these levels for planning materiality are inappropriately 
large if the O-Score is used a bright-line test for going concern.  
4.2.2 O-ScoreTesting. 
I collect the variables needed to calculate each determinant of Ohlson’s O-Score 
specified in equation 5 and 6 from Compustat North America Daily - Fundamentals 
Annual dataset from 1999 through 2016. I match the variable to my sample from Audit 
Analytics. I define X6 as an indicator variable when the cumulative net income over the 
previous two years is negative and X8 as an indicator variable equal to one if owners’ 
equity is negative. The matched sample includes 142,784 firm-year observations with 
adequate data availability that include 2,098 bankruptcies and 14,417 modified going 
concern opinions. Table 4.14 includes descriptive statistics for the determinant variables 
of Ohlson’s O-Score, Winsorized at 1% to limit the effect of outliers in the Compustat 
data. 
 
Table 4.14 Descriptive Statistics for Determinant Variables in O-Score Models – 
Equations 4-5 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in O-Scores for all Firms in Sample 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
AT 142,784 13,516.45 112,235.96 0.00 441.52 3,771,199.85 
ACT 102,232 1,029.53 4,797.65 -0.17 86.84 161,978.00 
LT 142,784 11,618.56 105,587.11 0.00 249.90 3,589,783.24 
LCT 102,687 813.47 4,521.89 -
43,132.55 
38.57 329,795.00 
WCAP 101,368 224.30 1,713.09 -
99,289.00 
21.87 88,652.00 
NI 123,796 163.98 1,446.50 -
80,053.00 
2.63 104,821.00 
EBIT 123,150 381.12 2,382.41 -9.35 4.59 130,622 
Oscore 29,206 -5.61 26.51 -182.98 0.47 9.53 
Oscore04 29,206 6.32 2.57 0.33 6.54 19.74 
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT is 
total assets, ACT indicating total current assets, LT is total liabilities, LCT is total current 
liabilities, WCAP is working capital, NI is net income, EBIT is earnings before interest 
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and taxes, Oscore is the result of equation 5, and Oscore04 is the result of equation 6. N 
is the number of firm-level observations. 
Table 4.15 reports the mean of Ohlson’s O-Score for each model. Panel A 
compares the sample of firms with bankruptcies in t+1 to all other firms. Panel B 
compares the sample of firms with going concern opinions in t to firms all other firms. 
Note that, as expected, the mean O-Score for both bankrupt and going concern samples 
is lower than the mean for surviving firms and those with unmodified opinions. However, 
using the 2004 re-estimated model shows that the average O-Score for firms with GCOs 
is higher than the non-GCO firms. In all cases, the standard deviation of the means for 
bankrupt or GCO firms is larger.  
 
Table 4.15 Decriptve Means of O-Score Models - Equations 4-5Panel A: Descriptive 
Statistics for O-Scores by Bankruptcy Indicator  
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
0 
Oscore 28,581 -5.61 26.70 -182.98 0.53 9.53 
Oscore04 28,581 6.35 2.57 0.33 6.55 19.74 
1 
Oscore 625 -5.26 15.53 -182.98 -2.22 9.53 
Oscore04 625 5.24 2.42 0.33 4.71 19.74 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for O-Scores by GCO Indicator  
GCO 
Indicator 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
0 
Oscore 24,789 0.15 8.45 -182.98 1.12 9.53 
Oscore04 24,789 6.11 1.84 0.33 6.55 19.74 
1 
Oscore 4,417 -37.89 54.96 -182.98 -13.13 9.53 
Oscore04 4,417 7.54 4.80 0.33 5.86 19.74 
Where the Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730 
days of the audit report filing date. GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern 
qualifications in the audit report. Oscore is the result of equation 5, and Oscore04 is the 
result of equation 6. N is the number of firm-level observations. 
 
I test the appropriateness of using a bright-line test based on BPMs as a 
substitute for auditors’ judgment to identify firms with going concern uncertainty during 
the planning stages of an audit. Following Hillegeist et al. 2004, I test two O-Score 
models to estimate the probability of bankruptcy. I test the original model (equation 4) 
and the 2004 re-estimated model (equation 5) and use probability of bankruptcy > 50% 
and 70% as a bright-line tests to substitute for auditor judgment.   
Table 4.16 reports the error rates of each model. Using the more-likely-than-not 
definition (where the probability of default is estimated to be greater than 50%) as a 
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bright-line test or the 2004 O-Score model resulted in the greatest number of GCO 
warnings issued prior to a bankruptcy (2,093, 85.22%) which is significantly better than 
auditor’s predictions (987, 40.19%). Type I error rates were 3.8 times higher for bankrupt 
firms based on auditor judgments. If the only goal of auditors was to predict 
bankruptcies, the bright-line test in Panels B and D would appear to be a clear winner; 
however, there were significantly more Type II errors using the bright-line test in for O-
Score in Panel B (93,393) compared to historical errors (14,981). Overall, auditors 
predicted 15,968 bankruptcies and were correct 6.18% of the time. The Bright-line test in 
Panel B predicted 95,486 bankruptcies and was correct 2.19% of the time. The Bright-
line test in Panel D predicted 95,466 bankruptcies and was correct 2.19% of the time. 
Evaluating the usefulness of each test requires cost trade-off analysis between Type I 
and Type II errors. 
 
Table 4.16 Results of Bright-Line Testing of O-Score Models 
Panel A: Historical Error Count based on Auditor Judgment 
Panel B: Simulated Error Count Where Bright-Line Testing Replaces Auditor Judgment 
Bright-Line Test 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
1980 O-Score with Probability 
(p>0.5) 
124,530 
87.22% 
2,307 
1.62% 
15,798 
11.06% 
149 
0.10% 
142,784 
100.00% 
1980 O-Score with Probability 
(p>0.7) 
127,011 
88.95% 
2,348 
1.64% 
13,317 
9.33% 
108 
0.05% 
142,784 
100.00% 
2004 O-Score with Probability 
(p>0.5) 
111,747 
78.26% 
1,831 
1.28% 
28,581 
20.02% 
625 
0.44% 
142,784 
100.00% 
2004 O-Score with Probability 
(p>0.7) 
112,085 
78.50% 
1,837 
1.29% 
28,243 
19.78% 
819 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning 
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I 
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a 
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III 
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. 
 The sample contains 1,991 Chapter 11 bankruptcies that may be strategic and 
not proxy for a failing firm. Table 4.17 examines the use of bright line testing for the 454 
Chapter 7 bankruptcies included in the sample. Auditors using the bright-line test with 
the 2004 O-Score Model (Equation 5) would have identified 370 (81.50%) of these 
Auditor Judgment 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
Going Concern Opinions 
Percentage 
125,347 
87.79% 
1,469 
1.03% 
14,981 
10.49% 
987 
0.69% 
142,784 
100.00% 
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bankruptcies prior to filing. Using the bright-line test limited Type I errors to 18.50% for 
Chapter 7 bankruptcies. This is significantly fewer Type I errors than using historic GCO 
(195, 42.95%). 
 
Table 4.17 Simulated Error Count Using O-Score Classic Model for Bright-Line Test by 
Bankruptcy Type 
Bankruptcy Type Type I: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
Chapter 7 195 
42.95% 
259 
57.05% 
454 
100.00% 
Chapter 11 1,254 
63.49% 
727 
35.51% 
1991 
100.00% 
Chapter 15 9 
90.00% 
1 
10.00% 
10 
100.00% 
Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, 
but subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued 
within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.  
I include a Pearson’s Correlation matrix in Table 4.17 of each BPM against actual 
bankruptcies in t+1. As expected, each model is significantly predictive. The correlation 
coefficient is higher between the bankruptcy indicator and auditors going concern 
opinions than the tested O-Score models. This suggests that auditor judgment 
outperforms the scores for bankruptcy prediction.   
Table 4.18 Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for BPM Predictions compared to Historical 
Going Concern Opinions and Bankruptcy Filings 
Variable 
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
GCO  
Indicator 
1980 O-
Score(p>0.5) 
Indicator 
2004 O-
Score(p>0.5) 
Indicator 
Bankruptcy  
Indicator 
1.00000    
GCO  
Indicator 
0.12175 
<0.0001 
1.00000   
1980 O-
Score(p>0.5) 
Indicator 
-0.02269 
<0.0001 
-
0.10114 
<0.0001 
1.00000  
2004 O-
Score(p>0.5) 
Indicator 
0.01644 
<0.0001 
0.05382 
<0.0001 
0.63949 
<0.0001 
1.00000 
Where the Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730 
days of the audit report filing date. GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern 
qualifications in the audit report. Model specifications and variable definitions are 
provided in equations 4-5. 
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 Next, I simulated the risk-based auditing environment by transforming the 
accounting fundamentals for individual companies to reflect negative news at common 
materiality thresholds.  
I simulated the performance of bright-line testing using the 2004 O-Score model 
with the threshold probability of default at 50%. The five types of misstatements tested 
include simulations where (A) net sales are overstated, (B) long-term assets are 
overstated, (C) current assets are overstated, (D) long-term liabilities are understated, 
and (E) current liabilities are understated. I manipulate the accounting fundamentals of 
the companies to reflect negative news within five common materiality thresholds. The 
five levels of planning materiality simulated or each type of misstatement include (1) five 
percent of earnings before taxes (EBIT), (2) one percent of EBIT, (3) 0.3 percent of total 
assets, (4) 0.5% of total assets, and (5) one percent of retained earnings. I simulated 
five errors at five levels of planning materiality. In analyzing the results, I limited inclusion 
based on the general use of EBIT-based materiality thresholds to audit income 
statement items and asset-based thresholds to audit balance sheet items. The fifteen 
most relevant simulations follow in Table 4.18. 
 
Table 4.19 Simulated Error Count from Bright-Line Tests using O-Score Models in a 
Simulated Audit Planning Environment 
Panel A: Bright-Line Tests of 1980 O-Score Model Given Simulated Overstatements in 
Sales 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
5% of EBIT 112,250 
78.62% 
1,835 
1.29% 
28,058 
19.66% 
621 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
1% of EBIT 112,236 
78.61% 
1,837 
1.29% 
28,092 
19.67% 
619 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
1% of RE 112,957 
79.13% 
1,842 
1.29% 
27,341 
19.15% 
614 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
Panel B: Bright-Line Tests of 1980 O-Score Classic Model Given Simulated 
Overstatement in Long-term Assets 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
0.3% of TA 113,005 
79.14% 
1,842 
1.29% 
27,323 
19.14% 
614 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 113,036 
79.14% 
1,842 
1.29% 
27,322 
19.14% 
614 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
1% of RE 112,950 
79.13% 
1,842 
1.29% 
27,348 
19.15% 
614 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
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Table 4.19 (continued) 
Panel C: Bright-Line Tests of 1980 O-Score Model Given Simulated Overstatement in 
Current Assets 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
0.3% of TA 112,942 
79.10% 
1,841 
1.29% 
27,386 
19.18% 
615 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 112,971 
79.12% 
1,841 
1.29% 
27,357 
19.16% 
615 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
1% of RE 112,405 
78.72% 
1,840 
1.29% 
27,923 
19.56% 
616 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
Panel D: Bright-Line Tests of 1980 O-Score Classic l Given Simulated Understatement 
in Long-Term Liabilities 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
0.3% of TA 112,876 
79.05% 
1,841 
1.29% 
27,452 
19.23% 
615 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 112,876 
79.05% 
1,841 
1.29% 
27,452 
19.23% 
615 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
1% of RE 112,942 
79.10% 
1,842 
1.29% 
27,356 
19.18% 
614 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
Panel E: Bright-Line Tests of 1980 O-Score Model Given Simulated Understatement in 
Current Liabilities 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
0.3% of TA 112,851 
79.06% 
1,841 
1.29% 
27,447 
19.22% 
615 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 112,822 
79.02% 
1,841 
1.29% 
27,506 
19.26% 
615 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
1% of RE 113,445 
79.45% 
1,847 
1.29% 
26,883 
18.83% 
609 
0.43% 
142,784 
100.00% 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning 
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I 
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a 
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III 
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. 
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT 
indicates total assets, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, and RE is retained 
earnings. 
 The 2004 O-Score model appears to be sensitive to errors that auditors may 
consider immaterial during the planning stage of the audit. Table 4.19-Panel B reports 
363 Type I errors with the 2004 O-Score model used as a bright-line test in audit 
planning. The simulations demonstrate that a misstatement at the level of planning 
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materiality would result in 375-433 Type I errors using this bright-line test. Type II errors 
would decrease from 93,393 to between 84,909 and 88,337. This may indicate that 
these levels for planning materiality are inappropriately large if the O-Score is used a 
bright-line test for going concern. 
4.2.3 Hazard Model Testing. 
 The Shumway Hazard model required data from Compustat North American 
Daily – Fundamentals Annual dataset and the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) Stock/Security Files. I calculated all scores then matched the scores to my 
sample from Audit Analytics. The matched sample includes 53,043 firm-year 
observations with adequate data availability that include 963 bankruptcies and 2,046 
modified going concern opinions. Table 4.20 includes descriptive statistics for the 
determinant variables for Shumway’s Hazard model (Windsorized at 1%). Panel A 
highlights the difference in variable means by error type. Firms with going concern 
indicators were smaller with a mean net loss. Note that the probability of default is higher 
for bankrupt and GCO firms, as expected. The mean probability of default for bankrupt 
firms with GCO warnings is 43%. Bankrupt firms with GCO warnings had the smallest 
mean assets and the largest mean loss of any group, as expected. 
 
Table 4.20 Descriptive Statistics for Determinant Variables of Shumway Model – 
Equation 6 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Shumway for all Firms in Sample 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
AT 50,043 4,752.86 18,632.88 5.02 398.61 161,165.00 
LT 50,043 3,185.14 12,905.69 0.89 191.24 111,881.00 
NI 50,043 135.66 578.07 -642.37 6.25 4295.30 
PRCC_F 50,043 19.24 18.94 0.27 13.62 94.00 
CSHO 50,043 100.88 260.74 1.47 27.30 1,884.31 
sigma 50,043 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.03 1.21 
shumway 50,043 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Shumway by Bankruptcy Indicator  
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
0 Shumway 52,080 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.00 1.00 
1 Shumway 963 0.24 0.36 0.00 0.04 1.00 
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Table 4.20 (continued) 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Shumway by GCO Indicator  
GCO 
Indicator 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
0 Shumway 50,997 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 
1 Shumway 2,045 0.29 0.36 0.00 0.10 1.00 
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT 
indicating total assets, ACT indicating total current assets, LT is total liabilities, NI is net 
income, CSHO is the number of common shares outstanding, and PRCC_F is the price 
per share of common stock at the end of the fiscal year. Sigma and Shumway are 
outputs of the model specified in equation 6; where Shumway represents the likelihood 
of default. N is the number of firm-level observations. 
 Table 4.21 reports the mean Shumway score (3%). Panel A compares the mean 
Shumway score for the sample of firms with bankruptcies in t+1 (0.24) to all other firms 
(0.03). Panel B compares the mean Shumway score for the sample of firms with going 
concern opinions in t (0.29) to firms all other firms (0.02). These results highlight that 
auditors capture the information contained in Shumway scores to some degree during 
their going concern judgments.  
 
Table 4.21 Results of Bright-Line Testing of Shumway Models 
Panel A: Historical Error Count based on Auditor Judgment 
Panel B: Simulated Error Count Where Bright-Line Testing Replaces Auditor Judgment 
Bright-Line Test 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
Shumway with Probability (p>0.5) 51,070 
96.28% 
765 
1.44% 
1,010 
1.92% 
198 
0.37% 
53,043 
100.00% 
Shumway with Probability (p>0.7) 51,252 
96.62% 
793 
1.50% 
826 
1.56% 
170 
0.32% 
53,043 
100.00% 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning 
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I 
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a 
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III 
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. 
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels.  
 
Auditor Judgment 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
Going Concern Opinions 
Percentage 
50,356 
94.93% 
641 
1.21% 
1,724 
3.25% 
322 
0.51% 
53,043 
100.00% 
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To test the appropriateness of using Shumway default probability scores as a 
substitute for auditors’ judgment in the identification of going concern uncertainty during 
the planning stages of an audit, I define a bright-line test of Shumway probability at 
greater than 50% and 70%. Table 4.22 contains the results of this test. Panel A reports 
the errors using p > 0.50. Using this bright-line test resulted in the correct identification of 
198 bankruptcies (20.6%) with 765 (79.4%) misidentified of the 963 in the sample. This 
test recommends the issuance in 1,208 GCOs, of which 1,010 would be on firms that did 
not go bankrupt in the following period (83.6%). Panel B reports the errors using p > 
0.70. The 70% bright-line test would predict 998 bankruptcies. Using this definition 
correctly identified 170 bankruptcies with 793 (82.3%) Type I errors and 828 (83.0%) 
Type II errors. Defining the appropriate threshold for the bright-line testing highlighted a 
trade-off between Type I and Type II errors. While the 50% probability bright-line test 
identified more bankruptcies (as would be expected), ranking the appropriateness of 
these tests cannot be determined without comparing the cost of each error type. 
 
Table 4.22 Simulated Error Count Using Shumway Model for Bright-Line Test by 
Bankruptcy Type 
Bankruptcy Type Type I: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
Chapter 7 134 
76.57% 
41 
23.43% 
175 
100.00% 
Chapter 11 657 
83.69% 
128 
16.31% 
785 
100.00% 
Chapter 15 2 
100.00% 
0 
0.00% 
2 
100.00% 
Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, 
but subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued 
within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.  
  The sample contains 785 Chapter 11 bankruptcies that may be strategic and not 
proxy for a failing firm. This represents the bulk of the sample with sufficient data 
availability for the Shumway model. Table 4.24 examines the use of bright line testing for 
the 175 Chapter 7 bankruptcies included in the sample. Reported in Panel A, auditors 
using the bright-line test with the 70% threshold with the Shumway default probability 
score would have identified 41 (23.4%) of these bankruptcies in the period prior to filing. 
Type I errors for Chapter 7 bankruptcies (134) represented 76.6% of the Chapter 7 
bankruptcies remaining in the sample. Panel B reports that 82 of the 175 received a 
GCO in the prior period. This indicates a significantly higher rate of Type I errors using 
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the bright-line test (134, 76.6%) than using historic GCO (93, 53.1%) for the sub-sample 
of Chapter 7 firms.  
Table 4.23 tests the significance of resulting predictions using a Pearson’s 
Correlation Matrix. It reports that Shumway’s model is significantly predictive at p < 
0.001. The correlation statistic for the model (0.20048) is slightly lower for the Shumway 
score than for GCO Indicator (0.20687). This suggests that auditor judgment is a better 
predictor of bankruptcy than the Shumway model. 
 
Table 4.23 Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for BPM Predictions compared to Historical 
Going Concern Opinions and Bankruptcy Filings 
Variable 
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
GCO  
Indicator 
Shumway 
(p>0.5) 
Indicator 
Bankruptcy  
Indicator 
1.0000   
GCO  
Indicator 
0.20687 
<0.0001 
1.0000  
Shumway 
(p>0.5) 
Indicator 
0.20048 
<0.0001 
0.37705 
<0.0001 
1.0000 
Where the Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730 
days of the audit report filing date. GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern 
qualifications in the audit report. Model specifications and variable definitions are 
provided in equations 6. 
 
Next, I simulated the risk-based auditing environment by transforming the 
accounting fundamentals for individual companies to reflect negative news at common 
materiality thresholds. Because the Shumway model relies less heavily on accounting 
fundamentals, changes in materiality in several scenarios does not affect model results. 
For example, total current assets and total current liabilities aren’t variables in the 
Shumway model, so the simulations for overstated current assets and understated 
current liabilities have been omitted. The panels in Table 4.24 display only those 
scenarios where my planned manipulations affected Shumway scores. The number of 
correctly predicted bankruptcies range from 188 to 198. The number of Type I and Type 
II errors range from 765 to 775 and 931 to 1,013, respectively. It appeared that the 
performance of this model was most sensitive to non-material overstatements of assets.  
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Table 4.24 Simulated Error Count from Bright-Line Tests using Shumway Model in a 
Simulated Audit Planning Environment 
Panel A: Bright-Line Tests of Shumway Model Given Simulated Overstatements in Sales 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
5% of EBIT 51,088 
96.31% 
766 
1.44% 
992 
1.67% 
197 
0.37% 
53,043 
100.00% 
1% of EBIT 51,076 
96.29% 
766 
1.44% 
1,004 
1.89% 
197 
0.37% 
53,043 
100.00% 
1% of RE 51,098 
95.33% 
767 
1.45% 
982 
1.85% 
196 
0.37% 
53,043 
100.00% 
 
Panel B: Bright-Line Tests of Shumway Model Given Simulated Overstatement in Long-
term Assets 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
0.3% of TA 51,067 
96.27% 
765 
1.44% 
1,013 
1.91% 
198 
0.37% 
53,043 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 51,067 
95.27% 
765 
1.44% 
1,013 
1.91% 
198 
0.37% 
53,043 
100.00% 
1% of RE 51,149 
96.43% 
775 
1.46% 
931 
1.76% 
188 
0.35% 
53,043 
100.00% 
 
Panel C: Bright-Line Tests of Shumway Model Given Simulated Understatement in 
Long-Term Liabilities 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
0.3% of TA 51,066 
95.28% 
765 
1.44% 
1,012 
1.91% 
198 
0.37% 
53,043 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 51,067 
96.27% 
765 
1.44% 
1,013 
1.91% 
198 
0.37% 
53,043 
100.00% 
1% of RE 51,118 
95.37% 
769 
1.45% 
962 
1.61% 
194 
0.37% 
53,043 
100.00% 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning 
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I 
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a 
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III 
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. 
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT 
indicates total assets and RE is retained earnings. 
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4.2.4 Distance-to-Default Testing.  
I followed the framework established by Bharath and Shumway (2008) to 
estimate the Merton-KMV Distance-to-Default model using Compustat and CRSP to 
obtain the financial variables needed for the analysis. From Compustat, I obtained the 
total value of long-term debt (DLTTQ) and the value of debt in current liabilities (DLCQ) 
on a quarterly basis. From CRSP, I acquired daily stock prices (PRC) and total shares 
outstanding (SHROUT) on a daily basis. I obtain the monthly risk-free rate for three-
month treasury bills from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. I used 
the SAS code provided by Bharath and Shumway (2008) to fit the Merton Distance-to-
Default model and calculated the EDF.  
I began by calculating the EDF for all firms with adequate data availability. This 
resulted in 297,095 firm-quarter observations. I matched these observations to my 
sample of firms from Audit Analytics and isolated the largest quarterly EDF per firm-year. 
The matched sample includes 90,746 firm-year observations with adequate data 
availability that include 1,199 bankruptcies and 2,859 modified going concern opinions. 
Table 4.25 includes descriptive statistics for the determinant variables for Merton’s KMV 
model. Panel A highlights the difference in variable means by error type. Firms with 
going concern indicators were smaller with a mean net loss. Note that the expected 
default frequency is higher for bankrupt and GCO firms, as expected. The mean EDF for 
bankrupt firms with GCO warnings is 95%. Bankrupt firms with GCO warnings had the 
smallest total firm value of any group, as expected. 
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Table 4.25 Descriptive Statistics for Determinant Variables of Merton’s Distance-to-
Default Model – Equation 7 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Distance-to-Default for all Firms in 
Sample 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
AT 63,987 156,033.55 525,167.70 0.06 12,560.22 30,121,763.83 
MU 63,987 -0.63 1.75 -25.29 -0.39 32.23 
assetvol 63,987 0.90 0.66 0.02 0.72 17.25 
F 63,987 39,410.35 660,725.18 0.02 2,209.00 72,701,942.00 
EDF 63,987 0.39 0.41 0.00 0.19 1.00 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Distance-to-Default by Bankruptcy Indicator  
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
0 EDF 62,788 0.38 0.41 0.00 0.17 1.00 
1 EDF 1,199 0.85 0.28 0.00 0.99 1.00 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Distance-to-Default by GCO Indicator  
GCO 
Indicator 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
0 EDF 61,128 0.37 0.40 0.00 0.16 1.00 
1 EDF 2,859 0.78 0.34 0.00 0.98 1.00 
Where AT is the total value of assets, MU is the expected asset return, assetvol is the 
volatility of AT and F is total current liabilities plus one half of the long-term debt. 
 
 Table 4.25 reports the mean EDF of 0.39. Panel A compares the mean Merton 
Distance-to-Default score (EDF) for the sample of firms with bankruptcies in t+1 (0.85) to 
all other firms (0.38). As expected, firms with subsequent bankruptcies have a mean 
EDF that is higher than both bright-line testing thresholds (50% and 70%). Panel B 
compares the mean EDF for the sample of firms with going concern opinions in t (0.78) 
to firms all other firms (0.37). These results highlight that auditors capture the 
information contained in EDF scores to some degree during their going concern 
judgments.  
To test the appropriateness of using Merton’s Distance-to-Default scores as a 
substitute for auditors’ judgment in the identification of going concern uncertainty during 
the planning stages of an audit, I define a bright-line test of Merton’s Distance-to-Default 
probability at greater than 50% and 70%. Table 4.26 contains the results of this test at 
the 50% threshold. Panel A reports the errors using p > 0.50. Using this bright-line test 
resulted in the prediction of 24,759 bankruptcies--correctly identifying 1,058 bankruptcies 
(88.24%) with 141 Type I errors (11.76%). This test would also result in 23,701 predicted 
bankruptcies on firms that did not go bankrupt in the following period (Type II errors). 
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Panel B reports the errors using p > 0.70. The 70% bright-line test would predict 20,423 
bankruptcies. Using this definition correctly identified 993 (82.82%) bankruptcies with 
206 (17.19%) Type I errors and 19,430 Type II errors. Defining the appropriate threshold 
for the bright-line testing highlighted a trade-off between Type I and Type II errors. While 
it is tempting to disqualify Distance-to-Default as a useful test for auditors, the relative 
cost between Type I and Type II errors must be considered. While the 50% probability 
bright-line test identified more bankruptcies (as would be expected), ranking the 
appropriateness of the thresholds also cannot be determined without comparing the cost 
of each error type. 
 
Table 4.26 Results of Bright-Line Testing of Distance-to-Default Models 
Panel A: Historical Error Count based on Auditor Judgment 
Panel B: Simulated Error Count Where Bright-Line Testing Replaces Auditor Judgment 
Bright-Line Test 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
D2D with Probability (p>0.5) 39,087 
61.09% 
141 
0.22% 
23,701 
37.04% 
1,058 
1.65% 
63,987 
100.00% 
D2D with Probability (p>0.7) 43,358 
67.76% 
206 
0.32% 
19,430 
30.37% 
933 
1.55% 
63,987 
100.00% 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning 
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I 
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a 
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III 
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. 
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels.  
 The data requirements for the Distance–to-Default model limit the sample. The 
sample of firms with sufficient data for the model contains 986 Chapter 11 bankruptcies 
that may be strategic and not proxy for a failing firm. Table 4.27 examines the use of 
bright line testing for the 206 Chapter 7 bankruptcies included in the sample. Reported in 
Panel A, auditors using the bright-line test with the 50% and 70% thresholds the EDF 
score would have identified 108 (52.4%) and 162 (78.64%) respectively of Chapter 7 
bankruptcies in the period prior to filing. Type I errors for Chapter 7 bankruptcies 
represented 47.6% (21.36%) of the Chapter 7 bankruptcies remaining in the sample. 
Panel B reports that 108 of the 206 Chapter 7 received a GCO in the prior period. These 
Auditor Judgment 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
Going Concern Opinions 
Percentage 
60,341 
94.30% 
787 
1.23% 
2,447 
3.82% 
412 
0.64% 
63,987 
100.00% 
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results indicate a significantly lower rate of Type I errors using the bright-line test than 
using historic GCO for the sub-sample of Chapter 7 firms.  
The test also provides empirical evidence that the threshold for a bright-line test 
using the Distance–to-Default model is sensitive to bankruptcy type. The model was 
more successful in predicting Chapter 7 bankruptcies (47.6%) than Chapter 11 
bankruptcies (30.8%) using the 50% threshold (when accuracy is measured by count). 
However, the model is less successful in predicting Chapter 7 bankruptcies (78.6%) than 
Chapter 11 bankruptcies (83.6%) using the 70% threshold.  
 
Table 4.27 Bright-Line Testing of Merton’s Distance-to-Default Model by Type of 
Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy Type Type I: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
Chapter 7 33 
16.02% 
173 
83.95% 
206 
100.00% 
Chapter 11 108 
10.95% 
878 
89.05% 
986 
100.00% 
Chapter 15 0 
0.00% 
6 
100.00% 
6 
100.00% 
Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, 
but subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued 
within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.  
 
Table 4.28 tests the significance of resulting predictions using a Pearson’s 
Correlation Matrix. It reports that Distance-to-Default model is significantly predictive at p 
< 0.01. The correlation coefficient is higher for GCO Indicator (0.19995) than for EDF 
(0.15698). This suggests that auditor judgment outperforms a bright-line test based on 
the Distance-to-Default model.  
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Table 4.28 Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for BPM Predictions compared to Historical 
Going Concern Opinions and Bankruptcy Filings 
Variable 
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
GCO  
Indicator 
D2D 
(p>0.5) 
Indicator 
Bankruptcy  
Indicator 
1.00000   
GCO  
Indicator 
0.19995 
<0.0001 
1.00000  
EDF (p>0.5) 
Indicator 
0.15698 
<0.0001 
0.20500 
<0.0001 
1.00000 
Where the Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730 
days of the audit report filing date. GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern 
qualifications in the audit report. EDF is the expected frequency of default from the 
distance to default model specified in equation 7. 
 
Next, I simulated the risk-based auditing environment by transforming the 
accounting fundamentals for individual companies to reflect negative news at common 
materiality thresholds. Because the Distance-to-Default model does not rely heavily on 
accounting fundamentals, changes in materiality in several scenarios does not affect 
model results. The model only considers current and long-term liabilities. Therefore, the 
simulations for overstated current assets, total assets, and sales have been omitted. The 
panels in Table 4.29 display only those scenarios where my planned manipulations 
affected Distance-to-Default bright-line tests at the 50% and 70% thresholds. It appears 
that this model is not sensitive to relatively small overstatements of liabilities. 
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Table 4.29 Simulated Error Count from Bright-Line Tests using Distance-to-Default 
Model in a Simulated Audit Planning Environment 
Panel A: Bright-Line Tests of Distance to Default Model with a 50% threshold for 
Expected Default Given Simulated Understatement in Long-Term Liabilities 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
5% of EBIT 25,289 
57.52% 
111 
0.25% 
17,714 
40.29% 
854 
1.94% 
43,968 
100.00% 
1% of EBIT 25,120 
57.58% 
111 
0.25% 
17,543 
40.21% 
852 
1.95% 
43,968 
100.00% 
0.3% of TA 17,083 
58.81% 
48 
0.17% 
11,562 
39.80% 
354 
1.22% 
29,047 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 17,059 
58.73% 
48 
0.17% 
11,586 
39.89% 
354 
1.22% 
29,047 
100.00% 
1% of RE 10,892 
55.26% 
41 
0.21% 
8,490 
43.07% 
288 
1.46% 
19,711 
100.00% 
Panel B: Bright-Line Tests of Distance to Default Model with a 70% threshold for 
Expected Default Given Simulated Understatement in Long-Term Liabilities 
Materiality Threshold 
Type 0: 
No Error 
Type I: Type II: 
Type III: 
No Error 
Total 
5% of EBIT 28,377 
64.54% 
152 
0.35% 
14,626 
33.27% 
813 
1.85% 
43,968 
100.00% 
1% of EBIT 19,142 
65.90% 
66 
0.23% 
9,503 
32.73% 
336 
1.16% 
43,968 
100.00% 
0.3% of TA 19,142 
65.90% 
66 
0.23% 
9,503 
32.72% 
336 
1.16% 
29,047 
100.00% 
0.5% of TA 19,135 
65.88% 
66 
0.23% 
9,510 
32.74% 
336 
1.16% 
29,047 
100.00% 
1% of RE 12,309 
62.45% 
58 
0.29% 
7,073 
35.88% 
271 
1.37% 
19,711 
100.00% 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning 
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I 
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a 
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III 
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. 
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. Where AT is 
total assets, EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, and RE is retained earnings. 
4.2.5 Summary of Bright-line Testing. 
The majority of bankruptcy prediction research evaluates the success and 
effectiveness of a particular model using count or percentages to comparing predictive 
between models. Table 4.30 provides a summary of count and percentage of accuracy 
of bright line testing to historic accuracy rates without considering sensitivity to 
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materiality thresholds. The sample size of each model differs due to data limitations. 
Note that the Z-Score and Distance to Default models outperform historical auditor 
judgment (GCOs) by limiting Type I errors. Auditor’s GCO predictions result in fewer 
Type II errors than Z-score, O-score, and Distance-to-Default models.  
 
Table 4.30 Summary of Results from Bright-Line Tests 
Panel A: Count of Errors by Type for Each Model Compared to Auditor Judgment  
Bright-Line Test No Error: 
Correctly 
Predicted 
Surviving 
Firm 
Type I 
Error: 
Bankrupt 
Firms with 
No 
Warnings 
Type II Error: 
Surviving 
Firms with 
Predicted 
Bankruptcies 
No Error: 
Correctly 
Predicted 
Bankruptcy 
Total 
Historical Auditor 
Judgment 
233,222 
 
1,944 
 
46,539 
 
1,514 
 
283,219 
1968 Z-Score <1.8 
Auditor Judgment 
52,568 
125,331 
387 
1,469 
87,726 
14,963 
2,069 
987 
142,750 
142.750 
1968 Z-Score Prob >0.5 
Auditor Judgment 
71,050 
125,331 
1,471 
1,469 
69,244 
14,963 
985 
987 
142,750 
142.750 
1993 Z-Score Prob >0.5 
Auditor Judgment 
75,706 
125,331 
1,831 
1,469 
64,588 
14,963 
625 
987 
142,750 
142.750 
2004 Z-Score Prob >0.5 
Auditor Judgment 
52,551 
125,331 
474 
1,469 
87,743 
14,963 
1,982 
987 
142,750 
142.750 
1974 O-Score Prob >0.5 
Auditor Judgment 
246,638 
251,410 
3,909 
2,017 
51,468 
46,696 
277 
1,549 
302,292 
301,672 
2004 O-Score Prob >0.5 
Auditor Judgment 
204,709 
251,410 
2,092 
2,017 
93,397 
46,696 
2,094 
1,549 
302,292 
301,672 
Shumway’s Score – 50% 
Auditor Judgment 
79,483 
77,734 
1,171 
908 
962 
2,711 
195 
458 
81,811 
81,811 
Shumway’s Score – 70% 
Auditor Judgment 
79,784 
77,734 
1,232 
908 
661 
2,711 
134 
458 
81,811 
81,811 
Merton’s EDF – 50% 
Auditor Judgment 
39,087 
60,341 
141 
787 
23,701 
2,447 
1,058 
412 
63,987 
63,987 
Merton’s EDF – 70% 
Auditor Judgment 
43,358 
60,341 
206 
787 
19,430 
2,447 
993 
412 
63,987 
63,987 
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Table 4.30 (continued) 
Panel B: Percentage of Historic Bankruptcies Identified  
Bright-Line Test 
No Error: 
Correctly Predicted 
Bankruptcy 
Type I Error: 
Bankrupt Firms 
with No Warnings 
Total 
Bankruptcies 
Historical Auditor 
Judgment 
1,514 
43.8% 
 
1,944 
56.2% 
 
3,458 
 
1968 Z-Score <1.8 
 
 
1968 Z-Score Prob >0.5 
 
 
1993 Z-Score Prob >0.5 
 
 
2004 Z-Score Prob >0.5 
 
 
Auditor Judgment  
2,069 
84.2% 
 
985 
40.1% 
 
625 
25.4% 
 
1,982 
80.7% 
 
987 
40.2% 
387 
15.8% 
 
1,471 
59.9% 
 
1,831 
74.5% 
 
474 
19.3% 
 
1,469 
59.8% 
2,456 
 
 
2,456 
 
 
2,456 
 
 
2,456 
 
 
2,456 
 
1974 O-Score Prob >0.5 
 
 
2004 O-Score Prob >0.5 
 
 
Auditor Judgment 
277 
6.6% 
 
2,094 
50.0% 
 
2,169 
51.8% 
3,909 
93.4% 
 
2,092 
50.0% 
 
2,017 
48.2% 
4,186 
 
 
4,186 
 
 
4,186 
 
Shumway’s Score – 50% 
 
 
Shumway’s Score – 70% 
 
 
Auditor Judgment 
 
198 
20.6% 
 
170 
17.7% 
 
332 
34.5% 
765 
79.4% 
 
793 
82.7% 
 
641 
66.6% 
963 
 
 
963 
 
 
963 
Merton’s EDF – 50% 
 
 
Merton’s EDF – 70% 
 
 
Auditor Judgment 
1,058 
88.2% 
 
993 
82.8% 
 
412 
34.4% 
141 
11.8% 
 
206 
17.2% 
 
787 
65.6% 
1,199 
 
 
1,199 
 
 
1,199 
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Table 4.30 (continued) 
Panel C: Percentage of GCOs Correctly Predicted 
Bright-Line Test 
No Error: 
Correctly Predicted 
Bankruptcy 
Type II Error: 
Surviving Firms 
with Predicted 
Bankruptcies 
Total 
Predicted 
GCOs 
Historical Auditor 
Judgment 
1,514 
3.2% 
46,539 
96.8% 
48,053 
1968 Z-Score <1.8 
 
 
1968 Z-Score Prob >0.5 
 
 
1993 Z-Score Prob >0.5 
 
 
2004 Z-Score Prob >0.5 
 
 
Auditor Judgment 
 
2,069 
2.3% 
 
985 
1.4% 
 
625 
1.0% 
 
1,982 
2.2% 
 
987 
6.2% 
87,726 
97.7% 
 
69,244 
98.6% 
 
64,588 
99.0% 
 
87,743 
97.8% 
 
14,963 
93.8% 
89,795 
 
 
70,229 
 
 
65,213 
 
 
89,725 
 
 
15,950 
 
1974 O-Score Prob >0.5 
 
 
2004 O-Score Prob >0.5 
 
 
Auditor Judgment 
 
277 
0.5% 
 
2,094 
2.2% 
 
1,549 
3.2% 
51,468 
99.5% 
 
93,397 
97.8% 
 
46,696 
96.8% 
51,745 
 
 
95,491 
 
 
48,245 
Shumway’s Score – 50% 
 
 
Shumway’s Score – 70% 
 
 
Auditor Judgment 
195 
16.9% 
 
134 
16.9% 
 
458 
14.5% 
962 
83.1% 
 
661 
83.1% 
 
2,711 
87.4% 
1,157 
 
 
795 
 
 
3,169 
Merton’s EDF – 50% 
 
 
Merton’s EDF – 70% 
 
 
Auditor Judgment 
 
1,058 
4.3% 
 
993 
4.9% 
 
412 
14.4% 
23,701 
95.7% 
 
19,430 
78.5% 
 
2,447 
85.6% 
24,759 
 
 
20,423 
 
 
2,859 
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Table 4.30 (continued) 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning 
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I 
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a 
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III 
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing.  
Table 4.30 Panel B presents Type I errors as a percentage of total bankruptcy. 
This panel shows the percentage of bankruptcies that would be preceded by a warning 
under each condition. The 1968 Z-Score and Distance to Default models result in the 
lowest percentage of Type I errors. Of the ten primary models tested, six outperformed 
auditor judgment for percentage of predicted bankruptcies. 
Table 4.30 Panel C presents Type II errors as a percentage of total GCO predictions. 
This panel addresses the false positive result. The reported counts may be misleading 
because sample size varies across models due to data limitations. For example, auditors 
issued 15,950, GCOs for the Altman Z-Score sample firms. A bright-line test using the 
1968 Z-Score model specification would have resulted in over 5 times more warnings. In 
general, number of warnings issued would be significantly higher using BMP bright-line 
testing based on O-Score and Z-Score models. Seven models produce a higher 
percentage of correctly predicted bankruptcies. Shumway’s Hazard Model outperformed 
auditor judgment in both count and percentage.   
4.3 Part 2. Cost Trade-off Between Type I and Type II Errors 
During a review of literature, I noted that most studies regarding BPMs evaluate 
the efficacy of models by calculating the count of percentage of accurate predictions. 
Count and percentages are not the only way to evaluate the effectiveness of a BPM. For 
Example, when a firm with a large market value prior to bankruptcy files bankruptcy 
without warning, the cost to stakeholders is higher than when a small firm with smaller 
enterprise value files. Chava and Jarrow (2004) evaluate models using size deciles, 
arguing that different models are more appropriate for different sized firms. They also 
classify BMP results by count and percentages after controlling for industry effects 
across models (Chava & Jarrow, 2004). However, I argue that count and percentages 
ignore market value and the cost trade-off between Type I and Type II errors. In the 
following analysis, I attempt to capture the cost trade-off by estimating the cost of 
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bankruptcy prediction errors and applying the estimated market cost to a simulated 
environment.    
I calculate CAR for each firm during my sample period around various windows 
surrounding (1) the date or the auditors’ predictive opinion and (2) the date a bankruptcy 
was declared or, for surviving firms, one year past the date of the original report. I used 
the Eventus tool available to graduate students at the University of Kentucky through the 
WRDS portal. Eventus pulls data directly from CRSP stock database, calculates the 
CAR or standardized CAR (hereafter, SCAR) according to the parameters set by the 
user. To calculate CAR for this research I loaded the entire sample twice. First, I 
calculated CAR and SCAR on windows based on the date of the auditors’ report (time t). 
I ran the program for CAR and SCAR windows defined as windows at (-2, +2), (-1,+1), 
(0,0) (-1, +3) (-1,+30) and (-30, +1). Next, I calculated CAR and SCAR on windows 
based on the earlier of a bankruptcy filing date or 365 after time t (t+1). I ran the program 
for the same CAR and SCAR windows. I reviewed the resulting tables for anomalies. 
General patterns emerged that appeared consistent with expectations. At time t, the 
mean CAR and SCAR for companies with GCO modifications or subsequent bankruptcy 
were negative. The CAR for firms with Type I and Type II errors were negative across 
almost all windows surrounding time t. Standard deviations were higher for firms with 
errors, going concern modifications, and bankruptcies. Standard deviations were larger 
for longer windows. At time t+1, CAR estimates were near zero or positive for firms 
without prior GCO modifications. They were significantly negative for firms with GCO 
modifications. At time t+1, The CAR for firms with Type I and Type II errors were 
negative across all windows. Standard deviations at time t+1 followed a pattern similar to 
time t.  
In the next step, I added the effect from both windows and compared average 
change in enterprise value (EV) for firms in each of the following conditions: (0) a 
surviving firm with no GCO warning, (1) a firm with a Type I Error, (2) a firm with a Type 
II Error, (3) a firm with a GCO warning that filed bankruptcy in t+1, and (4) a firm with a 
GCO warning that filed bankruptcy in t+2. I note the distributions for combined CAR were 
non-normal with high kurtosis and skewed. I found empirical evidence that for firms with 
historic errors, the percent change in stock price estimated by CAR was negative with a 
high kurtosis and negative skewness. A scatter plot confirmed the distributions were 
non-normal with the scatter and histograms of the CAR for Type I error, Type II error, 
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and correctly predict bankrupt firms all having leptokurtic density functions with thicker 
left-hand tails. 
I estimate the change in market capitalization for each firm, using the following 
formula: 
 
ΔMRKTCAP = (CAR x CHSO x PRCC_F)     (7) 
 
Where ΔMKTCAP is the change in total market capitalization for each firm, CAR 
is the mean combined buy/hold CAR calculated as a percentage of stock price over the 
five day window (-2, 2) at time t and t+1, CHSO is the net number common shares 
outstanding at year end for t, and PRCC_F is firm closing stock price at time t.  
Table 4.31 compares the CAR and change in market capitalization between firms 
with and without a GCO in period t. The results are as expected. The CAR of firms with a 
GCO is negative with a relatively large standard deviation. Firms that didn’t have a going 
concern warning achieved higher abnormal returns across all windows. Panels A 
through C report that the estimated mean abnormal change in total market capitalization 
is 6-7 times higher for firms without a GCO.  
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Table 4.31 Descriptive Statistics of Changes in Market Capitalization based on Going Concern Indicator 
Panel A: Estimated Change in Market Capitalization over a 3-Day Window (-1,+1) 
GCO 
Indicator 
CAR (-1,+1) 
N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skew 
Standard 
Error 
Min P5 P95 Max 
0 37,039 0.00 0.07 90.92 3.73 0.00 -0.84 -0.08 0.08 1.96 
1 963 -0.02 0.18 57.80 5.31 0.01 -0.82 -0.22 0.17 2.38 
Total 38,002 0.00 0.07 124.87 4.96 0.00 -0.84 -0.09 0.09 2.38 
 
GCO 
Indicator 
Change in Market Capitalization Over a 3-Day Window (-1,+1) 
N Sum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skew 
Standard 
Error 
P5 P95 
0 21,247 -$232 0 26.22 1,676.26 21.27 0.18 -10.56 10.82 
1 505 -904 -2 24.62 84.25 5.06 1.10 -26.37 12.88 
Total 21,752 -1,227 0 26.19 1,647.77 4.96 0.18 -11.00 10.85 
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Table 4.31 (continued) 
Panel B: Estimated Change in Market Capitalization over a 5-Day Window (-2,+2) 
GCO 
Indicator 
CAR (-2,+2) 
N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skew 
Standard 
Error 
Min P5 P95 Max 
0 37,039 0.00 0.08 273.61 6.41 0.00 -0.79 -0.00 0.11 4.41 
1 963 -0.02 0.21 30.63 3.64 0.01 -0.27 -0.02 0.23 2.30 
Total 38,002 0.00 0.09 231.27 6.31 0.00 -0.11 -0.00 0.11 4.41 
 
GCO 
Indicator 
Change in Market Capitalization Over a 3-Day Window (-2,+2) 
N Sum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skew 
Standard 
Error 
Min P5 P95 Max 
0 21,247 $2,594 $0 30.29 2,400.44 33.65 0.21 -$573 0.01 13.28 $2,130 
1 505 -1,202 -2 26.07 36.13 2.00 1.16 -192 -0.68 17.24 233 
Total 21,752 1,392 0 30.20 2,373.31 33.19 0.20 -573 0.00 13.37 2,130 
 
Panel C: Estimated Change in Market Capitalization over a 367-Day Window (-1,+365) 
GCO 
Indicator 
CAR (-1,+365) 
N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skew 
Standard 
Error 
Min P5 P95 Max 
0 37,051 -0.02 0.08 440.06 -7.50 0.01 -73.30 -1.55 1.57 23.46 
1 967 0.10 0.21 8.37 -1.26 0.08 -16.29 -3.54 3.80 9.77 
Total 38,018 -0.01 0.09 361.78 -6.63 0.01 -73.30 -1.61 1.64 23.46 
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Table 4.31 (continued) 
GCO  Change in Market Capitalization Over a 367-Day Window (-1,+365) 
Indicator N Sum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skew 
Standard 
Error 
Min P5 P95 Max 
0 
1 
31,193 $2,142 $0 335.39 790.24 -6.36 1.90 -$15,094 -147.42 -147.87 $13,773 
844 -3,867 5 225.50 196.15 -10.15 7.76 -4,504 -180.43 -180.98 1,350 
Total 32,037 -1,724 0 332.96 793.23 -6.41 1.86 -15,094 -147.99 -149.18 13,773 
GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern qualifications in the audit report. 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies 
were filed in the subsequent year; Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a warning was issued but the firm did not file 
bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. Where 
possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels.  
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Table 4.32 reports the descriptive statistics for CAR and ΔMRKTCAP for each 
condition. Following prior research, RQ4 predicted that the cost of Type I Errors were 35 
times costlier than Type II Errors. The results from my sample suggest that total change 
in enterprise value for Type I Errors is between 3.24 and 3.41 times less costly than 
Type II Errors. I find that the estimated costs do not have a normal distribution. The 
distribution is marked by high positive kurtosis which indicates that the distribution has 
heavier tails than a normal distribution and that maximum and minimum estimates may 
be misleading. An abnormal distribution of CAR could mean CAR a larger number of 
outliers than would be predicted in a normal distribution. I examined the plots of the 
distribution for each error classification to verify that outliers are not responsible for this 
result. I tabulate the CAR at the 95% confidence interval and include ranges in my 
estimates to provide a more complete explanation of the estimates.  
 For sensitivity, I estimate the change in MRKTCAP for each firm over 3-day, 5-
day and 367-day windows from the date of the auditor’s report. The beginning of each 
window is based on the date the 10-K was filed (t). One year past the filing date for 
surviving firms or the date a bankruptcy was filed is defined as t+1. The three-day 
window includes the abnormal returns of six days: t, the active trading days before and 
after the filing at t, t+1 and the active trading days before and after t+1. The five-day 
window includes the abnormal returns of 10 days: t, the active trading days two days 
before and two days after the filing at t, t+1 and the two active trading days before and 
after t+1. The 365-day window begins on day t and extends through the shorter of two 
trading after the next scheduled 10-K filing or two days after a filed bankruptcy.  
I estimated CAR over defined windows and observed similar patterns and results 
with each window. The five-day window (tabulated) captures any fluctuation or effects 
due to timing yet is less noisy and eliminates confounds that might be included the CAR 
calculated over an entire trading year. Although the 3-day window showed similar 
results, it might be too short and include an initial market reaction to bankruptcy news 
without subsequent correction. I report the results of in Table 4.34. The change in 
market capitalization for firms with Type I errors over the five-day window had a mean 
loss of 30.96 (-739.92 to 22.52 at the 95% confidence interval). The change in market 
capitalization for firms with Type II errors over the five-day window had a mean loss of 
1.07 (-62.26 to 33.13 at the 95% confidence interval). The mean estimate market cost 
for Type I errors was almost 29 times higher than Type II errors. This generally supports 
prior findings on minimizing Type I errors at the expense of increasing Type II errors. 
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Table 4.32 Descriptive Statistic of Changes in Market Capitalization based on Bankruptcy Indicator 
Panel A: Estimated Change in Market Capitalization over a 3-Day Window (-1, +1) 
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
CAR (-1, +1) 
N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skew 
Standard 
Error 
Min P5 P95 Max 
0 37,742 0.00 0.07 130.77 5.10 0.00 -0.84 -0.09 0.09 2.38 
1 260 -0.01 0.16 10.52 1.45 0.01 -0.52 -0.23 0.17 1.02 
Total 38,002 0.00 0.07 124.87 4.96 0.00 -0.84 -0.09 0.09 2.38 
 
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
Change in Market Capitalization Over a 3-Day Window (-1, +1) 
N Sum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skew 
Standard 
Error 
Min P5 P95 Max 
0 
21,641 $1.219 $0 26.05 1,690.75 21.45 0.18 
-
$764 
-10.43 10.82 $1,650 
1 111 -2,446 -22 40.16 5.14 -1.61 3.81 -219 -108.11 43.51 52 
Total 21,752 -1.277 -0 26.19 1,647.77 20.96 0.18 -764 -11.00 10.85 1,650 
Panel B: Estimated Change in Market Capitalization over a 5-Day Window (-2, +2) 
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
CAR (-2,+2) 
N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skew 
Standard 
Error 
Min P5 P95 Max 
0 37,742 0.00 0.09 245.79 6.60 0.00 -0.79 -0.10 0.11 4.41 
1 260 -0.02 0.20 5.42 0.74 0.01 -0.78 -0.30 0.29 0.90 
Total 38,002 0.00 0.09 231.27 6.31 0.00 -0.79 -0.11 0.11 4.41 
 
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
Change in Market Capitalization Over a 3-Day Window (-2, +2) 
N Sum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skew 
Standard 
Error 
Min P5 P95 Max 
0 21,641 $4,230 $0 30.09 2,421.89 33.78 0.20 -0.79 -0.10 0.11 4.41 
1 111 -2,838 -26 40.45 5.26 -1.78 3.84 -0.78 -0.30 0.29 0.90 
Total 21,752 1,392 0 30.20 2,373.31 33.19 0.20 -0.79 -0.11 0.11 4.41 
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Table 4.32 (continued) 
Panel C: Estimated Change in Market Capitalization over a 367-Day Window (-1, +365) 
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
CAR (-1, +365) 
N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skew 
Standard 
Error 
Min P5 P95 Max 
0 37,758 -0.01 1.22 371.94 -6.76 0.01 -73.30 -1.58 1.64 23.46 
1 260 -0.69 1.82 2.75 -0.36 0.11 9.59 -3.37 2.39 4.50 
Total 38,018 -0.01 1.22 361.78 -6.63 0.01 -73.30 -1.61 1.64 23.46 
 
Bankruptcy 
Indicator 
Change in Market Capitalization Over a 367-Day Window (-1, +365) 
N Sum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skew 
Standard 
Error 
Min P5 P95 Max 
0 31,795 $11,109 $0 333.76 791.56 -6.41 1.87 -$15,094 -145.01 149.15 $13,773 
1 242 -12,833 -53 193.30 15.90 -1.92 12.43 -1,485 -333.44 151.08 832 
Total 32,037 -1,724 -0 332.96 793.23 -6.41 1.86 -15,094 -147.99 149.18 13,773 
Where Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed within 730 days of the audit report filing date. GCO Indicator 
equals 1 for firms with going concern qualifications in the audit report. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return calculated over 
specified windows.
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 Figure 5 highlights the mean percent change in stock price over the five-day 
window given historical error types. Following prior studies, predicted bankruptcies were 
costlier than Type I errors. The decrease in stock price was 8.69 times larger for Type I 
errors. The mean decrease in stock price on a five-day window around Type I errors was 
19.519%. The mean decrease for Type II errors was 2.247%. However, that did not 
correspond to the same percentage decrease in enterprise value due to differing capital 
structures within the historical sample. For this study, I defined the market cost as the 
total decrease in market capitalization among firms classified into different error groups 
based on historical GCO in t and Bankruptcies filed in t+1. Firms with GCOs in t and 
bankruptcies in t+2 were classified as a separate group and not included in the cost 
analysis. 
 
  
No Bankruptcy in 
t+1 
Bankruptcy in  
t+1 
Unmodified Audit 
Opinion in t 
No Error:  
 
-0.041% 
Type I Error:  
 
-19.519% 
Modified Audit 
Opinion in t 
Type II Error:  
 
2.247%  
No Error:  
 
-39.156% 
Figure 5: Diagram of Mean Estimated Percent Change in Stock Price on 5-Day Window 
by Error Type 
The vast body of bankruptcy prediction research evaluates the accuracy and 
effectiveness of BPMs using a simple count or percentage of correct classification. I 
used this methodology in part one. Other studies question whether a pure count 
adequately measures effectiveness of a method.  
I hypothesis that an error in predicting bankruptcy for a firm with greater market 
capitalization is costlier to the market than errors predicting bankruptcy for firms with 
lower value. By multiplying the mean change in CAR per share (Figure 3) by the total 
outstanding shares for each firm, I can compare a naïve estimate of total market cost for 
each bankruptcy model. I apply the mean change in CAR to estimate the change in 
market capital in time t for each firm. Then, instead of evaluating the precision of the 
BMP (i.e. the count of percentage of correctly classified firms), I compare the total 
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estimated market cost of errors for each model. As Table 4.33 indicates, auditor’s 
historical GCOs have the lowest total market cost per firm and outperform bright-line 
testing from BPMs, except for the Merton-KMV model.
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Table 4.33 Summary of N and Mean estimated total market cost of errors on a 5-day window by BPM (dollars in thousands) 
 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies 
were filed in the subsequent year; Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a warning was issued but the firm did not file 
bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. Where 
possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. 
 Cost per Error Condition 
Total 
Average 
Cost  
(per 
firm) 
Type 0: 
Predicted 
Survivor 
Type I Type II 
Type III: 
Predicted 
Failure 
Auditor’s GCO 
Judgment  
$4,758 
36,838 
($2,164) 
201 
$528 
904 
($674) 
59 
$1,392 
38,002 
$0 
1968 Z-Score $38,587 
18,724 
($2,218) 
52 
($1,499,572) 
13,278 
($35,268) 
347 
($1,498,470) 
32,401 
($46) 
1993 Z-Score $58,891 
21,958 
($7,019) 
60 
($386,814) 
10,044 
($25,637) 
339 
($360,579 
32,401 
($11) 
2004 Z-Score $38,587 
31,995 
($2,218) 
52 
($1,499,572) 
13,278 
($35,268) 
347 
$63,641 
32,401 
($46) 
1980 O-Score $932 
11,912 
($13,794) 
462 
($423,119) 
12,115 
($54,815) 
101 
($490,796) 
24,590 
($20) 
2004 O-Score $19 
324 
($26) 
6 
($473,136) 
23,703 
($82,434) 
557 
($555,577) 
24,590 
($23) 
Shumway $8,512 
23,758 
($39,398) 
495 
($7,708) 
269 
($3,453) 
68 
($42,047) 
24,590 
($2) 
Distance to 
Default 
$83,596 
60,332 
($24,296) 
312 
($5,469) 
2,446 
($83,405) 
887 
($29,573) 
63,977 
($0) 
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Altman et al. (1977) estimates that Type I errors are 35 times costlier than Type II 
errors. I hypothesis (4a) that the cost of Type I errors is more than 35 times the cost of 
the average Type II Error. My naïve model for estimated market costs finds that the 
mean historical cost per Type I error was ($2,164 thousand) and the mean cost per Type 
II error resulted in a $528 thousand increase in market capitalization. Because the data 
requirements for each model differ, the firms included in each sample differ. It is 
therefore necessary to compare the average change in market capitalization value per 
firm for each model. This measure indicates that Type I errors are costlier than Type II 
errors by a factor of 5.1. This cost trade-off is significantly different than Altman et al.’s 
1977 estimate.  
Bright line testing based on each model found that the models are sensitive to 
relatively small (i.e. planning materiality) misstatements. My data provides empirical 
evidence to reject the hypothesis that the change in total cost of errors due to simulated 
misstatements is zero.  
Hypothesis 4(c) predicts that a decrease in Type I errors would result in a greater 
than 35% increase in Type II error costs. I find that the Z-Score models (1968, 1993, 
2004), the 2004 O-Score model, and Merton-KMV have better Type I accuracy when 
using bright-line testing to replace auditor judgments. However, average market cost is 
higher for the 1968 Z-Score, 1993 Z-Score, 2004 Z-Score and 2004 O-Score. Merton-
KMV has a lower rate of Type I error but a significantly higher Type II error rate. The 
average estimated market cost per firm is closer to auditor judgment (and $0) than 
models with lower Type I and Type II error rates. This evidence suggests that Merton’s-
KMV is more accurate in predictions for firms with high market capitalization. This 
provides empirical evidence that costs in addition to accuracy rates should be 
considered when evaluating model usefulness.   
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND INFERENCES 
 
 This dissertation encompasses two parts. The first part includes testing the 
feasibility of employing four BMPs in the planning phase of an audit. This part includes 
simulations to test the sensitivity of models to an audit environment where immaterial 
misstatements may subsequently be identified and adjusted without altering an overall 
audit opinion. The preliminary results from this testing suggest that certain BMPs would 
qualify more companies as uncertain going concerns. The results also highlight that 
audit judgment has historically outperformed models at limiting Type II errors. While 
some research suggests this may indicate a conflict of interest, my testing highlights the 
need for systematically valuing the trade-off between lowering Type I errors while 
simultaneously increasing Type II errors. A more detailed discussion of these results 
follows. 
5.1 Part 1. Discussion of Results Models and Simulations 
As described above and in Tables previously presented, I have examined the 
results of four seminal BPMs from finance and accounting research: Altman-Z Score, 
Ohlson’s O-Score, Shumway’s Default Probability Score, and Merton’s EDF Score. 
Regulation requires auditors to evaluate management’s assertions about whether 
“substantial doubt” exists for a company to not continue as a going concern. Using the 
50% and 70% probability threshold established by “substantial doubt”, a bright-line test 
for each BPM evaluates the feasibility of substituting auditors’ judgment with a binary 
decision model to issue a GCO. I first tested the classic Z-Score model using the 
definition of a score less than or equal to 1.8 as distressed and at risk for a going 
concern opinion. I then tested updates Z-Score models after converting the results to a 
probability. Three other models were tested. Unlike the Z-Score model, these models 
produce scores that can directly be interpreted as probabilities of default. I defined 
bright-line thresholds for decision making as a company being identified as distressed if 
the probability of default produced through Ohlson’s, Shumay’s, or Merton’s model was 
greater than 50%, and 70%. The results of the initial bright-line tests are summarized in 
Table 5.1.  
In general, historical predictions by auditors resulted in fewer total errors when 
compared to application of the tested models. However, four models (the test Z-Scores 
as classically defined, the 2004 Z-Score, the 2004 O-Score, and Merton’s EDF) reduced 
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Type I errors but increased Type II errors. Anecdotal evidence of public reaction, 
litigation results and reputation effects from Type I errors suggest that the cost of Type I 
errors is higher than the cost of Type II errors. Quantifying the cost trade-off between 
these types of errors is difficult, yet important in evaluating the usefulness of these four 
mathematical models in GCO predictions.  
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Table 5.1 Summary of Results from Bright-line Tests 
Bright-Line Test No Error: 
Correctly 
Predicted 
Surviving 
Firm 
Type I 
Error: 
Bankrupt 
Firms with 
No 
Warnings 
Type II Error: 
Surviving 
Firms with 
Predicted 
Bankruptcies 
No Error: 
Correctly 
Predicted 
Bankruptcy 
Total 
Historical Auditor 
Judgment 
233,222 1,944 46,539 1,514 283,219 
1968 Z-Score 
<1.8 
Auditor Judgment 
52,568 
125,331 
387^ 
1,469 
87,726 
14,963 
2,069^ 
987 
142,750 
142.750 
1968 Z-Score 
Prob >0.5 
Auditor Judgment 
71,050 
125,331 
1,471 
1,469 
69,244 
14,963 
985 
987 
142,750 
142.750 
1993 Z-Score 
Prob >0.5 
Auditor Judgment 
75,706 
125,331 
1,831 
1,469 
64,588 
14,963 
625 
987 
142,750 
142.750 
2004 Z-Score 
Prob >0.5 
Auditor Judgment 
52,551 
125,331 
474^ 
1,469 
87,743 
14,963 
1,982^ 
987 
142,750 
142.750 
1974 O-Score 
Prob >0.5 
Auditor Judgment 
246,638 
251,410 
3,909 
2,017 
51,468 
46,696 
277 
1,549 
302,292 
301,672 
2004 O-Score 
Prob >0.5 
Auditor Judgment 
204,709 
251,410 
2,092 
2,017 
93,397 
46,696 
2,094^ 
1,549 
302,292 
301,672 
Shumway’s 
Score – 50% 
Auditor Judgment 
79,483^ 
77,734 
1,171 
908 
962^ 
2,711 
195 
458 
81,811 
81,811 
Shumway’s 
Score – 70% 
Auditor Judgment 
79,784^ 
77,734 
1,232 
908 
661^ 
2,711 
134 
458 
81,811 
81,811 
Merton’s EDF – 
50% 
Auditor Judgment 
39,087 
60,341 
141^ 
787 
23,701 
2,447 
1,058^ 
412 
63,987 
63,987 
Merton’s EDF – 
70% 
Auditor Judgment 
43,358 
60,341 
206^ 
787 
19,430 
2,447 
993^ 
412 
63,987 
63,987 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning 
was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year; Type I 
indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a 
warning was issued but the firm did not file bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III 
indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. 
Where possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. 
^ indicates prediction counts that are more accurate than historic GCOs in a given sample 
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Recent regulation requires management to make a going concern assertion and 
defines the auditor’s role of testing these assertions. My research examines the 
usefulness of BPMs in testing management assertions. Results from my testing suggest 
that BPMs may be useful as a screening tool in the planning stage of an audit. Auditors 
could use discriminate analysis BPMs (such as the 1968 or 2004 Altman Z-Score) in the 
planning stage of the audit to identify a large pool of distressed firms based on 
probability thresholds established by regulation. However, if auditors use these BMPs for 
planning and testing, auditor judgment would still be necessary to reduce the number of 
Type II errors in final GCO opinions.  The Shumway Hazard model predicts fewer 
bankruptcies overall, thus limiting Type II errors. However, historical auditor judgment 
does a better job predicting bankruptcies and limiting Type I errors. Merton’s Distance to 
Default also has a lower Type I error rate with a high Type II error rate compared to 
auditor judgment. This model also suffers from sample loss due to data availability. This 
model may be less practical than the Z-Score. 
Beyond testing the precision of bankruptcy models, proposing that these models be 
used as analytical procedures in the planning stage of the audit environment introduces 
the concept of materiality to the usefulness of the models. My research examined the 
sensitivity of BMP-based decisions in an environment where immaterial misstatements 
may exist. The results of the models’ financial data with simulated errors is discussed by 
model in Chapter 4. Overall, bright-line decisions based on the models were sensitive to 
manipulations set at the threshold of commonly used quantitative materiality thresholds. 
This suggests that auditors should reduce common quantitative materiality thresholds 
during audit planning for firms identified as having net loss, little net income, or at high 
risk for default. Overall, the simulation results provide evidence that the models would 
perform as expected in the planning stage of an audit, but if misstatements are identified 
judgments of uncertainty should be reassessed regardless of materiality.  
5.2 Part 2: Discussion of Results of Cost Estimation 
 The first part of this research examines the precision of four types of BPMs by 
count and percentages of Type I and Type II errors and the sensitivity of each model to 
manipulations at the level of planning materiality. In the second part, I calculated CAR 
over several windows surrounding historical auditors’ reports and subsequent 
bankruptcies or 10-K filings. I compared the results of the change in stock price for each 
error type. The distribution of CAR was non-normal. I graphed the distribution and 
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gained confidence that Type I errors were much more costly in the market than Type II 
errors. Looking at the results over a 95% confidence interval supports this conclusion. I 
found that the results were not sensitive to the window used, so I applied the mean 
change in stock price over a five-day window at the auditors’ report in time t and the 
subsequent auditors’ report or bankruptcy filing. The results suggest that BMP 
usefulness should be evaluated based on more than precision count and error 
percentages.  
Table 5.2 summarizes the sum and mean change in estimated market 
capitalization over a 5-day window for each error type given the bright-line decisions 
from Part 1. Historical GCO’s, the Shumway model, and the Merton model result in the 
lowest mean cost across all companies. However, note that the total estimated market 
cost of Type II errors is higher than the cost of Type I errors for the 1993 Z-Score, 2004 
Z-Score, the Shumway’s hazard model, and the Merton’s distance to default. Overall, 
the total change in market capitalization is only positive using the actual auditor 
decisions. This provides evidence that going concern opinions based on auditor 
judgment, not the BMPs tested, results in the highest market valuation. These results 
provide evidence to support the continued use of auditor judgment over the application 
of bright-line testing for GCO decisions.
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Table 5.2 Summary of Changes in Market Cost Estimated by Applying CAR to Market Capitalization over a 5-Day Window (in 
thousands of dollars) 
Bright-Line Test  No Error: 
Correctly 
Predicted 
Surviving 
Firm 
Type I Error: 
Bankrupt Firms 
with No 
Warnings 
Type II Error: 
Surviving Firms 
with Predicted 
Bankruptcies 
No Error: 
Correctly 
Predicted 
Bankruptcy 
Total 
Historical Auditor 
Judgment 
Sum 
Mean 
$4,758 
$0 
($2,164) 
($25) 
($528) 
($1) 
($674) 
($27) 
$1,392 
($0) 
1968 Z-Score <1.8 
 
Sum 
Mean 
38,587 
2 
(2,218) 
(43) 
(1,499,572) 
(113) 
(35,268) 
(102) 
(1,498,470) 
(46) 
1993 Z-Score Prob 
>0.5 
Sum 
Mean 
58,891 
3 
(3,360,133) 
(335) 
(808) 
(13) 
(25,637) 
(76) 
(3,327,687) 
(103) 
2004 Z-Score Prob 
>0.5 
Sum 
Mean 
0 
0 
(31,396,475) 
(981) 
0 
0 
(39,717) 
(100) 
(31,436,192) 
(970) 
1980 O-Score Prob 
>0.5 
Sum 
Mean 
932 
0 
(13,794) 
(30) 
(423,119) 
(35) 
(54,815) 
(543) 
(490,796) 
(20) 
2004 O-Score Prob 
>0.5 
Sum 
Mean 
19 
0 
(26) 
(4)^ 
(473,136) 
(20) 
82,434) 
(148) 
(555,577) 
(23) 
Shumway’s Score 
– 50% 
Sum 
Mean 
8,512 
0 
(39,398) 
(80) 
(7,708) 
(29) 
(3,453) 
(51) 
(42,047) 
(2) 
Merton’s EDF – 
50% 
Sum 
Mean 
83,596 
1 
(24,296) 
(78) 
(5,468) 
(2) 
(83,405) 
(94) 
(29,573) 
0 
Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a going concern (i.e. no warning was issued) in year t and no bankruptcies 
were filed in the subsequent year; Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was identified as a going concern, but 
subsequently filed bankruptcy; Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a warning was issued but the firm did not file 
bankruptcy within 730 days; Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 730 days before a bankruptcy filing. Where 
possible, firm-level variables are consistent with Compustat labels. 
^ indicates mean change in market capitalization is lower than historic auditor judgment 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
One goal of this dissertation is to identify patterns in the data that suggest future 
inferences that are interesting to regulators, preparers, auditors, or other stakeholders. 
My results suggest several important inferences. First, Table 9.1 suggests that bright-
line testing using four BPMs would warn investors about more bankruptcies while 
simultaneously issuing many more warnings for firms that would survive. GCOs issued 
by auditors resulted in fewer bankruptcies being predicted and fewer “false positive” 
going concern opinions (Type II errors), but more bankruptcy surprises (Type I errors). 
Type II errors are not costless. In looking at a simple proxy for the cost trade-off between 
Type I and Type II errors, my results suggest that bright-line tests for GCOs are not a 
good substitute for auditor judgment. However, they may be a useful compliment if 
employed during the planning stage of an audit.  
In addition, the results demonstrate that going concern predictions based on 
bankruptcy models are sensitive to quantitative thresholds of materiality. Initial 
assessments on GCO uncertainty based on unaudited amounts using these models 
require updating when misstatements are identified even when those misstatements fall 
below common thresholds for quantitative planning materiality. This suggests that the 
common quantitative thresholds should be lowered for at-risk firms for BMPs to be used 
appropriately. 
Finally, the results suggest that my research may inform practice. Regulatory 
agencies have cautioned against setting static quantitative materiality thresholds. My 
results highlight that the use of a bright-line test for all firms may not be appropriate, 
particularly in cases where quantitative planning materiality is set using the 5% of net 
income “rule-of-thumb”. Table 3 also provides support for the practice of setting lower 
materiality thresholds for distressed firms during the planning stages of an audit.  
Several researchers and regulators have suggested the use of analytical tools in 
the planning stage of an audit. My preliminary results suggest that while bankruptcy 
models may highlight distressed firms, they also over-predict bankruptcies. The use of 
bankruptcy models during analytical procedures may be justified for firms with specific 
identifiable features. Further testing will be required to determine if this finding is a 
limitation of only this specific model.   
Furthermore, my results inform default prediction research by exploring a naïve 
model to evaluate BPMs based on the change in overall market value. My results 
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suggest that the usefulness of BPMs need to be evaluated on more than accuracy 
counts because a surprise bankruptcy is costlier in larger firms with higher initial market 
capitalization than in small firms and firms with already low stock prices.  
6.1 Limitations 
I am aware of several limitations to my research. The design of this study is 
limited by the bankruptcy models selected, the availability of data, and the proxies 
available. 
Kurruppu et al. (2003) argues that bankruptcy is not the best proxy for going 
concern given that the debtor-oriented bankruptcy laws in the U.S. They argue that 
statistical models to predict corporate distress and liquidation are better  proxies as 
filing for bankruptcy does not necessarily mean that a company is not a going 
concern. The research argues that a bankrupt company can be regarded as a going 
concern until the resolution of bankruptcy, and that company bankruptcy is less 
costly compared to company liquidation. They further argue that corporate 
bankruptcy is not as costly as liquidation to shareholders and to other stakeholders, 
citing that “50 percent of companies that re‐emerge from bankruptcy generate a 
return that exceeds the return available on benchmark portfolios”.  
I acknowledge that in countries with debtor-oriented insolvency laws (i.e. the 
USA), corporate bankruptcy procedures encourage companies in financial difficulty 
to continue as going concerns (Franks, Nyborg, & Torour, 1996). I further 
acknowledge that companies that file for bankruptcy can either reorganize and 
emerge from bankruptcy or merge with another entity as a going concern (Carson, 
et al., 2013); therefore, filing for bankruptcy is not synonymous with uncertainty of 
the going concern assumption (Schultz, 1995). However, research has shown that 
investors expect GCO’s to predict bankruptcy and respond to GCOs as a signal for 
impending bankruptcy. I follow this large body of expectation gap and going concern 
literatures that use bankruptcy as a proxy for going concern failure. I present data 
highlighting Chapter 7 bankruptcy predictions and error rates for BMP studied.  
While accountants use quantitative analysis to identify potential material 
events and transactions, materiality is not a simple calculation. The SEC warns that 
exclusive reliance on any specific quantitative benchmark for working materiality is 
not appropriate (Vorhies, 2005). By definition, if an amount would change a user’s 
decisions, then that amount is material. Therefore, any amount that changes the 
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bankruptcy decision in a hardline test would be material. However, in practice,  
quantitative materiality thresholds, such as the 5%-rule, are commonly used. 
Therefore, examining the sensitivity of decision outcomes of BPMs during the 
planning stage of audits to set quantitative materiality thresholds is informative.  
Limitations for each BPM’s usefulness exist. Some limitations impact a class 
of BPMs. Discriminate-based models are only as accurate as the data that goes into 
it; therefore, earnings management and fraud affect the usefulness of these 
measures. Other models use market reactions to capture information outside of the 
annual report (good and bad news) that may affect a company’s ability to continue 
as a going concern.  
Limitations are also model specific. For example, the original Z-Score was 
intended to be used among manufacturing firms only (Altman E. I., 1968). The Z-
Score also isn't an effective tool for evaluating new companies with little or no 
earnings. These companies, regardless of their financial health, will score low. 
Moreover, the Z-Score does not directly address the issue of cash flow. Another 
limitation of the Z-Score is volatility. Z-scores can swing from quarter to quarter 
when a company records one-time write-offs. These can change the final score, 
suggesting that a company that's really not at risk is on the brink of bankruptcy.  
I estimate market costs using methods from prior literature. I limit my 
estimation of the cost of going concern opinions and bankruptcies to the impact of 
these announcements on stock prices. This estimation method provides some 
information about the overall costs in changes of prediction accuracy. Other costs 
associated with Type I and Type II errors are ignored in this estimation. I 
acknowledge the conflicting sources of cost between auditors and other 
stakeholders. A Type I error is misclassifying a failed company as non ‐failed and are 
costliest to auditors, where it would lead to the possible loss of audit fee, 
professional reputation and litigation from shareholders (Koh, Model Predictions and 
Auditor Assessments of Going Concern Status, 2012). The costs of Type II errors 
(misclassifying a healthy company as failed) to auditors include the loss of 
professional reputation, loss of audit fee, and litigation due to financial injury to the 
client due to the inappropriate audit opinion (Louwers & Richard, 1999). I 
acknowledge that my research considers neither the client retention or litigation 
costs to auditors nor other related costs to employees, creditors, or other 
stakeholders. 
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6.2 Directions for Future Research 
 This research was largely exploratory and initially sought to inform regulators 
about the appropriateness of using statistical BPMs in the planning stage of an audit. I 
established the hypotheses and research design during the discussion of changing 
regulations around the auditing of going concern opinions. These questions remain 
relevant as the subsequent issuance of SAS No. 132 provides general testing guidance, 
does not address specific testing for assessing going concern risk through analytical 
procedures. My dissertation provides empirical evidence of the sensitivity of BPMs in the 
planning stage of an audit due to its unique environment concerning materiality. 
However, my tests were limited to certain seminal models within the research. As 
models that are more current emerge, research should consider how each of these 
models would perform in this environment. After all, BPMs are only as good as the data 
that they are built from and the financial statements used in the planning stage contain 
(by definition) unaudited and unverified amounts. 
This research also builds on Mai’s 2010 dissertation from Rutgers University that 
identifies the same BMPs for testing. Like so many researchers, Mai assesses the 
precision of the models using a simple count of errors. Not only does count fail to 
consider the difference in cost to different classes of stakeholders between types of 
errors, but it also fails to consider the enterprise value of the firms underlying the errors. 
If a model is better able to catch a bankruptcy for a larger and more highly-valued firm, 
that model may be more useful for auditor decision making models that perform well in 
predicting failures among start-up companies. My research provides empirical evidence 
of one other evaluation scheme: a naïve costing model based on changes in market 
capitalization using an estimate of CAR. Further research is needed to address the 
relative usefulness of specific models for new firms, large firms, and firms with negative 
net income.  
My research explores one model for estimating costs of errors within publicly 
traded markets. Additional models for estimating market costs related to privately held 
companies should be examined. This study also ignores switching and litigation costs. 
Researchers should take up the call to develop a more comprehensive model for 
estimating costs for all stakeholders.    
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6.3 Conclusion 
Results suggest that BPMs provide a quantitative measure of going concern 
uncertainty, which may be important for documentation in the planning stage of an audit. 
The results also highlight a tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors and suggests 
additional information and auditor judgment is necessary to eliminate excessive Type II 
errors. Assuming misstatements at the magnitude of “material misstatements” under 
common materiality thresholds influenced accuracy of going concern predictions. When 
misstatements are identified auditors using these models as analytical procedures 
should update their Going Concern uncertainty assessments. This suggests that 
materiality thresholds may be set too high when assessing going concern uncertainty 
during the planning stages of an audit.  
My study informs the ongoing debate over auditors' responsibility to predict 
bankruptcies and warn investors by issuing a going concern opinion. I test the inherent 
limitations of the information environment and current prediction models. The trade-off 
between Type I and Type II errors does not justify the use of BPMs as a bright-line test 
in the absence of auditor judgment. At most, these models may be useful in the planning 
stage of an audit to provide quantitative documentation for firms that are low-risk. While 
accuracy rates and the cost of errors has been explored in the literature, the difference 
in my research and prior studies is that I used simulation to test the sensitivity of the 
models to detect bankruptcies given commonly used quantitative materially thresholds. 
Investigating quantitative materiality levels provides information about the impact of 
materiality thresholds on the use of these models as analytical tools in the planning 
stage of an audit. I am unable to make normative conclusions about the equilibrium; 
rather this research provides evidence that, given current predictive models and 
common thresholds for “material misstatements”, I fail to find a model where the cost 
trade-off between Type I and Type II errors improves by substituting bright-line testing 
for auditor judgment. I identified no model that could replace auditor judgment, certain 
models—where data is available-- may be useful in the planning phase of an audit to 
provide quantitative documentation of going concern uncertainty testing. Discriminate 
analysis models come with a high total market cost of failure and auditor judgment is 
necessary to limit Type II errors. Merton’s Distance to Default and Shumway’s Hazard 
Model limit Type II errors, but fail to timely identify bankruptcies better than auditor 
judgments. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A Glossary 
Term Definition 
BPM Bankruptcy prediction models are a set of financial models 
that are used to predict the likelihood of default.  
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy A straight or liquidating bankruptcy that can clear away 
many types of unsecure debt with no plan for restructuring. 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy A form of bankruptcy that involves reorganization giving a 
debtor a fresh start and keeps the business in operation to 
pay creditors over time. 
Chapter 15 Bankruptcy Means to deal with insolvency cases involving debtors, 
assets, claimants, and other parties of interest involving 
more than one country. This case is generally ancillary to a 
primary proceeding brought in another country. 
MDA Multiple discriminant analysis. Statistical method in finance 
models used to evaluate multiple variables at once. 
Type 0  Type 0 indicates that a firm was correctly identified as a 
going concern (i.e. no warning was issued) in year t and no 
bankruptcies were filed in the subsequent year. 
Type I Error Type I indicates a firm with a Type I error where a firm was 
identified as a going concern, but subsequently filed 
bankruptcy within 730 days. 
Type II Error Type II indicates a firm with a Type II error, where a GCO 
warning was issued, but the firm did not file bankruptcy 
within 730 days.  
Type III Type III indicates a firm with a GCO warning issued within 
730 days before a bankruptcy filing. 
CAR Cumulative Abnormal Return is the sum or the differences 
between the expected return on a stock and the actual 
return over a defined time window. 
SCAR Average standardized cumulative abnormal return across 
all firms.  
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Appendix B Variable definitions 
Variable Description 
GCO Indicator GCO Indicator equals 1 for firms with going concern 
qualifications in the audit report. 
Bankruptcy Indicator Bankruptcy Indicator equals 1 for firms with a bankruptcy filed 
within 730 days of the audit report filing date.  
AT Total Assets 
ACT Total Current Assets 
LT Total Liabilities 
LCT Total Current Liabilities 
NI Net Income 
EDF Expected Default Frequency, probability of default expressed 
as a percentage.  
MU Expected Asset Return 
VDIF ASSETVOL – Penultimate VA 
ASSETVOL Volatility of Total Market Capitalization 
F Current Debt 
RE Retained Earnings 
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes 
ROA Return on Assets 
LM Leverage Measure. Total Liabilities/Total Assets 
N Number of firms-year observations 
CHSO Common Shares Outstanding 
PRCC_F Price per share of common stock at fiscal year end 
ΔMRKTCAP  Change in Market Total Capitalization = (CAR x CHSO x 
PRCC_F) 
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